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 VICTIMS WHO DO NOT COOPERATE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE INCIDENTS 
Anne L. Stahl, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007is dissertation examined extralegal factors that predicted the likelihood of victim non-
operation in domestic violence incidents and whether the type of arrest policy influenced the 
ds of non-cooperation when the nature of the victim/offender relationship and the type of 
mestic assault were considered.  National Incident Based Reporting System data (2003) was 
ed to investigate whether there was evidence contained in the incident level data routinely 
ported by law enforcement that would reliably predict whether a victim would be unwilling to 
operate with police in an incident of domestic violence.  The multivariate analyses used 
cident characteristics as predictors of victim non-cooperation with the police at the scene, 
cluding offender demographics, number of offenders, presence of a weapon, incident location, 
mber of victims, victim demographics, victim injury, victim's relationship to the offender, and 
cident clearance method. The victim’s domestic relationship to the offender was characterized 
 a family relationship (related by blood or marriage) or an intimate relationship.  Logistic 
gression was employed to determine whether there was evidence contained in the that would 
liably predict that a victim would be unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement and whether 
at evidence was influenced by the restrictiveness of the domestic violence arrest policy.  The 
ajor finding of this study was that the victim's relationship to the offender played a central role 
 determining the likelihood of non-cooperation.  The odds of a victim not cooperating with 
lice increased significantly if the victim was an intimate partner versus a family member; these 
iv 
odds increased with the restrictiveness of the arrest policy.  For incidents involving domestic 
violence, states typically use civil code to define the victim's relationship to the offender and 
criminal code to define the offense.  The current trend among states' amending constitutions in 
order to define legally recognized civil relationships could affect whether or not domestic 
violence laws will apply to unmarried individuals in intimate relationships.  Changes resulting in 
the legal exclusion of intimate victims from the protections of domestic violence legislation in a 
state may affect victim decision making, perhaps reducing the number of such incidents that 
come to the attention of law enforcement. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Over the last thirty years, domestic violence has become an increasingly visible and important 
social issue.  Public awareness began to develop in the 1960s when child abuse was identified as 
a major problem. Until the 1970s domestic violence was rarely acknowledged as a social 
problem.  There were no shelters, hotlines or laws specific to battering.  But with new laws, 
shelters, organizations, services, and research focused on domestic violence, it has emerged as a 
major social problem that is now handled through the criminal justice system.  This shift in focus 
has created new dilemmas and problems (Ferraro, 1989).  Among them is the gap between 
legislation and how law enforcement responds to domestic violence incidents (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 2003).   
In the late 1970's, states began to enact laws providing for civil court orders of protection 
from domestic violence.  Changes began to occur, although slowly, in the administration of 
justice beginning with police recognition that domestic violence was a significant problem 
(Miller, 2005).  By 1980, domestic violence legislation had been passed by 47 states mandating 
changes in protection orders, allowing warrantless arrest for misdemeanor domestic assaults, and 
recognizing a history of abuse as part of a battered woman's legal defense for killing her husband 
(Fagan, 1996).   
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In an attempt to make arrest and prosecution of domestic abusers easier, states passed 
new arrest policies including mandatory arrest, "pro-arrest", and “preferred” arrest laws 
(Bachman & Saltzman, 1995; Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, & Rogan, 1992).  Advances in criminal 
law relating to domestic violence can be seen in the adoption of antistalking laws in 50 states 
where there were none in 1989, the repeal or limitation of states’ spousal exception laws in rape 
cases, and passage of new family battery laws that provide unique penalties in family-related 
assault and battery cases.  Additionally, hundreds of legal sanctions were either enacted or 
changed between 1997 and 2002 and some states created a new crime of domestic violence 
(Miller, 2004).  Statutory revisions included increasing the relationships covered by the domestic 
violence statutes (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  Virtually all states now have statutes that require 
an aggressive police response to parents, children, siblings, other family members (such as 
cousins, grandparents), and intimate partners, including current and former spouses, current 
boy/girlfriends, and homosexual relationships (Buzawa & Hotaling, 2006). 
One of the key concerns among researchers and theorists today is whether or not these 
laws have had an impact on domestic violence incidents and what role law enforcement 
responses play in the outcomes of domestic violence incidents.  In addressing the problem of 
domestic violence, the focus has been on the application of legal sanctions through arrest and 
prosecution of assailants or the threat of legal sanctions through civil legal remedies, such as 
protection orders, that carry criminal penalties if violated (Fagan, 1996).   
Domestic violence arrest policies can be classified into three general categories; 
mandatory, preferred, or discretionary.  In 21 states and the District of Columbia police arrest is 
required (mandatory) when the officer determines that probable cause exists.  In 8 states, an 
arrest for domestic violence is the preferred action.  Discretionary domestic violence arrest 
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policies exist in the remaining 21 states.  States that employ discretionary arrest policies allow 
police officers to make a misdemeanor arrest without a warrant based on a police officer's 
determination that probable cause exists to believe that an act of domestic violence has occurred 
(police discretion); legislation in some of these states require an arrest without a warrant if the 
victim has an order of protection on file (Miller, 2004). 
The increased legislative attention to the problem of domestic violence has resulted in a 
wide variety of statutory arrest models among the states.  Some laws, such as permitting 
warrantless arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence cases, serve to make arrest and 
prosecution of abusers easier (Miller, 1998).  Others supplement the protections provided by the 
new arrest laws by integrating civil protective laws with criminal laws to protect abused spouses 
and other family members.  For example, in almost all states, violation of a court order of 
protection is a crime; in some states the violation is a felony, in others a misdemeanor.  Police 
officers are authorized to arrest protection order violators without a warrant, based on a 
determination of probable cause (Miller, 2004).   
From a legal perspective, the definition of domestic violence involves both the offense 
and the offender.  Typically, the offenses that are considered to be domestic violence are 
specified in a state's penal code, and the criminal laws rely on the definition of domestic 
relationship that is used in the states' civil law codes (Miller, 2005).   
In short, two types of policy reforms have characterized criminal justice responses to 
family violence.  One type is aimed at procedures and jurisprudential issues to increase the 
participation of battered women in the criminal justice process and to simplify the procedure.  
The other type of reform targeted specific measures to stop the violence by legally sanctioning 
the offenders.  The theory underlying these reforms, deterrence theory, was that domestic 
 3
violence could be stopped through legal sanctions and that these legal sanctions would be 
effective in reducing the incidence of violent acts. Reflective of the interdependency of legal 
institutions (police and courts), the interventions to control domestic violence reflect different 
policy goals and separate but parallel tracks: criminal punishment and deterrence of batterers, 
and protective interventions designed to insure victims' safety and empowerment (Fagan, 1996). 
It is well known that police practice often deviates from legal standards and that there is a 
gap between the law on the books and the law in action (Hoyle, 1998).  There is not much 
congruence between mandatory arrest laws for domestic assault and police enforcement of those 
laws (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  Despite the prominent existence of mandatory and proarrest 
policies among the states, law enforcement continues to fail to make an arrest in the majority of 
domestic violence cases.  Although the likelihood of arrest has been found to be higher in 
jurisdictions that have employed a mandatory arrest policy (versus those who have employed 
less restrictive domestic violence arrest policies), a recent study found the average arrest risk to 
be only about 50%, lending credence to claims that there continues to be considerable police 
discretion regarding the decision to arrest in these cases (Eitle, 2005).   
It is widely accepted that police base their decisions on situational characteristics of an 
incident (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  One of those decisions is how to resolve, or clear, a 
reported crime.  An incident can be cleared by arrest or by exceptional means. Exceptional 
means, such as death of the offender or unwillingness of the victim to cooperate, is used when 
police determine that an element beyond law enforcement control prevents the filing of formal 
charges against the offender.  The lack of victim cooperation at the incident scene can result in 
police clearing the incident using an exceptional means code.  
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Despite the importance of cooperation of victims, there is little to no discussion of the 
role played by the victim's cooperation or lack of cooperation with the police (Hoyle, 1998).  If 
the victim is uncooperative at the arrest level, the victim’s reluctance to co-operate, for whatever 
reason, will probably result in the police not pursuing the case.  When this happens, it is unlikely 
that the rest of the criminal justice system will ever have any opportunity to play any a role in the 
case creating incidents that are hidden whose victims become “invisible”.   
The dynamics of domestic violence situations are complex.  Any combination of factors 
may influence a victim of domestic abuse and render that victim unwilling to cooperate with the 
police as they investigate an incident of domestic assault.  As gatekeepers of the criminal justice 
system, police implement and interpret the law and decide whether or not an incident becomes 
part of the official record.  Thus, police discretion determines who enters into criminal 
proceedings as either the alleged criminal or the complainant (Sparks, 1997). 
Thus, the initial impact of police discretion cannot be separated from the impact of other 
justice system components such as prosecutors, courts, prison, probation, and parole (Sparks, 
1997).  Once an incident is cleared using exceptional means, the door to the rest of the criminal 
justice system is closed with regard to this incident.  While we know that an exceptional 
clearance ends the justice system involvement with the incident, we do not know how frequently 
this occurs.  The combination of victim non-cooperation and police discretion may serve to 
diminish the intended effect that arrest legislation might have on addressing the problem of 
domestic violence.   
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1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Very generally, domestic violence is defined as a pattern of coercive behavior by a 
spouse or intimate partner to gain power and control.  The problem is exceptionally serious for 
women, the majority of the victims in incidents of domestic violence.  In contrast to other forms 
of violence, domestic violence is often a recurring event between individuals in daily contact, 
usually without the visibility to others that would be available in public spaces.  In this context, 
threats can be readily conveyed and quite believable, while making it very difficult to use legal 
sanctions to create a deterrent threat within a context of ongoing and unsupervised contact 
between the victim and the perpetrator (Fagan, 1996).   
As reforms have been enacted and new aggressive arrest policies enforced, offenders 
began to be held accountable for behavior that had previously been ignored.  Reforms targeted at 
improving responsiveness to victims simultaneously reduced the degree of process that had been 
previously accorded to suspects at a crime scene (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  Even so, domestic 
violence continues to be a serious problem in the United States. 
The risk of domestic violence victimization is much higher for women than men.  
Estimates from national victimization surveys, which use nationally representative samples to 
estimate the prevalence of domestic violence, provide insight regarding the gender distribution of 
victims.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS), women reported six times as many incidents of violence as men (Bachman & 
Saltzman, 1995) and 85 percent of 1 million violent crimes that were committed against intimate 
partners involved women as victims (Rennison & Welchans, 2000).  Additionally, 22 percent of 
all female victims of violence were attacked by an intimate partner, compared to 3 percent of 
male victims (Rennison & Welchans, 2000).  NCVS estimates indicate that while domestic 
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violence exists in all racial, ethnic, and economic groups, it is more prevalent in low-income and 
urban households.  Domestic violence is most commonly used against women ages 20 through 
24, but women ages 35 through 49 are most vulnerable to being murdered by an intimate partner 
(Rennison, 2002).   
Estimates from the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAW) reveal that men's 
use of physical assault was 3 times the rate of women's and that 1.8 million women are 
victimized by intimate partners each year compared to 1 million men (Tjaden & Theonnes, 
2000).  Additionally, the consequences for female victims are more serious than for male 
victims.  Almost one-third (29 percent) of all female homicide victims in 1997 were killed by an 
intimate partner, a rate that remained relatively constant between 1976 and 1997 (Owens-
Manley, 1999), compared to 6 percent of all male homicides (Rennison & Welchans, 2000).   
Victim preference for arrest has been credited for the largest variances in arrest rates 
(Berk & Loeske, 1980; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996; Feder, 1996; Smith & Klein, 1984; Worden & 
Pollitz, 1984).  “In all but mandatory arrest jurisdictions, an informal operational requirement for 
a domestic assault arrest is the victim’s desire for the arrest” (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003, p.148).  
In fact, in the past, most jurisdictions had policies that discouraged arrest without victim 
concurrence (Bell 1984).  
Research on victim cooperation has largely been measured by victim preference for arrest 
(Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  In this context, victim “cooperation” at the scene influences arrest 
decisions (Berk & Loeske, 1980; Buzawa & Austin, 1993; Smith, 1987).  Police officers know 
that without a victim's cooperation, the case is likely to be dismissed or the perpetrator acquitted 
for lack of evidence (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).   
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1.2.1 Victim reluctance to cooperate   
Victims of domestic violence may have personal interests that conflict with the interests 
of the criminal justice system.  Victims of domestic violence have emotional ties to their 
perpetrators, which may lead them toward rational objectives when invoking legal sanctions.  
Victims of domestic violence may more be more concerned with using legal institutions to 
guarantee their own safety, surviving economically, protecting their children, or getting 
counseling help for their assailants than with deterrence or punishing their assailant (Ford, 1991).  
If victim choices about invoking legal sanctions are associated less with punishment and 
deterrence and more with seeking to use the law for other goals, the social control functions of 
the law are compromised even though victim needs are being met (Fagan, 1996).  Thus, there are 
many reasons why victims of domestic violence may decide that the costs and risks of 
cooperating with police outweigh the potential consequences for their assailants or benefits for 
themselves (Hart, 2005). 
In incidents involving domestic violence, victims are faced with a dynamic situation that 
seems unpredictable, uncontrollable and that may present a threat to their safety and/or the safety 
of family members.  A situation like this requires the victim to operate in a continual process of 
assessment of risk, evaluation of actions, and reassessment of the situation.  This evaluation 
process involves a sequence of decisions made quickly and under conditions of uncertainty and 
stress.  Decision processes in uncertain situations, such as incidents of domestic violence, differ 
significantly from those used in routine day-to-day activities.  
Studies of decision making that have focused on the reasoning processes of individuals 
lend insight to the dynamics of these decision processes (Weick, 1993).  The process is driven 
both by the context of the uncertainty and by the limits of human information processing 
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capacity (Simon, 1996).  The victim of domestic violence is engaged in making sense of the 
situation from his/her point of view.  Knowing the circumstances that led up to the incident, the 
victim is making decisions about what actions to take in the interest of both present and future 
personal safety (and perhaps that of family members) while interpreting physical and verbal cues 
from other actors involved in the situation.  This becomes an ongoing process of decision-
making based on the victim's knowledge of the factors surrounding the immediate incident, the 
factors experienced in past incidents, and the victim's perception of what could occur both 
immediately and in the future.  When a victim experiences injury or perceives a threat of injury 
in the future, that victim may decide that the costs of certain actions outweigh the benefits of 
these actions.   
The sensemaking process involves the understanding of many different and 
interdependent factors that must be integrated with the specifics and timing of the circumstances 
surrounding the problem (Weick, 1995).  In situations involving domestic violence, levels of 
knowledge and experience with these situations vary greatly among victims as well as police 
officers.  Limited timeframes and the volatility of these incidents lead to high-pressure situations 
in which sensemaking processes must be employed before victim decision making occurs.  For 
the victim, decision-making becomes the skill of selecting among alternatives based on 
evaluations that determine how much more sense one option makes than another in the situation. 
A belief that is espoused may or may not be reflected in a person's behavior in a 
particular situation (Argyris & Schon, 1996).  This concept is especially important when 
considering that a large part of the complexity involved with the victim's decision-making 
environment is the intimate relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.  The victim's 
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decision as to whether or not to cooperate with police may actually appear to serve to protect the 
assailant rather than their own safety and/or the safety and welfare of other family members. 
Further defining the context in which a victim of domestic violence must operate in sense 
making and decision making is the policy environment, specifically the domestic violence policy 
protocols that are applied by law enforcement and the justice system in the jurisdiction in which 
the incident takes place.  A victim in a domestic violence incident is facing a complex and 
uncertain situation, is continuously optimizing; the victim becomes a "satisficer" making choices 
that are "good enough" because the best choice in the situation is unknowable (Simon, 1996).  
While victims of domestic violence face uncertainty about their future and that of their family, 
they must decide what the costs will be associated with cooperating with police, further limiting 
their ability to make a fully rational decision.   
In incidents involving domestic violence, the victims have only "bounded rationality"; 
they are forced to make decisions by setting an aspiration level that they feel they are able to 
achieve and that they will be happy enough with in their "bounded" and uncertain real world 
(Simon 1996).  In making a decision as to whether or not to cooperate with law enforcement, the 
victim is weighing a number of factors including safety, situational barriers, demographics, 
possible future involvement with the justice system, and police discretion. 
Victims of domestic violence fear retaliation, and rightfully so.  Although not all batterers 
engage in escalated violence between the time of arrest and prosecution proceedings, as many as 
half threaten retaliatory violence (Davis et al., 1990) and nearly one third of batterers may inflict 
additional assaults during the pre-disposition phase of prosecution (Hart, 2005).  Victims of 
domestic violence may be at a higher risk of violent assault after intervention by the criminal 
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justice system (Hart, 2005).  Battered women are most often killed when they attempt to seek 
legal remedies or to leave an abusive partner (Browne, 1987).   
Many victims of domestic violence need protection in order to remain safe during their 
participation with the criminal justice system.  Battered victims may be much more concerned 
about preventing future violence than in punishing their assailant for the crimes previously 
committed.  The victim's concern about future safety may create conflict with the criminal justice 
system interests of winning criminal convictions.  Some of these victims may feel that exposing 
their perpetrator to the criminal justice system and its coercive controls will facilitate, rather than 
deter, future violence (Hart, 2005). 
1.2.2 Police discretion.   
In the United States, law enforcement is part of an incident-driven criminal justice 
system, responding uniformly to incidents of domestic violence without examining the 
motivations and consequences of such acts.  Police intervention in cases of domestic violence 
requires a designation of a specific unit of time, an incident.  The “incident” is abstracted from 
the context, the history of the relationship of the victim and the offender.  Consequently, when 
police respond to an incident of domestic violence, any pattern of escalating violence is not 
considered relevant (Miller S., 2005). 
Arrest is only one of the options available to police when responding to these incidents.  
Police also have the ability to clear an incident by exceptional means indicating that there is 
some reason outside law enforcement control that prevents arresting, charging, and prosecuting 
the offender.  In order to clear an incident by exceptional means, all of the following conditions 
must be met: 
• The investigation must have established the identity of the offender, 
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• There must be sufficient information to support an arrest, charge, and turning over 
to the court for prosecution, and  
• The exact location of the offender known so that the subject could be taken into 
custody immediately. 
As street-level bureaucrats, law enforcement officers are public workers who interact 
directly with citizens in implementing and delivering public policies. Although most of these 
officers probably regard their work as a technical job far from the political arena, they are 
important actors in the policy implementation process.  Law enforcement officers, as street-level 
bureaucrats, often have substantial discretion in performing their duties.  Victims perceive the 
way law enforcement officers enforce regulations to be the law.  The discretion that law 
enforcement officers have in enforcing the law creates a version of the public policy that, in 
practice, may misrepresent its original intended goals.  In this way, the policy-making process is 
inverted and street-level bureaucrats such as law enforcement officers become important policy-
makers (Lipsey, 1980). 
There is some controversy surrounding the implementation of aggressive arrest policies, 
that is, legally requiring police to arrest in incidents of domestic violence.  Although there have 
been major administrative pressures to increase the role of arrest in incidents involving domestic 
violence, for the most part arrest is not routine when officers respond to a domestic call (Buzawa 
& Buzawa, 2003).   
Some want to hold law enforcement accountable for executing the government’s mandate 
to protect citizens.  However, even though police have a clear mandate to enforce the law, as 
agents of social control, they possess considerable autonomy in how they exercise their power 
(Sparks, 1997).  Police can make a variety of decisions in cases of domestic violence.  They can 
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choose whether to “act” or “not to act” when responding to an incident, resulting in the 
difference between making an arrest and not making an arrest.   
Some argue that police decisions regarding arrest are largely due to an overwhelming 
police bias against arrest (Bayley 1986; Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003), while others assert that 
victim unreliability due to withdrawal of statements is a myth promoted by police to make 
excuses for this bias (Faragher 1985).  It has also been argued that police are more willing to 
arrest perpetrators who have committed crimes against more influential victims; parties to any 
domestic dispute, particularly female victims, are by definition non-influential (McConville, 
Sanders, & Leng, 1991).  There are also those who claim that police show special leniency 
toward male suspects in domestic assaults (Buzawa et.al., 1995; Dobash & Dobash, 1979).  It is 
argued that this approach serves to perpetuate the problem of domestic assault.  Donald Black 
(1976) proposed that the degree of intimacy affects the "quantity of law".  The greater the 
relational distance (the less intimacy) between adversaries, the more likely the police are to make 
an arrest in the incident; police are most likely to make an arrest in a violent incident that 
involves strangers and least likely to arrest suspects in family disputes. 
From the police perspective, it is important to consider the investment that police make in 
their arrests (Sparks, 1997).  One of the factors cited as contributing to police reluctance in 
making an arrest in incidents involving male violence against female partners is the belief that 
arrests in domestic incidents fail to result in successful prosecutions (Buzawa & Austin, 1993; 
Ferraro, 1989; Sparks, 1997).  If the victim is unwilling to initiate a complaint, police may use 
exceptional means to clear the incident regardless of the seriousness of the attack because, 
without the victim's cooperation, there is little chance of a successful prosecution (Buzawa & 
Austin, 1993). 
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Police also want to make "good" arrests; good arrests are those that result in felony 
convictions.  Because domestic assault is usually charged as a misdemeanor, the arrest does not 
have the same prestige in the police subculture ((Buzawa & Austin, 1993)).   
1.3 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
While research into the issue of domestic violence, and violence against women in particular, has 
been voluminous, there has been little research looking at the effects of police discretion and/or 
victim non-cooperation (Hoyle, 1998).  Furthermore, legislative efforts to limit police discretion 
in incidents involving domestic violence may not ensure a standardized response; officer 
discretion may be redirected in order to circumvent requirements (Manning, 1997).  At the same 
time, many victims of domestic violence are fearful of future retaliatory violence targeted at 
themselves or members of their family if they do cooperate with police in the arrest of their 
perpetrator.   
The incident characteristics of domestic violence incidents cleared using exceptional 
means due to the unwillingness of the victim to cooperate with police may differ from those not 
resolved in this manner.  This study aims to identify whether certain extralegal factors predict the 
likelihood of victim noncooperation in incidents involving domestic violence and, controlling for 
each general type of domestic assault arrest policy (mandatory, preferred, discretionary), the 
extralegal factors that predict the likelihood of victim noncooperation in incidents involving 
domestic violence.  In particular, this dissertation sets forth the following specific research 
questions: 
Before and after controlling for the for the dominant domestic violence arrest policy: 
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1. How does a victim's relationship to the offender, intimate versus family, affect the odds 
of an incident of domestic violence being cleared due to victim noncooperation? 
2. How does the seriousness of the incident affect the odds of an incident of domestic 
violence being cleared due to victim noncooperation and do these odds vary when 
controlling for victim/offender relationship? 
3. How does the vulnerability of the victim affect the odds of an incident of domestic 
violence being cleared due to victim noncooperation and how does the victim/offender 
relationship affect these odds? 
4. How does the characterization of the incident being a sexual assault affect the odds of an 
incident of domestic violence being cleared due to victim noncooperation and do these 
odds vary when controlling for victim/offender relationship? 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I discuss the emergence of 
naming domestic violence as a serious social problem in the United States, dividing the issue into 
public matters versus private matters in order to explain how women and children's relegation to 
the private sphere of the home resulted in their legal and social subordination, thus putting them 
at a higher risk of being victims of domestic violence.  In Chapter 3, I present the two major 
theoretical perspectives on domestic violence, the family violence perspective and the feminist 
perspective, and their contributions to our current understanding of the issue.  In Chapter 4, I 
describe how domestic violence is defined in terms of state policy and how the domestic 
violence arrest statutes might influence arrest outcomes in incidents involving domestic violence.  
In Chapter 5, I delineate the scope of the research, and describe the data set and how these data 
will be used to answer the research questions.  In Chapter 6, I discuss the results of both 
descriptive analyses of the data, and of the logistic regressions.  In the final chapter, I apply the 
results of this study in my discussion of the theoretical and practical policy implications. 
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2.0  BACKGROUND 
2.1 PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC 
In order to understand domestic violence as a social issue, it is important to place its emergence 
of being defined as a social problem in a historical context.  Violence in the home is not new.   
Spouse abuse, wife abuse in particular, has always existed and many of the Christian leaders of 
the European settlers of colonial America sanctioned wife beating; English Common Law 
accepted it (Felter, 1997).  In patriarchal societies, males had the right to control their wives and 
children; in most societies the patriarch of a family had the right to use force against the women 
and children under his control (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  A major shift in ideology has moved 
us from the belief that a man has a God given right to control his woman and his family to a 
belief that domestic violence and intimate partner abuse are criminal acts. 
2.2 PRIVATE  
The family has historically been viewed as a private unit, and the state did not have the right (nor 
the desire) to interfere in family affairs.  This veil of privacy was accompanied by the reality that 
we had existed for centuries as a patriarchal society promoting a tolerance for violence 
perpetuated by men. (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  Violence was viewed as a necessity for 
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maintaining social order.  Family violence was not only accepted but was maintained within a 
male-dominated hierarchy of power with the understanding that “outsiders” were not to become 
involved (Felter, 1997).  
2.2.1 The Private Sphere 
"It is possible, reading standard histories, to forget half the population of the 
country.  The explorers were men, the landholders and merchants men, the 
political leaders men, the military figures men.  The very invisibility of women, 
the overlooking of women, is a sign of their submerged status." (Zinn, 2003, pg. 
103). 
2.2.1.1 Women in the Private Sphere 
Evidence of efforts in this country to cope with violence against women and children can be seen 
as far back as the 1600’s in the Puritan policies.  The Puritans believed that some level of 
violence was necessary to ensure that men could meet their responsibility of maintaining family 
discipline.  The Puritans specified restrictions on its use and created boundaries for what was  
considered to be appropriate in the eyes of God.  Ministers usually resolved allegations of 
domestic abuse and there is little documentation that men were punished for these violations 
(Felter, 1997; Pleck, 1979; Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  During this time period, the fear 
of witchcraft gave men a great deal of social power; they could easily explain their use of 
violence as a means that was necessary to combat the practice of witchcraft.  By 1700, the 
enforcement of Puritan policies regarding domestic abuse had essentially ceased (Kurst-Swanger 
& Petcosky, 2003).  Use of force within the family was considered a private matter that produced 
such policies as the ruling known as William Blackstone’s “rule of thumb”.  In his interpretation 
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of English law, Sir William Blackstone defined the power of authority given to husbands in 
legal, rather than moral, terms (Browne, 1987).  Since the husband was viewed as responsible for 
his wife’s misbehavior, the law found it reasonable to give him the authority to chastise his wife 
just as he would be allowed to discipline his apprentices or children.  The chastisement was to be 
administered within reasonable limits; a husband could beat his wife with a rod no thicker than 
his thumb.  In the early colonies of the United States, the husband was allowed to give his wife 
“lawful and reasonable” chastisement, so long as he did not inflict permanent injury or death 
(Spruill, 1972; Zinn, 2003). 
The idea of the unity of husband and wife was a fundamental principal of the law in the 
colonies.  Single women were legally considered to be competent persons.  They could be sued, 
bring suit, make contacts, execute deeds, dispose of estates through a last will and testament, and 
serve as guardians for minors.  However, when a woman married, her legal existence was 
incorporated into that of her husband and he was recognized as her head or lord; she could have 
no will or property of her own.  The husband had absolute possession of his wife’s property and 
any wages that she earned (Berkin, 1996; Spruill, 1972; Zinn, 2003). 
English law also gave the father the authority over his children, even after his death.  
According to Blackstone’s interpretation, a mother had no legal right over her children; she was 
only entitled to reverence and respect.  A man could deal with the custody of his children, both 
living and unborn, through a will or a deed.  In the United States, the colonies passed statutes 
insuring fathers these same rights.  Colonial fathers regularly used their last wills and testaments 
to direct the estates of their children.  In most cases the children’s custody was assigned to their 
mothers.  Sometimes the husband appointed his wife guardian of the children as long as she 
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remained a widow and named other guardians for the children if she married again.  The wills 
were written as if the children were his property (Spruill, 1972).   
The practice of appointing a guardian other than the mother was used to protect a child 
and his estate from a potential immoral stepfather.  Under the law, a wife and all of her 
possessions were subject to her husband’s authority.  A husband acquired by marriage any 
interest that his wife had in the estate of her deceased husband.  Therefore, if she remarried, 
would have no authority to protect the interests of her children, whether they be person or 
property interests.  If another guardian was appointed, that person could pursue legal action 
against the stepfather’s “waste of the orphan’s estate” or mistreatment.  But the mother, having 
remarried, was disqualified from suing her husband or testifying against him in a court of law 
(Spruill, 1972). 
The colonies’ rules regarding women’s inheritance and property ownership also followed 
the general characteristics of English law.  There was a preference for sons over daughters in the 
distribution of estates (Berkin, 1996; Spruill, 1972) and that preference was so strong that land 
would be left to brothers or nephews rather than daughters (Spruill, 1972). 
Many times the husband bequeathed a portion of his estate to his wife, sometimes with 
the condition that she not remarry.  The husband usually had acquired a portion of the property 
disposed of in his will through marriage.  So, in some cases a wife was given property that was 
formerly hers on the condition that she not remarry.  In other cases, wives received only part of 
what had originally been theirs at the time of the marriage.  Upon the death of a wife, the 
husband had the sole right to administer her estate; wives could not by will appoint anyone else 
as executor and the court did not have the power to interfere with the husband’s administration  
of the estate (Spruill, 1972). 
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In March 1776, prior to the Declaration of Independence, Abigail Adams wrote to her 
husband asking him to be more “generous” to women and not to place unlimited power in the 
hands of husbands.  She wrote “Remember, all men would be tyrants if they could.”  However, 
Jefferson emphasized, “all men are created equal” and stated that American women would be 
“too wise to wrinkle their foreheads with politics.”  After the Revolution, only New Jersey’s new 
state constitution granted women the right to vote and that right was rescinded in 1807; New 
York’s constitution purposely disenfranchised women by using the word “male” in its 
constitution (Spruill, 1972; Zinn, 2003).  Women in the United States did not gain the right to 
vote until 1920, one hundred and forty-three years after the Declaration of Independence was 
signed. 
Between the time of the American Revolution and the Civil War, changes in American 
society were both numerous and complex.  The economy was expanding, the population was 
growing and moving west.  While women were being pulled out of the house and into industrial 
life, there was also pressure for them to stay home where they were more easily controlled.  “The 
outside world, breaking into the solid cubicle of the home, created fears and tensions in the 
dominant male world, and brought forth ideological controls to replace the loosening family 
controls: the idea of ‘the woman’s place,’ promulgated by men, was accepted by many women.” 
(Zinn, 2003) 
 As the economy developed, men dominated the workplace as mechanics and tradesmen; 
aggressiveness became increasingly defined as a male trait more and more.  A new set of ideas 
began to be taught in churches, in schools and in families; the woman was expected to be pious, 
sexually pure, and obedient, and her job was to keep the home happy, to maintain religion, to be 
a nurse, cook, seamstress and flower arranger (Spruill, 1972).  Women were told (and taught) to 
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be passive.  A woman was not to read too much and some reading was to be avoided by women 
completely.  When Harriet Martineau wrote Society in America in the 1830s, one review 
suggested that it be kept from women because it would unsettle them and throw the world into 
confusion.  “The cult of domesticity for the woman was a way of pacifying her with a doctrine of 
separate but equal – giving her work equally as important as the man’s, but separate and 
different.” (Zinn, 2003, pg. 114)   
This ideology held no meaning in the lives of the African American women, many of 
whom were enslaved in the Southern States as part of the largest minority population in the new 
nation (Spruill, 1972).  Nor could it be embraced by the oldest group of female residents of what 
was now called the United States, Native American women.  The “cult of domesticity”, also 
referred to as “republican womanhood”, was based on the assumption that a wife and mother 
within a secure family circle without any concern of being separated from her husband or 
children.  It also assumed that sons would be educated and become full citizens in the new 
society.  These were not the realities for African American women even among the free black 
communities in the North (Berkin, 1996). 
Throughout the 1820s and 1830s women remained restricted to the private sphere.  
Women were not able to vote, own property, attend colleges, and women’s wages were 25 to 
50% of what men earned.  Women were barred from higher education and excluded from the 
ministry, and from the professions of law and medicine.  As the economy developed, the “cult of 
domesticity” assigned a woman’s domain to the home (Berkin, 1996; Spruill, 1972; Zinn, 2003).  
Placing all women in the same category and giving them all the same domestic sphere to 
cultivate served to create a classification of intimately oppressed citizenry by sex (Zinn, 2003).  
At about the same time, there were European philosophers claiming that natural roles for women 
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natural roles were domestic roles (in the private sphere) and that women were inherently inferior 
to men physically and mentally.  The perception was created that women did not belong in the 
public, masculine domains of business, politics, education, and religion (Felter, 1997). 
English common laws, as well as Blackstone’s interpretation of them, had a compelling 
influence on the construction of legislation in the United States.  In 1824, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court upheld the principle of a man’s right to physically chastise his wife and 
continued to affirm that he could do so without being concerned about being prosecuted or 
disgraced (Browne, 1987).  In 1864, a North Carolina Court ruled, in a case that involved a man 
choking his wife, that the husband had a right to direct and discipline his spouse in the same 
manner as a child.  In 1866 North Carolina, modified a law that was created as an example of 
compassionate reform regarding the weapons that a husband could use to chastise his wife; the 
amendment limited the man’s right to beat his wife to the use of a stick as large as his finger, but 
no larger than his thumb (Browne, 1987). 
Several women, including suffragists Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, 
were outspoken on these subjects and as activists, called for reforms.  As the activists agitated, 
and cultural norms changed, legislators reacted. In 1871, both Alabama and Massachusetts 
revoked the legal right for a husband to beat his wife (Felter, 1997).  In 1874, North Carolina 
made a similar ruling, but with a very important qualification that limited the cases that would 
qualify for court intervention.  If no permanent injury was inflicted “nor malice, cruelty, nor 
dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public 
gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive”.  This ruling became known as the “curtain 
rule” and has been used as the justification for both the use of force and for policies of 
nonintervention (Browne, 1987). 
 22
At the time, very few women activists suggested that inequitable gender relations were 
the cause of domestic violence and political action that related men’s violence to gender 
inequality was avoided (Felter 1997).  Verbalization about wife beating emerged in other social 
and political movements such as Prohibition and woman suffrage (Felter, 1997; Kurst-Swanger 
& Petcosky, 2003).  In fact, the women’s suffrage movement and the advocacy of temperance 
may have rekindled interest in the appropriateness of using violence against women in the home.  
Women’s suffrage groups were quite successful in gaining rights for women, including the right 
to vote, the right to own property, and not to be considered their husband’s legal property (Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  The temperance movement’s focus on the relationship between 
drinking, violence, and the evil influences of alcohol on family life triggered a new 
consciousness about the rights of women to live life free of drunkards.  Using this argument, 
temperance advocates were ultimately successful in beginning the development of divorce 
reform (Eigenberg, 2001). 
2.2.1.2 Children in the Private Sphere 
In early American society, the lives of children did not appear to be much different than what 
researchers believed existed during medieval times.  Religious practices encouraged a rigid, 
inflexble, and harsh approach to child rearing; children were viewed as inherently sinful.  
Physical punishment was the accepted method of discipline and children who misbehaved had 
were beaten; Calvinistic theology focused on infant depravity and damnation (Kurst-Swanger & 
Petcosky, 2003) and the biblical dictum “spare the rod and spoil the child” provided justification 
for beating children; beating a child with a rod was considered appropriate. (Gelles, 1997; Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003)   
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Families sent their children to work to address their economic needs, abandoning their 
education.  Families were also known to place their children under involuntary servitude and 
apprenticeships; children were bought and sold like slaves. (Whitehead & Lab, 1999; Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  There was no law to protect children in early American society.  It 
was not until the late 1800s that a national dialogue began about child maltreatment and the lack 
of legislation to protect children.   
The case of Mary Ellen Wilson, in 1874, marked the beginning of the American 
movement to protect children (Gelles, 1997; Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003)  A church social 
worker was informed that Mary Ellen Wilson, a 9 year old female, was being abused by her legal 
custodians.  The social worker reported the case to the New York City Police Department and a 
charity agency, but neither organization would get involved because of a lack of statutory 
guidelines and evidence.  In an endeavor to gain legal recourse to protect the child, the social 
worker sought assistance from the American Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals 
(ASPCA).  The ASPCA brought suit against Mary Ellen’s legal guardians, charging that the 
child was a member of the animal kingdom and as such, she had a right to protection from 
cruelty like any other animal, (Gelles, 1997; Sagatun & Edwards, 1995; Kurst-Swanger & 
Petcosky, 2003).  The court agreed to hear the case, and the child was removed from the home 
and placed in an orphanage.   
In December 1874 the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
(SPCC) was founded (Gelles, 1997) and in 1881 the SPCC became the first child protection 
agency in the country.  Although it was a voluntary organization, the agency had the right to 
conduct investigations, recommend alternative living arrangements for children, and bring legal 
suit against alleged child abusers (Gelles, 1997; Sagatun & Edwards, 1995; Kurst-Swanger & 
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Petcosky, 2003).  Until 1935, the primary protective services for children were administered by  
voluntary organizations.  After that, the passage of the Social Security Act provided federal 
funding for state-operated protective services; some states created their own publicly 
administered child protective agencies prior to the passage of the Act. (Wiehe, 1992; Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  In time, state administered government programs replaced private 
protection agencies, however the transition was slow (Gelles, 1997, Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 
2003)  
In 1912, the Children’s Bureau was founded by an act of Congress with the mandate of 
disseminating information on child development.  Initially it was an agency in the Department of 
labor, probably due to public concern that the new waves of immigrants were sending their 
children to work in the factories in lieu of school.  Later, the bureau was relocated, first to the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and to the Department of Health and Human 
Services where it has remained (Gelles, 1997).  When it was created, the bureau had a budget 
and a mandate to conduct research on issues concerning child development.  The first of the 
series of Juvenile Court Statistics reports was published by the Children’s Bureau in 1927; much 
of the report is dedicated to child abuse and neglect. 
In the 1940s, the development of diagnostic X-ray technology sparked an additional 
movement toward identifying child abuse and subsequently developing public policy to address 
the issue.  The use of X-ray technology made it possible to view injuries that were not visible to 
the naked eye.  In 1946, a radiologist published an article describing his observations of 6 infants 
who had multiple fractures of long bones and chronic subdural hematomas (Rathgeb, Smith, & 
Freinkel, 1988).  While this article did not suggest that violence was the cause of the injuries, it 
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did stimulate interest in conducting research on the nature and potential causes of these kinds of 
injuries in children (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky , 2003). 
2.3 PUBLIC SPHERE 
“There was no Mary Ellen for battered women, no technological breakthroughs 
such as pediatric radiology to uncover years of broken jaws and broken bones, No 
medical champion would capture public and professional attention in the way 
Kempe had forbattered children.  There was no “Women’s Bureau” in the federal 
government” (Gelles, 1997, pg. 32) 
2.3.1 Women in the Public Sphere 
Attention to wife battering came from the women themselves through a traditional grassroots 
effort (Gelles, 1997).  After a pause in the feminist movement following World War I and 
through the 1950s, campaigns began in the 1960s against physical and sexual violence, for 
divorce reform, birth control, abortion, and sexual freedom.  The battered-women’s movement 
and the provision of shelters and refuges reveals this legacy (Dobash & Dobash, 1992).  Housing 
represented more than simply a roof over one’s head.  Shelter provided one of the essential keys 
in the context of change and was a fundamental indicator of women’s social status. 
A new wave of awareness emerged, with the perception that women with comparable 
talents and training had less opportunity for social recognition than their male counterparts.  The 
slogan, "personal as political", signified a belief that patriarchy dominated many aspects of 
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women's personal lives as well as their public participation; the women's movement began to 
push for women's equality (Belknap, 2001).   
A renewed interest in domestic violence was rekindled when the women’s movement 
brought violence against women to the attention of the public.  In her book, Women and Male 
Violence, Susan Schechter (1982) tells us that in the early 1970s, although it seemed as if the 
issue of battered women came out of nowhere, this movement was the result of changing 
political consciousness and organizing activity of women.  The results of a small study that 
indicated high rates of wife abuse were reported to the National Organization for women (NOW) 
and a special task force was created to take the issue nationwide and promote the establishment 
of shelters to protect women (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  One of the oldest shelters 
established for women in the United States started as part of a consciousness- raising effort in 
1971.  Early leaders of the women’s liberation movement identified women’s oppression as a 
cause of their victimization, and freedom from that oppression was crucial to living free of 
violence (Schechter, 1982; Felter, 1997).  Battered women’s shelters provided a safe haven for 
abused women and children while also serving to provide organizing space for the battered 
women’s movement (Felter, 1997).  The “refuge” itself became a fundamental resource to 
sustain and advance the feminist movement within the context of the issue itself and in close 
contact with the women who were victimized.  The provision of space being so thoroughly 
involved with the problem and with the lives of the victims and shelter workers was unique 
among social movements (Dobash & Dobash, 1992). 
No corresponding movement evolved to institutionalize abusive men, perhaps reflective 
of a historical legacy that it seemed more natural to shelter women (Felter, 1997) and illustrating 
women’s continued dependence in marriage and the economic disadvantages of depending on 
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men for the basic necessity of shelter (Dobash & Dobash, 1992).  The economic dependence of 
women upon men was viewed as a key component of partriarchal control.  The shelter stood, 
both symbolically and materially, at the core of the movement to eliminate men’s abuse of wives 
and female partners.  It was rare, if ever necessary, that men needed accommodations to escape 
abusive women upon whom they were economically dependent for the necessities of everyday 
life (Dobash & Dobash, 1992). 
In the 1970s, through the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), the 
federal government trained and paid half of all shelter employees.  Some states started to place a 
tax on marriage licenses, using the proceeds to fund shelters.  The Social Security Administration 
provided the largest source of public funding to provide temporary housing for abused and 
neglected children.  In 1977, federal legislation was introduced for the funding of battered 
women’s services; it failed.  By 1979, fewer than 15 states had passed legislation funding 
shelters; less than half of these shelters received any public funding (Felter, 1997).  
In 1977, two national domestic violence bills were defeated and the Domestic Violence 
Assistance Act failed to pass in 1978.  However, feminists had succeeded in attracting attention 
to the issue of domestic violence against women. In 1979, Democratic President Jimmy Carter 
established the Office of Domestic Violence.  In 1980, the Senate took action against the 
Domestic Violence Prevention and Services Act and blocked its passage.  In 1981, Republican 
President Ronald Reagan closed the Office of Domestic Violence (Brooks, 1997). 
In 1984, the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act provided limited funding to 
support shelters and services for women and children victims of domestic violence.  Also in 
1984, the Victims of Crime Act provided assistance to grants designed to aid victims of domestic 
violence, sexual assault, and child abuse (Brooks, 1997). 
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In June 1990, the first version of the Violence against Women Act (VAWA) was 
introduced by Senator Joseph Biden signifying the beginning of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings on this piece of legislation.  Survivors of violent attacks testified and the media focused 
focused on the victims of such attacks.  Journalists were attracted to the issue resulting in 
editorials and newspaper articles nationwide.  The media attention raised public awareness of the 
issue of domestic violence, however the actual piece of proposed legislation, VAWA, was only 
discussed secondarily in many reports (Brooks, 1997).   
According to Brooks (1997) most of the action on the bill at this stage was the result of 
hard work by insiders.  In order to generate popular support, Senator Biden held hearings on the 
bill to attract the attention of his colleagues and the media.  The Judiciary Committee passed the 
bill unanimously in October, 1990, however the full Senate did not vote on the bill and it had to 
be reintroduced in 1991.   
Action by interest groups had already begun.  The National Organization for Women 
Legal Defense and Education Fund directed a task force , formed for the purposes of advising 
and lobbying Congress regarding revisions and additions to VAWA.  The task force included 
over 170 groups including unions, churches, women’s health groups, and educational interest 
groups (Brooks, 1997). 
Senator Biden introduced the Violence against Women Act of 1991 to the Senate in 
January, and again, it was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.  The new bill contained 
new technical definitions, changes in the grant amounts, and modifications in the requirements 
for receiving grants.  In March 1991, Representative Barbara Boxer introduced the new version 
of the bill to the House of Representatives.  There were two major differences between the 
Senate and House versions of the bill.  The Senate version required states to set up commissions 
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to study domestic violence and authorized a national media campaign to educate the public about 
the problem; neither of these was in the House version.  The Senate version also created 
programs in the schools to educate children about domestic violence, while the House version 
did not.  Late in the year, components of the House bill were added to other legislation while in 
the Senate attempts were made to attach VAWA to the Crime bill.  While action on the bills was 
slow inside Congress, The Violence Against Women Task Force had organized to lobby, make 
recommendations, and apply external pressure for the Act (Gelles, 1997; Brooks, 1997). 
By the end of 1992, the bill had received a large amount of publicity and organizational 
support was strong with the momentum high.  Barbara Boxer had been elected to the Senate, and  
discussion began as to who would reintroduce the bill to the next session of Congress.  Female 
Members of Congress were organized in support of VAWA, providing the internal momentum 
that was needed to move the legislation.  The lack of significant action on the bill in the Senate in 
1992 prompted Senator Biden to pledge to prioritize VAWA in 1993 (Brooks, 1997).   
In January 1993, Senator Boxer working with Senator Biden introduced VAWA in the 
Senate; the bill was nearly identical to the 1992 Senate version.  The Senate added a requirement 
that the Centers for Disease Control to fund a study of the cost of domestic violence injuries as 
well as a provision for funding a national hotline for domestic violence victims.  Representatives 
Schroeder, Slaughter, and Morella introduced the House bill in February 1993.  The updated 
version of the House bill included provisions for the protection of battered immigrant women.  
The Senate Judiciary Committee approved VAWA in May and in November attached it to the 
Senate Crime Bill.  When the House passed VAWA in November, the bill had undergone a 
series of changes including the elimination of the civil rights provision (Brooks, 1997).   
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Although the full House passed a version of VAWA in 1993, VAWA measures were 
incorporated into the Crime Bill.  In March 1994, the House Judiciary Committee passed a crime 
bill that included VAWA as Title XVI; the House crime bill was passed in April 1994 (Brooks, 
1997).  Now VAWA had been incorporated into the Crime bills in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate.   
This put feminists in a position of lobbying for a Crime Bill in order to get VAWA 
passed.  Additionally, the Crime Bills presented a number of controversial issues for Republicans 
and Democrats apart from their VAWA differences.  The National Rifle Association was 
opposed to the gun ban in the Crime Bill and strongly lobbied House members.  The majority of 
the House voted against the rule in August 1994, blocking the bill’s movement and returning it to 
the House-Senate committee for revisions.  In August the House approved the revised version 
(including a cut of $3.3 billion), and the Senate voted to pass the bill exactly as it came out of 
committee.  President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 in which VAWA was enacted as Title IV (Brooks, 1997). 
2.3.2 Children in the Public Sphere 
In 1962, Henry Kempe and his associates introduced the term “battered child syndrome” in an 
article that was published in the Journal of the American Medical Association.  The article, based 
on their review of the research conducted on more than 300 cases of abuse, concluded that some 
children were being victimized by their parents and/or caretakers (Gelles 1997; Kurst-Swanger & 
Petcosky, 2003).  “Time, Newsweek, the Saturday Evening Post, and Life followed up on the 
Kempe article with news and feature stories (Gelles, 1997).  The article fueled a legislative 
movement.  Issues of child abuse moved to the top of the political agenda and child protection 
agencies were given more credibility and authority.  Kempe’s work served to facilitate interest in 
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conducting research into the nature and causes of child abuse; the government, medical 
profession, and other professions that interact with children would no longer ignore the battered 
child (Pagelow, 1984; Gelles, 1997; Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003). 
In 1963, the U.S. Children’s Bureau disseminated principles and suggested language for 
states to form legislation for mandated reporting procedures to the protective services of the state 
for physically abused children.  For two reasons, the initial language suggested by the Children’s 
Bureau placed the primary duty to report on physicians.   First, the Bureau felt that abused 
children were most likely to come to the attention of someone outside of the home when the 
caretaker sought medical care for the child.  Second, the reporting would uncover cases that a 
physician would come to suspect because of the specialized skills and training needed to practice 
in the medical profession.  Furthermore, it was felt that physicians were failing to report because 
they felt that they were either ”meddling” or violating “professional confidence”.  It was also 
thought that some physicians were deterred from reporting due to a fear of civil liability, a fear, 
some argued, that could be diminished by enacting a statutory immunity from liability. (Paulsen, 
1967) 
By the end of the 1960s, every state had enacted some form of mandated-reporting 
legislation, prompting Congress to follow with federal legislation (Gelles, 1997; Kurst-Swanger 
& Petcosky, 2003).  Senator Walter Mondale introduced a bill proposing the Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) while he was chair of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Children and Youth.  Debate centered on the definition of child abuse, focused on “the most 
horrific examples of physical abuse” to deter the challenges “from conservatives who might have 
opposed the bill  as undue interference in the family and parental discipline.” (Rathgeb, Smith, & 
Freinkel); child neglect was not emphasized.  The Nixon administration opposed the bill, as the 
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CAPTA created a new categorical spending program.  New spending was in direct opposition 
with the administration’s goal of curtailing federal spending on local social problems. 
In 1974, Congress passed CAPTA and, in addition to providing funds for child 
maltreatment programs and services, the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN) 
and the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information (NCCANI) were 
created.  NCCAN serves as a major resource for professionals and the community and continues 
to function at the center of child abuse public policy; NCCANI serves as a resource for research, 
programs, and general information. CAPTA also provided federal funding for child maltreatment 
programs for states that were not able to comply with the federal requirements.  States were 
provided incentives to improve their policies and procedures on mandated reporting, 
investigating, processing of cases, and training of personnel in return for federal funding.  
CAPTA also provided federal funding for research and demonstration projects (Gelles, 1997; 
Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003). 
CAPTA was reauthorized in 1978 and the Adoption Reform Act was added to it.  In 
1984, amendments expanded the definition of abuse to include medical neglect, maltreatment of 
children in out-of-home care, and sexual exploitation.  The amendments also authorized the 
National Incidence Study (NIS), a nationwide study of the incidence and prevalence of child 
maltreatment.  NIS is currently the only existing tool that can be used to estimate the scope of 
child maltreatment in the United States (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003). 
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2.4 LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF LANGUAGE 
The concept of separate public and private realms is imbedded in the law regarding the state's 
relationship to the family.  In the case of domestic violence, issues surrounding the public and 
private realms become particularly important because this kind of violence typically occurs in 
the private realm.  Ideologically, the private realm is separate from the state.  The family as a 
social unit has been constructed both socially and historically making the organization of the 
family including the place of women politically significant.  To address domestic violence, one 
must also address the public/private split which can be used as an ideological camouflage for the 
state's actual interventions into the private realm (Marshall, 1997). 
2.4.1 Private Sphere  
The public is that which is owned, organized, or administered by the state; the private is that 
which is assumed by voluntary arrangements made between private individuals especially 
between the family and the economy (Dobash & Dobash, 1992).  Historically, the only arena in 
which the state could legitimately intervene was that of the public world; historically, the arena 
in which women could legitimately operate as a group was the private arena of the family and 
home (Belknap, 2001; Dobash & Dobash, 1992).  The distinction between public and private and 
maintaining the idea that it is inappropriate for the state to intervene in private affairs creates 
problems in seeking police protection in incidents of domestic violence (Dobash & Dobash, 
1992).   
The call for state intervention dates back at least to the demands of Mary Woolstonecraft 
in the eighteenth century (Dobash & Dobash, 1992).  Attempting to ensure enforcement of 
domestic violence arrest policies and creating public policy to house women and children 
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escaping from violent home situations represent attempts to obtain state intervention in the 
private family world.  For the most part, this private realm has historically been deemed beyond 
the legitimate control of the state. 
When dealing with the public sphere of the state, language becomes very important in 
defining abuse in the private sphere of the home.  The word “wife” implies a “woman” living in 
a legal state of marriage as opposed to the word “spouse” which is gender neutral; both imply the 
social institution of marriage.  Neither the term ”wife” nor the term “spouse” include 
cohabitating partners.  The term “family” implies a variety of relationships and the term 
“spouse” obscures gender, while implying a nuclear family (Naranch, 1997).   
Recall that in 1981, Republican President Ronald Reagan closed the Office of Domestic 
Violence and in 1984 the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act was passed.  Susan 
Schecter unsuccessfully argued against the consolidation of domestic violence against women 
with child abuse.  She stated that the major goal of child protection was to keep the family united 
and free from violence while the goal of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence was 
to support a woman in creating a violence-free life for herself and her children.  Naranch (1997) 
argues that incorporating child abuse and domestic violence against women into the term “family 
violence” can be used to obscure the issue of violence against women and violence by intimates 
outside of marriages. 
2.4.2 Public Sphere 
Most laws are, in terms of language, sex neutral; they do not mention sex or require gendered 
applications.  Because women and men hold different positions in society, unisex laws will have 
different results for women than for men.  Furthermore, lawmakers represent the interests of 
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dominant groups. The result has been that the law has reflected and maintained unequal power 
relations for women and men within society (Yeager, 1995). 
Legal changes are necessary in achieving access is necessary to effect social, political, 
and economic change; however, legal changes, alone, are not sufficient.  It is important to have 
both access and influence.  Access involves acquiring recognition and rights; influence involves 
being in a position to use the rights to attain new advantages and power (Belknap, 2001).   
A 1972 amendment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII, stated that it is illegal to use a 
person's sex, race, religion, or national origin as the basis for terms of employment.  Although 
the legislation helped to improve women's opportunities, it did not provide clear guidelines in 
allowing women equal opportunities (Belknap, 2001).  Women still constitute a conspicuous 
minority of those working in law enforcement, the law, and corrections (Coontz, 1998).  
Women's legal status continues to lag behind men hindering their full representation in the public 
sphere where decisionmaking takes place.  The combination of women's legal and social 
subordination continues to put them at greater risk of victimization. 
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3.0  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Although domestic violence is not new, defining it as a social problem worthy of state 
intervention is.  Prior to the 1970s, “legal fictions, social prejudices, and criminal justice apathy 
and ignorance combined to define domestic violence as a nonevent”, however, in the past 
decade, society’s acceptance of domestic violence has significantly diminished (Miller, 1998).  
Scholarly attention to this type of violence has a relatively short history since it has only been 
three or four decades since it has received enough attention to become a topic of concern 
(Loeske, Gelles, & Cavanaugh, 2005).  Two dominant theoretical perspectives, the family 
violence perspective and the feminist perspective, have emerged during the recent decades to 
shape domestic violence as a social problem.  While both of these perspectives are controversial 
and highly political, they continue to influence the direction taken by interventions, policies, and 
programs (Hart, 2005).  Although these are not the only perspectives, they are the perspectives 
that have dominated the public debate on the issue. 
3.1 FAMILY VIOLENCE PERSPECTIVE 
Family violence theories began to emerge during the 1960's and the 1970's, almost 
simultaneously with the Women's movement.  “Prior to this time, violence within the family was 
not recognized as a social problem and thus was not of much interest to scholars” (Kurst-
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Swanger & Petcosky, 2003, p. 27).  Early conceptualizations of family violence were heavily 
influenced by psychology (Loeske, Gelles, & Cavanaugh, 2005).  There was an increased 
emphasis on family as an institution.  Formerly viewed as private domain, the family was now 
being scrutinized by the public (Fagan 1988).  The first concerns focused on the welfare of 
children (Gelles, 1997; Pagelow, 1984).  In the 1960s the occurrence of child abuse was defined 
and framed as a problem by the medical community.  Sociologists began to suggest that the 
family home was not necessarily a safe and non-violent environment.  The family violence 
perspective emerged arguing that the cause of spouse abuse was within the structure of the 
existing family institution (Kurz, 1989).  The family, viewed as a system of social relations with 
distinct properties, was considered to be an optimal environment for violence (Gelles, 1997).  
The lack of social control of behaviors within the family was due to several distinct 
characteristics of the family structure as a social system; members spend a large amount of time 
with each other; their involvement with each other is intense, family members know each others' 
vulnerabilities; family membership is not voluntary; and family matters are generally private.  
All these system characteristics helped to hide violence that occurred within the family (Gelles, 
1997).   
As a result, two kinds of family violence emerged, child abuse and woman abuse (Gelles, 
1997; Pagelow, 1984).  The hierarchy of power in the patriarchal family provided that children 
had an inferior status.  Children were expected to be subordinate and to obey their fathers.  It was 
common practice for fathers, who were the head of the family unit, to use violence as a part of 
child rearing practices.  Women in a patriarchal society had less power than men in all aspects 
with their subordination being legitimized through the hierarchal structure of the family unit as 
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well as the hierarchal structure of the institutions of society as a whole.  Violence against women 
was seen as embedded cultural practice (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).   
 The complexity of family violence has raised many questions and has drawn the attention 
of a variety of experts who approach their work using different frameworks pursuing different 
goals.  The editors of Current Controversies on Family Violence, (Loeske, Gelles, & Cavanaugh, 
2005) cite four characteristics of the topic of family violence that lead to controversies among 
the experts.  First, family violence is a practical problem that needs to be resolved; it is about real 
people who experience sometimes life-threatening violence and about the people who commit 
this violence.  Second, family violence is a political issue; experts in the field can influence what 
is done to stop violence, help victims, and rehabilitate or punish offenders.  As the practical and 
political stakes increase, so does the intensity of the disagreements among the experts.  Third, 
views of morality underlie all definitions and measurements of family violence, making 
controversies difficult, if not impossible, to reach resolution based exclusively on reason and 
logic.  When adding moral dimensions such as evaluating what behaviors are defined as 
acceptable or not acceptable, or what values should be preserved, arguments can become 
emotionally charged “because morality is as much about feeling as about thinking.”  Finally, in 
the course of their work, researchers and practitioners have witnessed first hand the “sometimes 
disastrous unintended consequences of well-intentioned social policies.”   
Research on family violence has evolved into various theoretical models such as 
psychiatric/psychopathic (the most prevalent), sociopsychological, sociocultural, and 
multidimensional that attempt to explain family violence from different levels of analysis (Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  However, perhaps reflective of the complexity of the topic of 
family violence, there is no consensus on a “best” conceptual framework for evaluating the 
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problem.  Different conceptualizations will probably be “best” on different occasions because 
some violence by some people may be the consequence of psychopathy, some violence is clearly 
attributed to tactics of male control of women, and some violence may be associated with social 
structures, processes, coupled with social forces (Loeske, Gelles, & Cavanaugh, 2005).  
Therefore, for example, a psychological model may be particularly relevant for understanding 
certain instances of violence when personality disorder is recognized as a causative factor in 
spouse assault and completely irrelevant when explaining the prevalence of physical abuse from 
a spouse or partner experienced by women in general. 
During the 1960’s and 1970s, the psychiatric/psychopathic theory was the prevailing 
theory attributing family violence to a psychological abnormality that produces violent behavior 
and causes a person to physically attack family members.  The psychiatric/psychopathological 
model involves theories at the individual level where family violence is examined as a social 
problem by analyzing and explaining the behavior in terms of the individuals involved.  The 
model originated with physicians who were treating the effects of child abuse in their practices, 
the cause of violent behavior was attributed to a perpetrator’s medical condition analysis (Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  Since the focus is on offenders’ characteristics such as mental 
illness, alcohol and substance abuse, and personality disorders (Dutton, 1998; Gelles, 1997), the 
psychiatric/psychopathic model tends to concentrate on the individual batterer (Dutton, 1998; 
Gelles, 1997; Pagelow, 1984). 
Hamberger and Hastings (1986) used the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventopry (MCMI) 
and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), self-reporting instruments used as 
assessment tools to study the incidence of Personality Disorder (PD); the researchers began to 
see a non-PD group emerging from their data.  Later, in a sample of 196 men, Lohr, Hamberger 
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and Bonge (1988) used a cluster analysis to analyze the PD disorder scales and found a cluster, 
39% of the sample, that revealed no elevations on any of the 8 PD scales  In a subsequent study 
of 833 court-referred men, Hamberger, Lohr, Bonge, and Tolin (1996) found that 40% of the 
sample were categorized into the no PD cluster.  One problem with the study's approach was that 
the MCMI was not meant to be cluster analyzed because the instrument was designed for 
individual assessment.  A second problem was that the sample consisted of court-referred 
individuals.  The researchers acknowledged that the men entering the treatment groups who were 
assessed early and developed a sense that treatment was associated with a judgmental aspect and 
may have underreported pathological behaviors including violence experienced within the family 
(Dutton & Hemphill, 1992; Dutton & Starzomski, 1993).  In a study using the Personality 
Disorder Examination (PDE) and the MCMI-II, the incidence of personality disorders was 
investigated using sample of 85 court and self-referred wife assaulters; results from one 
instrument (MCMI-II) indicated that between 80% and 90% of the sample had some criteria for 
personality disorder while results using the other (PDE) indicated a smaller prevalence rate of 
about 50% (Hart, Dutton, & Newlove 1993).   
Research based on samples of subjects who are receiving treatment for a problem may 
have limited generalizability because the subjects may not really represent the entire population 
manifesting the problem.  The selection process by which someone decides to get help, or comes 
to the attention of the authorities and is forced into treatment, may represent the extreme tail of a 
distribution (Straus, 1989).  Straus cites several factors that could produce differences between 
clinical samples and representative community samples including the fact that extensive data can 
be collected on a clinical population, whereas community surveys are limited in the amount of 
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data that can be collected from each subject.  Straus also points out that a clinical population 
provides more opportunities to audit the accuracy of the information being collected. 
O'Leary (1994) asserts that individual level psychopathology only contributes to our 
understanding of the most extreme violent behavior.  Psychological theories may not be very 
useful in understanding why pushes, shoves, slaps and spankings are characteristic of routine 
family life (Loeske, 2005). 
Although some find the psychological model inaccurate and too simplistic, the model 
continues to be applied to explain family violence.  Gelles (1997) suggests that the reason for the 
persistence in the use of this model lies in the fact that intimate violence is so extensive in our 
society that we do not want to view it as a pattern of family relations; it is easier to attribute it to 
illness.  Gelles also suggests that the psychiatric model may serve as a smokescreen preventing 
our considering social organizational factors that cause family violence. 
The sociopsychological model approaches the problem of family violence at a group 
level and the problem is defined in terms of the family system, the environmental factors that 
affect the family, and the interactions between family members.  Family violence is explained in 
terms of family patterns as a whole, using relationships and interactions between family 
members.  The focus is on the structure and organization of the family and the environmental 
factors that affect the family system (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).   
One of the theories within this model is social learning theory.  Social learning theory 
examines a person’s behavior as a result of cognitive processes, modeling and reinforcement 
where violence is viewed as a learned behavior.  Thus, when violent behavior is reinforced, this 
behavior continues into adulthood as a method of conflict resolution.  Social learning theory 
posits that children learn through role modeling and imitate the behavior of their parents and they 
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are more inclined to imitate the behavior of the family member perceived to have more power 
(Pagelow, 1984).  When children learn to use aggressive behavior and the behavior is reinforced 
positively, it is likely to be repeated.  Social learning theory has been used to study the effects of 
experiencing domestic violence as well as witnessing it.  Often referred to as the 
intergenerational theory, it proposes that abusive behavior is transmitted from one generation to 
another; as children's use of aggressive behavior gets their needs met, they continue to use it as a 
means to meet their needs in adulthood (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).   
Stress theory explains violence and examines family characteristics and issues that would 
subject a family to increased levels of stress and perhaps predispose it to violent interactions 
(Gelles & Strauss, 1988).  One of the common features of violent families, social isolation, 
involves the privatization of the family.  When the family as an institution is isolated from the 
larger society, the family is not compelled to explain negative situations such as family violence, 
making it easy to keep family secrets (Finkelhor, 1983).  Additionally, social isolation prevents 
families from getting help due to limited contact with resources outside of the family (Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  
Power theory (Goode, 1971) explains family violence in terms of natural power 
differentials that exist within families based on gender and age; those who are bigger and 
stronger have greater access to resources and exert their will over those who are weaker, smaller 
and have fewer resources.  He discusses both the actual use of force as well as the threat of force 
to maintain power and control within the family unit.  According to this theory, men have more 
power due to their social status, size and strength; the most powerful tend to abuse the least 
powerful (Finkelhor, 1983).  The power differential between a couple may also be related to the 
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likelihood of victimization within the family; the less power that a female has compared to her 
husband, the more likely it is that she will experience abuse (Finkelhor, 1983).   
Resource theory, as an extension of power theory, posits that the more resources a family 
member has (social, personal, and economic) the more power that person has within the family 
system.  The most powerful person in the family, traditionally a male, is in a position to make 
decisions and enforce them on other family members; enforcement can involve threats or abusive 
measures (Gelles, 1997).  Since men generally hold the highest paying jobs and the most 
influence in the community, women and children are in the subservient roles making them more 
likely to be victimized in the home.   
Social control theory (Homans, 1961) perceives social attraction as a function of costs 
and benefits; a person invests resources in a social situation with an expectation of benefits.  
Gelles (1997) suggested that family violence is driven by the social exchange theory in that 
individual family members use violence to obtain goals such as controlling family decisions, 
getting attention, and meeting individual needs.  Social norms and family structure increase the 
likelihood that the benefits of using violence will outweigh the costs.  When violence is used, the 
private nature of the family prevents its members from seeking outside help and social 
institutions are reluctant to intervene in private matters; the abuse will go unreported and 
undetected at minimal expense to the abuser (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003). 
The "culture of violence" theory seeks to explain violence from two perspectives, cultural 
approval and subcultures of violence.  Cultural approval attributes family violence to the level of 
acceptance of violence in society.  It is more likely that violence will be used within the family if 
society accepts violence as a way of attaining goals, resolving conflicts, or maintaining the status 
quo.   If society reinforces the acceptance of using violence and if weapons are readily available, 
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violence becomes an accepted means of conflict resolution at both the institutional and personal 
levels.  The subculture of violence explains family violence in terms of how cultural norms vary 
within a society and how some subcultures value the use of violence.  If violent behavior is 
accepted as normal among members of a group, it is more likely that group members will use 
that kind of behavior (Kurst-Swanger & Petcosky, 2003). 
Conflict theory holds that domestic violence is the result of the social structure of our 
society.  From this perspective, our society is socially structured by gender and, because males 
have historically had greater access to resources such as property, education, employment 
opportunities and status, they have continued to maintain power over women (Kurst-Swanger & 
Petcosky, 2003).  In this structure, which has existed for centuries, males are socially in positions 
of power, enabling them to use abusive methods to resolve conflicts without consequence (Berry, 
1995; Browne & Herbert, 1997; Carderelli, 1997); the lower the status of women in society, the 
greater the frequency of wife beating (Straus, 1994). 
Each model and its corresponding theories help to explain some types of family violence, 
although most explain only a small part of a much larger picture.  Additionally, some theories 
account for the reasons family violence begins, but they fail to explain why it prevails (Kurst-
Swanger & Petcosky, 2003).  Family violence theories have provided little analysis regarding 
why domestic violence is tolerated by society and there has not been aggressive proponents for 
change.  “Although the pioneering work of sociologists such as Gelles (1972) and Steinmetz and 
Straus (1974) played a role in making domestic violence a salient public issue, they remain more 
active in academic circles and not as vocal in advocating institutional or structural changes as a 
mechanism to address domestic violence” (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003). 
 
3.2 FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 
The feminist theoretical perspective emerged during the Women's movement in the 1970's.  
From this perspective, domestic violence was more broadly defined as male privilege over and 
coercion of women.  Feminist theory posits the cause of domestic violence is in the patriarchal 
structure of society (Kurz, 1989) and that male dominated structures are manifested in the legal 
system, economic structures, social institutions, sexist division of labor, and traditional gender 
role expectations.  As power is related to patriarchy differential access to structural resources 
exist in our society and the disparity in women’s access to resources was due to society assigning 
value to certain characteristics and assigning a hierarchy as to what is viewed as inferior or 
superior.  As a result, society has historically valued the male attribute for gender more than the 
female attribute and this dualism has continued and persisted through time and movements for 
change (Griscom, 1992). 
The feminist perspective also raises important questions about the nature of conventional 
research including the place of values in research, the kinds of questions asked in research, how 
data is used, and the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the subject (Bograd, 
1988).  While most researchers attempt to be unbiased, or value-free, in their work, feminists 
argue that traditional research takes place in a social context that is patriarchal and male-defined 
social knowledge is a fundamental part of how we think.  Yllö (1988) suggests that hiding one's 
values behind a declaration of objectivity is not the same as being unbiased.  Feminists propose 
that it is important that researchers be candid concerning the values that guide the work and one 
of the primary values of feminist researchers is the commitment to explain women's experiences 
from women's perspectives.  Feminist researchers also pose different kinds of questions than 
mainstream researchers challenging the current explanatory frameworks.  When studying the 
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subject of chronic intimate abuse, mainstream social science researchers tend to ask why women 
stay in the relationship.  Feminist researchers ask why men use physical force against their 
partners and what social factors restrict women from leaving the relationship.  Because they ask 
different kinds of questions, feminist researchers often use different methods of collecting data, 
initially relying on collecting a large volume of qualitative data through open-ended questions.  
After the information is collected, the researcher analyzes the data to see what factors arise out of 
the data rather than imposing pre-established coding schemes.  Feminist researchers collect these 
data with the express purpose of changing the status quo; data collection, interpretation of the 
data, and how the data are used are inherently political activities (Bograd, 1988).  In traditional 
research, the researcher is supposed to be neutral, taking the necessary precautions not to 
influence the data collection effort; feminist researchers use more collaborative methods of 
inquiry replacing detached investigation with open dialogue (Yllö & Bograd, 1988). 
According to feminist theory, violence against women results from gender inequality on 
the societal level (Bograd, 1988). Feminist researchers argue that in order to stop men’s use of  
violence against women on the personal level, changes must be made to structures of gender 
inequality at the societal level (Brownmiller, 1975; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Yllö & Bograd, 
1988).  The more unequal women are compared to men in a society, the more likely men are to 
be violent toward women.  
Dobash and Dobash (1979) explain patriarchy as being ideological and structural, 
encompassing the beliefs, norms, and values about the status and roles of women in a society as 
well as women’s access to and positions within social institutions.  Ideologies and structural 
inequalities occur within political, economic, and social dimensions.  Political status includes 
access to power and representation in the state.  Economic status includes activities and 
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institutions constructed around the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and 
services.  Social status includes women’s access to education, their sexual objectification and 
reproductive rights (Bradley & Khor, 1993).  When men dominate family, political, economic, 
and other social institutions both in number and in power, the policies and practices of these 
institutions are likely to embody, reproduce, and legitimate male domination over women. Men’s 
power will be considered right and “natural” not only in these institutions but also throughout the 
society in general.  
There is evidence that violence against women is linked to structures of male dominance.  
Yodanis (1998) conducted a macro-level empirical test of violence against women using a data 
set constructed by combining data from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) and 
United Nations (UN) official statistics to develop a cross-national measure of the status of 
women.  The study was designed to research whether there was less violence against women in 
countries where the status of women was high and more violence when the status of women was 
low and whether women were less fearful in countries where rates of violence are low.  The main 
finding was that a structure of gender inequality was associated with a culture of violence against 
women.  The educational and occupational status of women in a country was correlated with the 
prevalence of sexual violence in a country, with a high status of women corresponding to lower 
rates of sexual violence.  The study also found that as the rates of sexual violence in a country 
and women’s general probability of being a victim increased, so did women’s fear.  She 
concluded that a culture of fear among women grows among a culture of violence against 
women.  A woman did not personally have to be a victim of violence to feel more fearful.  
Although the study was limited to a small number of cases and these data could not provide the 
details of how women actually experienced violence and fear in their lives, it did provide a cross-
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national test of the relationship between macro-level structural measures of the status of women 
and experiences of violence and fear among women.  The study revealed that social structural 
characteristics, particularly women’s access to and position in social institutions, were related to 
rates of sexual violence and that rates of sexual violence, in turn, are related to women’s fear.   
In a study designed to test the relationship between structural gender inequality and rates 
of violence against women Yllö (1983) used the U.S. states as the unit of analysis.  States were 
theoretically appropriate units of analysis for the comparative study because the timing of their 
settlement and development have influenced their individual characteristics and the position of 
women who reside in them and states are the initiators of legislation and the unit of 
implementation of federal policies that affect women (Yllö & Straus, 1999).  Yllö constructed a 
Status of Women Index ranking American states with regard to the economic, educational, 
political, and legal status of women.  Then, using the nationally representative survey on family 
violence that was conducted by Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz (1980), she correlated the state 
scores on the Status of Women Index with rates of domestic physical violence against women in 
the state, as measured by the Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS).  The initial analysis revealed a 
curvilinear relationship, that is, wife abuse did not simply decline as women's status improved.  
Rather, wife abuse was high in states where women's status was low and wife abuse declined as 
women's status improved.  However, rates of wife abuse increased in states in which women's 
status was highest relative to men (Yllö, 1983).  Yllö concluded that rapid changes in equality 
may have resulted in a violent backlash by husbands. 
The same curvilinear relationship was found in a replication study, indicating that as the 
status of women improves, violence declines to a point.  The authors suggest that different parts 
of the curves represent the operation of different processes.  The downward slope on the left side 
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reflects the principle that the greater the social inequality the more coercion that is needed to 
maintain the status quo.  The increase of wife beating on the right side of the curve may 
represent the increase in marital conflict when the balance of power between the sexes undergoes 
rapid change. The study also found a linear relationship between patriarchal family norms and 
wife beating; states with male-dominant norms displayed twice as much wife beating as those 
with egalitarian norms.  Additionally the logistic regression found an association between 
patriarchal norms and violence only in the states where the status of women was highest; wife 
beating was most prevalent in a context where women's status in economic , educational, legal, 
and political institutions were high, but the prevailing norms favor women's subordination in 
marriage.  The authors suggest that these findings may point to conflicts inherent in the 
inconsistency between equal structural status of women and the maintenance of a traditional 
patriarchal power structure within the family (Yllö & Straus, 1999).   
Feminists argued that in male-dominated institutions, violence was a tool that men could 
use to keep women out or subordinate and thereby maintain male power and control.  Given the 
male-constructed and male-defined policies and practices of these institutions, such violence was 
not likely to be punished or stopped. On the contrary, it may have been be subtly or overtly 
condoned and encouraged (Dobash & Dobash, 1979).  It is widely known that police, an 
institution dominated by men, usually considered arrest a last resort resolution in incidents of 
domestic violence (Black, 1976; Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, and Rogan, 1992).  Policing of men’s 
violence against women was largely in the hands of men (Stanko, 1989) exemplifying the male 
dominance underlying the problem of domestic violence; within institutions dominated by men, 
aggression is often legitimized; the police force as an institution, may have actually been 
contributing to maintaining the problem (Sparks, 1997).  Feminist theorists do not use terms such 
 50
as "family violence," "spouse abuse," marital violence," or "conjugal violence" because this 
language shifts the focus away from the concept of male coercion and away from the woman.  
Instead they advocate for terms such as "wife-beating," "domestic violence", "battered women" 
and " woman abuse" because this language represents the phenomenon of domestic violence 
more accurately (Davis & Hagen; 1992 Naranch, 1997).  They have provided a challenge to 
working within the context of traditional institutions to inquire why particular societal responses 
occur and why legal institutions have tolerated and sometimes even perpetuated domestic 
violence (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003). 
Male dominance within families can be viewed as part of this wider system of male 
power.  Structured gender inequality both in the home and in society in general serves to 
maintain “family values” as endorsed historically in our culture through religion, law, and 
tradition; family violence theorists do not stress the historical and cultural roots of violence 
against women (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  The traditional privatized family structure can serve 
to isolate victims and make family violence an individual problem rather than a societal problem 
(Schecter, 1982).  In the early 1970s, Gelles and Straus coined the term “the marriage license as 
a hitting license” in response to the discovery that the assault rate among married couples was 
many times greater than the assault rate between strangers; they further argued that the common 
law rule that gave husbands the right to physically chastise their wives, although not formally 
recognized by the courts, lived on in the way the criminal justice system actually operated (Stets 
& Straus, 1990).   
While family violence theorists argued that with all crimes occurring in the family the 
state exhibits a need and a desire to protect the privacy of the family as a social institution 
(Kantor & Straus, 1990) the feminist perspective provided a challenge to work toward social and 
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legal change within the context of traditional institutions as they were currently structured.  The 
historically derived interest of the state in non-interference in family matters, the conflicting 
interest of the state in regulating the family, and the interest in preserving the family as a social 
institution resulted in different standards in responding to family crime versus non-family crime 
(Kantor & Straus, 1990).  While the value that society places on preserving family privacy and 
integrity was seen by feminists as serving patriarchal interests, some family violence theorists 
argued that the differential treatment of family crime is more appropriately described as a 
situation of normative ambiguity.  Behaviors, such as parents using physical punishment to 
control children’s behavior, that would be considered crimes outside of the family, may be 
tolerated within the family (Kantor & Straus, 1990).  Since the social and legal connections that 
bind the family together as a social institution meet important needs of its individual members, 
norms exist that tolerate a certain level of mistreatment of family members (Hotaling & Straus, 
1980; Straus, 1974; Straus & Lincoln, 1985).   
While psychological and sociological theorists have helped to bring domestic violence 
into the public view as a significant issue, they remain more active in academic circles. 
Feminists, on the other hand, have been much more vocal in advocating institutional or structural 
changes as a way to address the problem of domestic violence and “they arguably have been the 
primary impetus for social and legal change” (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003, p. 68).  Feminists have 
argued that a holistic view of our social structure provides a more complete analysis of why 
violence occurs than any examination of individual circumstances of a specific offender or 
characteristics of a family unit.  They have provided a theoretical framework to how a society 
may be predisposed to violence against the less powerful of its members.  The feminist 
framework also provides insight into why social and legal institutions have tolerated, sometimes 
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perpetuated, domestic violence (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).   
Disagreements are now less common among feminist activists and researchers from other 
perspectives who do not agree that gender and power are the dominant features that explain 
intimate violence; a more cooperative spirit has emerged that seeks to understand a wide variety 
of risk factors – societal, historical, psychological, and familial (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003; 
Straus, 1992; Yllö & Bograd, 1988).  As the knowledge base has grown, the focus has shifted 
from philosophical differences to policy change and implementation. 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF ARREST POLICIES 
As discussed previously, whether intentional or not, the effect of statutory changes has delegated 
the primary responsibility of addressing domestic violence to the criminal justice system.  When 
VAWA measures were incorporated into a crime bill, domestic violence was framed as a 
criminal problem.  As such, the solutions offered to address domestic violence have been 
implemented primarily through the criminal justice system.  Zorza (1992), in her description of 
police department policies and training of police recruits across the United States during the 
1970s, describes how many police departments had a non-arrest policy or a policy that 
discouraged arrest or even responding to domestic calls.  The passage of VAWA altered this 
position resulting in profound structural changes in the response of government agencies to 
domestic violence and local law enforcement has had the most significant role in reacting to 
domestic violence (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003). 
Thus, in the past decade we have observed an enormous increase in legislative attention 
to the problem of domestic violence leading to new laws in every state and resulting in a wide 
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variation of statutory models.  Between 1997 and 2002, there were hundreds of enactments that 
included both amending old laws and passing new ones; a few states created a new crime of 
domestic violence (Miller, 1998).  In an attempt to make arrest and prosecution of abusers easier, 
many states passed new arrest policies including mandatory arrest, "pro-arrest", and “preferred” 
arrest laws (Bachman & Saltzman, 1995; Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, and Rogan 1992).  Every 
state now permits warrantless arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence cases subject to a police 
officer’s determination that domestic violence may have occurred and these laws vary from state 
to state (Miller, 1998).   
3.4 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 
Little to no direct empirical research has been conducted on the specific problem raised by this 
study, that is, victims’ decisions not to cooperate with police in incidents of domestic violence.  
The available empirical research both quantitative and qualitative, conducted by family violence 
researchers, feminist researchers, public policy researchers, and criminologists is used to identify 
the bounds of the issues that this dissertation addresses and to form the specific hypotheses. 
Social control through legislation and the use of aggressive arrest policies, has dominated 
the theories on how best to reduce and deter domestic violence.  In particular, the focus on the 
effects of increasing the risks and punishment costs of violence toward intimate partners has 
been rooted in assumptions of specific deterrence.  In this context, the emphasis has been on the 
application of legal sanctions through arrest and prosecution of assailants or the threat of legal 
sanctions through civil legal remedies, such as protection orders, that carried criminal penalties if 
violated (Fagan, 1996).   
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The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment is probably the most cited and the most 
influential criminal justice experiment in recent criminological and policy literature history.  The 
experiment was critical in influencing  public perception of domestic violence as a crime that 
required formal criminal justice intervention (Fagan, 1988).  The study used an experimental 
design to test the effects of arrest as a response to incidents involving domestic violence.  Police 
officers were assigned randomly to one of three groups of possible responses (treatments) to 
domestic violence situations; arresting the suspect, separating parties, or advising.  The authors 
then evaluated the success of these three treatments, finding that the smallest proportion of repeat 
offenders belonged to the group in which the police officer had arrested the offender.  These 
results did not necessarily address the question of what proper police response is to incidents of 
domestic violence.  However, the study received a great amount of publicity and its conclusions 
were federally funded and supported.   
Shortly after the findings of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment were 
reported by Lawrence Sherman and Richard Berk in a series of articles beginning in 1983, the 
number of police departments encouraging arrests for domestic violence tripled and almost a 
third of these departments stated that they had changed their position at least partially because of 
the Minneapolis experiment.  "The fact that it generated wide-scale abandonment of police 
doctrine that had remained static for decades is still probably an understatement of its importance 
in changing policy." (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003, pg. 98) 
Some argue that mandatory responses may place victims in danger.  The effectiveness of 
mandatory arrest is not clear.  The Spousal Assault Replication Program (SARP) conducted 
several replication studies of the original Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment with 
findings ranging from arrest having no effect to arrest producing an escalation effect.  
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Additionally, the data suggested that recidivism was reduced in the short term, but may have 
increased in the long term.  In a replication study using a Bayesian approach, Berk, Campbell, 
Klap, and Western (1992) conducted field experiments in 4 major US cities and found that, on 
average, arrest was no more effective than other police interventions in reducing new incidents 
of violence.  In fact, the authors found that arrest had differential effects on subsequent violence 
depending on the background of the offender.  Using prior arrests for domestic violence as a 
measure, the researchers found that those who had been previously arrested were more likely to 
offend again.  While they agreed with Sherman, Smith, Schmidt, and Rogan (1992) that arrest 
seemed to work better in terms of deterrence for employed versus unemployed suspects, they felt 
that employment status may have only indicated that an employed subject may be at home less 
and have fewer opportunities to interact with the victim.  Additionally, because this was a 
Bayesian approach, since arrest was found to have no effect on the average for a given pool of 
suspects and a beneficial effect for a subset of suspects, then it is an arithmetic necessity that 
arrest had a harmful effect on the remainder of the suspects. 
The replication experiments did not consider the effect of decisions by prosecutors and 
courts following arrest and therefore did not demonstrate the effectiveness of mandatory arrest as 
part of a coordinated system response to domestic violence; the experiments also did not address 
the effect of non-arrest.  Arrest communicates the message that domestic violence is a crime; a 
coordinated system response sends a message from the community that domestic violence will 
not be tolerated, and that the criminal justice and law enforcement systems will be involved 
(Zorza, 1994). 
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3.4.1 The influence of the victim's relationship to the perpetrator 
Sherman et al (1992) suggest that domestic assault offenders may retaliate if they think the 
victim played a role in having them arrested, offsetting any deterrent effect of arrest.  It has been 
well documented that a victim's preference for arrest is the strongest predictor of arrest (Buzawa 
& Buzawa, 2003).  Police who are intent on making an arrest may urge the victim to sign a 
complaint against the perpetrator.  The retaliation hypothesis suggests that an offender may view 
a victim signing a complaint against them as cooperating with police (especially if it leads to 
arrest).  This, in turn, may lead to retaliation.  Conversely, offenders may also interpret a victim's 
refusal to sign a complaint against them as acting on their behalf and appreciate it (Felson et.al., 
2005). 
There have been claims by some family violence researchers that women are as 
physically aggressive, or more aggressive, than men in their relationships with their spouses or 
male partners.  The authors of Behind Closed Doors (Straus, Gelles, & Steinmetz, 1980) applied 
the Conflict Tactics scale and reported that husband abuse was a more prevalent problem than 
wife abuse.  In a study evaluating the Conflict tactics scale, Straus (1992) examined the 
criticisms of the instrument, citing that feminists had been particularly critical of its use as it 
understated the victimization of women and overstated violence by women.  He notes, albeit in 
an endnote, that the CTS does not indicate who originates the violence, in other words, the 
instrument does not distinguish between offensive and defensive violence; the instrument also 
does not indicate the extent to which a victim is physically injured.  Straus states that when that 
information is obtained, it turns out that when women initiate, the injury rate is actually very 
low. 
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Barnett et al (1997) compared batterers with battered women to investigate differences in 
terms of frequencies, forms, outcomes, and attributions for abuse. To obtain data for abusive 
behavior profiles, 34 men arrested for spouse abuse and 30 women connected with a battered 
women's shelter completed the Relationship Abuse Questionnaire, which was a modified version 
of the Conflict Tactics Scale.  Although significant group differences did not occur in 
frequencies or forms of abuse, significant gender dissimilarities occurred in outcomes of abuse, 
attributions for abuse, and their interactions. Men reported frightening the other significantly 
more often than women.  The study also found that men endorsed controlling their partner as a 
rationale for their abuse significantly more than women. These results suggest that underlying 
the similar gender frequencies of abuse are statistically significant contextual gender disparities 
in outcomes and attributions. 
Hamberger and Guse (2002) investigated the experiences and impact of intimate partner 
violence using a sample of 119 men and 24 women who were ordered by the court to attend 
abuse abatement counseling and 50 women who were seeking services from a shelter program 
for abused women. While court-ordered men and women expressed violent acts in a similar way, 
used violence with similar frequency and injurious outcome, court-ordered women initiated 
significantly fewer violent episodes than did men and were less likely to start the overall pattern 
of relationship violence. Court-ordered women were less likely than were shelter women to call 
police, try to escape, or acquiesce to their partners' violence. The two groups of women reported 
more fear, anger, and insult and less amusement when their partners were violent than did men.  
Court-ordered men were significantly more likely than were women to laugh at partner-initiated 
violence and exhibit dominating and controlling behaviors. 
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Jacobson et. al. (1994) studied the affect, psychophysiology, and verbal content of 
arguments in 60 couples with a violent husband. On the basis of self-reports of violent 
arguments, there were no wife behaviors that successfully suppressed husband violence once it 
began.  The researchers found that husband violence escalated in response to nonviolent as well 
as violent wife behaviors.  Wife violence escalated only in reaction to husband violence or 
emotional abuse. Furthermore, only wives were fearful during violent and nonviolent arguments.  
In a retrospective study, Kalmuss (1984) found that modeling was not sex-specific 
providing some evidence for the observational learning aspect of social learning theory.  Using a 
nationally representative sample of 2,143 adults, to explore the relationship between childhood 
family aggression and marital aggression in the next generation, she found that observing one's 
father hitting one's mother increases the likelihood for both sons and daughters of becoming 
victims as well as perpetrators of severe marital aggression.  While she concluded that the results 
of the study indicated that the transmission of aggression across generations was not sex specific, 
but role specific, she also found that fathers hitting mothers was the most prevalent type of sex-
specific hitting.  In fact, there were too few cases of mothers hitting who were not hit by fathers 
to permit reliable comparisons across sexes. 
Stets and Straus (1990) investigated the frequency of assault among those who date, 
cohabitate, and are married.  There primary research questions were: 
• Are there differences in the frequency of assault across marital status groups? 
• Does the severity of the assault vary by marital status?, and 
• Does the partner who is violent vary by marital status? 
The sample of married (n=5,005) and cohabitating couples (n=237) was from the 1985 National 
Family Violence Resurvey.  The Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) was used to measure the 
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incidence of both minor and severe categories of violence.  The results of the study revealed that 
cohabitating couples were more likely to have experienced violence than those in dating or 
marital relationships; almost 35 out of every 100 cohabitating couples experienced a physical 
assault during the previous year (compared with 20 for dating couples and 15 for married 
couples).  The results also suggested that cohabitating couples are not only at the greatest risk for 
violence, but also the most dangerous forms of violence of the three groups.  After controlling 
for age, education, and occupation, the authors of the study offered suggestions for the 
differences between the groups in assault rates.  Specifically, they addressed characteristics that 
might be unique to cohabitating couples when compared to dating and married couples.  One 
explanation was that cohabitating couples may be more likely to be more isolated from their 
family network than dating or married couples resulting in their behavior not being as closely 
monitored by family members.  Another suggestion was that among dating couples who are not 
serious, the issue of control may not be as problematic because the partners may not have felt 
that they had the "right" to control their partner.  Married individuals may have felt they had the 
right to control but may also have agreed to "give in" believing they needed to make 
compromises for the sake of the relationship.   
Stets and Pirog-Good (1987) administered a survey consisting primarily of multiple 
choice through open-ended questions to a random sample of 56 upper-level classes at Indiana 
university.   The survey covered demographics, witnessing and experiencing violence in 
childhood, attitudes on violence and instrumentality-expressiveness, and dating information.  
The final sample included 505 respondents.  The results provided supporting evidence that sex-
specific models should be used to explain using and receiving violence.  Women were more 
likely to receive violence suggesting that violence against women was more problematic than 
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violence against men in dating relationships.  The results reveal that a one point increase in a 
man's score on the expressive scale increased the probability of using violence by 25%; 
apparently men who were emotional or devoted themselves completely to others possessed 
characteristics that were conducive for violence.  Additionally, the researchers found that a one 
point increase in accepting violence increased the probability of using violence by 200 percent, 
indicating that men who view violent acts toward women as nonviolent are more likely to use 
violent behavior themselves.  A one month increase in the length of time the man has dated 
increases the probability of using violence by 10 percent suggesting that violence occurs in more 
serious relationships.  The researchers also found that adding one month to the length of the 
dating relationship increased the probability of receiving violence by eight percent while adding 
one partner decreases the probability by 81 percent.  Therefore, dating relationships of longer 
duration and fewer partners increase the likelihood of violence occurring.  Dating frequency was 
positively related to receiving violence; more frequent dates implied a more serious relationship 
and more contact hours with an individual where violence could occur.  Adding one partner 
resulted in a 41% decline in the probability of receiving violence; the fewer the dating partners, 
the more likely the women will receive violence.  Finally, a condition of jealousy was shown to 
influence women's receiving violence; adding one point to this variable resulted in a 225% 
increase in the probability of receiving violence; women in serious relationships who dated other 
men were more likely to receive violence.  Women appear to be at a more elevated risk for 
receiving violence than males, and the likelihood increases if the relationship is defined as an 
intimate relationship rather than marital.   
The evidence supports the following hypotheses: 
 61
H1:  When an incident of domestic violence involves a victim who is an intimate partner 
(as opposed to a spouse), the odds of a victim not cooperating with police will increase. 
and 
H2:  When an incident of domestic violence involves a female victim, the odds of a victim 
not cooperating with police will increase. 
3.4.2 Incident characteristics 
At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive to hypothesize that incident characteristics 
that indicate more serious assaults or more vulnerable victims may be predictors of victim non-
cooperation with the police at the scene of the incident.  However, when we couple the victim's 
fear of retaliation and the fact that there may very well be a history of violence that has escalated 
to the point where the incident at hand has been reported to police, these incident characteristics 
may very well be indicators of the reality in which the victim is making decisions about what 
actions to take in the interest of both present and future personal safety of the themselves and 
perhaps that of other family members.   
Dugan, Nagin, and Rosenfeld (2003) evaluated the relationship between domestic 
violence prevention resources and intimate-partner homicide in 48 cities between 1976 and 1996.  
Using the FBI's Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) they incorporated indicators of 
domestic violence resources such as provisions for warrantless arrest, mandatory arrest, an index 
of legal consequences for violating an order of protection - contempt, misdemeanor, or felony- 
and an "exposure reduction" index.  The dependent variable was a count of intimate-partner 
homicide victims within a three year period. A Poisson likelihood function was used to estimate 
separate panel models for 12 possible combinations of victim sex, race and marital relationship.  
While several types of prevention resources were associated with lower levels of intimate partner 
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homicide, other resources were related to higher levels of homicide, suggesting a retaliation 
effect.  The results of the study suggested that too little exposure reduction (reducing the contact 
between intimate partners to reduce the opportunity for abuse and violence) in severely violent 
relationships may be worse than none at all.  A major weakness of the study was in using only 
policy inputs as indicators, there was no information as to who accessed the system and how well 
policy was implemented.  The authors cited Tjaden and Thoennes (2000) results of a national 
survey on violence against women that revealed more than 73% of the women who were 
assaulted by an intimate did not report the incident to the police; the leading reason was their 
belief that the police could not help.  Dugan and Rosenfeld stated that their findings of increased 
lethality, even null findings, could indicate failures within the criminal justice and social service 
systems to adequately protect victims once they access services. 
Felson and Messner (2000) analyzed data from the revised National Crime Victimization 
Survey to investigate control as a motive in intimate partner violence.  The sample included 
2,597 assaults involving a single unarmed offender and a single victim.  Couple was a dummy 
variable (yes/no).  The dependent variable indicated whether or not the victim was threatened 
before the attack and was coded dichotomously (yes/no).  The researchers examined three 
principal independent variables; the victim-offender relationship, the victim's gender, and the 
offender's gender.  The results revealed that the antagonists were a couple in 22.7% of the 
incidents, and in just under 20% of all incidents (both couple and non-couple) a male assaulted 
his female partner.  The results of the logistic regression indicated that the odds of a threat before 
an assault were over 3 1/2 times greater for men who assault their female partners than for other 
situations represented in the model.  Although the measurement of the control variable is 
indirect, the researchers believed that the measurement was strong enough to permit reasonable 
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inferences about the frequency of the control motive in one type of assault compared with other 
types, namely male assaults on female partners.  It appears, in support of the feminist 
perspective, that males have a greater interest in controlling their female partners; men are also 
probably more likely to have the physical capabilities necessary to use violence successfully 
against women.   
In an NIJ funded project funded done in the the Quincy District Court (QDC), which 
serves eastern Norfolk County, along Massachusetts' South Shore, Buzawa and Hotaling (2000) 
focused on male to female violence.  Information was collected from multiple sources and 
multiple perspectives including police incident reports, victim surveys, offender criminal history 
data, civil restraining order data, prosecutors’ office district court data, and data on study 
defendants’ and batterer treatment programs) covering data from significant periods of time both 
before and after the occurrence of the incident that led to its inclusion in the sample; these data 
were then linked together into one coherent data file.  The final sample consisted of 353 cases of 
which all but 3 came to the attention of the study as the result of arrest.  The researchers found 
that one group of victims who were most likely to be deterred from future use of the justice 
system were those who accurately determined that they were in the greatest danger of retaliation.  
Seventy-one percent of the incidents involved the use of violence, and 10% of the victims in the 
study experienced serious injuries including broken bones, broken noses, internal injuries and 
loss of consciousness.  An additional 27% experienced moderate injuries such as bruises and 
swelling.  Weapons such as knives, firearms, blunt objects and motor vehicles were used in 16% 
of the incidents and in 70% of the incidents the victims felt that they were going to be seriously 
injured.  More than 20% of the victims felt that they needed medical attention as a result of the 
incident.  Additionally, the analysis of the re-offenders in this study revealed that the official data 
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identified 1 in 5 of the victims were re-victimized while the victim survey data revealed a re-
victimization rate of more than 49%.  Re-offenders were more likely to have had a weapon in the 
original incident, and were more likely to be involved in incidents where someone other than the 
victim called the police.  Additionally, almost 3 out of 4 of the victims in this study had called 
the police on a prior occasion about the same offender.  Victims reported trying a variety of self-
defense tactics, but most of the time this served to increase offender violence.  Even when the 
victims moved away from their husband or partner, there was no guarantee of safety.  Less than 
half of the victims in this study were living with their assailant at the time of the incident, but 
three quarters of the attacks occurred in their homes. 
The researchers also found that victims are often quite capable of assessing their own 
danger.  The results of this study indicated that women's fears of offenders were accurate and 
that despite aggressive intervention by a full enforcement criminal justice system, the pattern of 
future offenses in many cases had not been broken. From victim accounts, almost half reported 
another instance of abuse or violation of a restraining order.  Women who thought they would be 
seriously injured in the study incident were nearly 3 times more likely to be re-victimized.  
Women who thought they were in need of medical attention as a result of the incident were one 
and a half times more likely to be re-victimized.  Women who described offender violence over 
the course of the relationship as having become more severe and frequent were more than twice 
as likely to be re-victimized than women who reported no discernable pattern of violence.  
Women in controlling relationships were almost twice as likely to be re-victimized and victims 
who feared serious injury were almost 3 times more likely to be re-victimized.  Victims who felt 
that going to court was going to reduce their ability to bargain with the offender were also more 
likely to be re-victimized.  While victims called the police for a variety of reasons other than just 
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arrest 16% of victims did not want arrest and victims who did not want arrest were usually the 
women who had not called the police. 
Dugan and Apel (2005) employed a routine activity model of violent victimization by 
incorporating an explicit rational choice perspective on potential victims' decision making to 
avoid violent encounters. The study proposed that the costs associated with a violent attack and 
the probability of offender retaliation depended on whether the offender's targeting strategy is 
opportunistic (stranger victim) or deliberate (intimate victim).  The offender's strategy was 
viewed as a function of the relational distance between the offender and victim. The researchers 
hypothesized that victim efforts to limit exposure to an offender may motivate a violent 
retaliatory response when the victim and offender are intimates as opposed to strangers.  
Depending on the victim's perceived risk of violence, it was hypothesized that there may not be 
any benefits to altering routine activities.  Potential costs of change in routine activities 
considered by the victim were summarized as 
• Probability(retaliation) * Attack costs + Resource costs 
Potential benefits of change, a reduction in attack costs such as injury, that were associated with 
exposure reduction, were summarized as 
• Attack costs * (1 - Exposure reduction)   
When the costs were less than the benefits, it was assumed that the victim would alter routine 
activities to avoid violent victimization.  Attack costs included whether a weapon was involved 
in the incident, whether the attack led to serious injury, and whether there were others present at 
the time of the incident.  Indicators used to measure the influence of attack costs on changes in 
routine activities included whether or not the victim contacted the police, and whether or not the 
victim sought help from non-criminal justice agency. 
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The hypotheses were tested using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(1992–2000) and the results suggested that female victims were more sensitive to an offender's 
targeting strategy than male victims.  The study revealed that the probability of violent retaliation 
in response to exposure reduction increased as relational distance decreased for females, but not 
for males.  In other words, females who have a close relational distance with their perpetrators 
were more vulnerable to retaliatory violence.  Women were almost 3 times more likely to be 
targeted deliberately (domestic offenders) than were men; therefore women were found to be at a 
higher risk of retaliatory violence if they tried to separate themselves from their intimate 
offenders.  Relatively few results were significant in the male model.  However for females, in 
contrast to victims of stranger violence, the researchers found if the attack led to serious injury, 
the wife was less likely to call the police, suggesting that the willingness of the husband to harm 
the wife might imply that he would harm her even further, placing the husband’s actions in a 
wider context of control over his spouse’s autonomy.   
Browne (1987) conducted a study of 42 incarcerated women from 15 states who were 
charged with a crime in the death or serious injury of their mates.  The results were later 
compared to those of 205 women who had been in abusive relationships, but did not take lethal 
action against their partners.  The focus of the inquiry was the on women’s actions in the context 
of their position as victims.  Browne investigated the impact that violence and threat of violence 
from an intimate partner had on the victims’ perceptions of danger and alternatives.  Almost all 
of the women in the homicide group reported that resisting the violence or fighting back 
worsened the attack.  Abused women also reported that an interruption in the violence was not 
expected to deter escalation of the violence.  After police intervention where the abuser was told 
to take a walk and cool down, abused women often reported that their abusers were even more 
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angry once the police had departed and the violence became more severe.  In the homicide 
group, once a pattern of aggression had been established, the assaults tended to increase in 
frequency and severity. 
It is reasonable to assume that a perpetrator of domestic assault would prefer not to be 
exposed to the criminal justice system and therefore would be opposed to the victim cooperating 
with the police in an arrest.  Based on the evidence, violence and the threat of violence are used 
as means of controlling the behavior of intimate partners.  The evidence also suggests that threats 
of violence are likely to precede an actual assault, possibly indicating that the victims are at risk 
of retaliatory violence at an escalated level.  We know that police response is incident driven 
while victim decision-making is contextual in nature.  We also know that many domestic 
violence victims have experienced previous violence at the hands of the perpetrator and, when 
the violence escalates to some tipping point, it may result in a reported incident. 
Given this information, we might expect higher levels of noncooperation among victims 
who are fearful of retaliation in the future at the hands of their assailant.  If, indeed, in incidents 
involving domestic violence, perpetrators often engage in escalated violence over time and 
threaten retaliatory violence when exposed to the possibility of being exposed to criminal 
sanctioning, we would expect to see odds of victim noncooperation increase as seriousness of the 
incident increases and as the vulnerability of the victim increases.   
The evidence further supports the following hypotheses: 
H3:  When an incident involves a weapon, the odds of a victim not cooperating with 
police at the scene of the crime will increase. 
and 
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H4:  When an incident of domestic violence involves injury to the victim, the odds of a 
victim not cooperating with police at the scene of the crime will increase. 
In Finkelhor and Yllö's (1985) research on the issue of marital rape, the researchers 
discovered an enormous gap in the research; marital rape was legally nonexistent and absent in 
research (Yllö (1988).  At the time journalists and legislators were asserting that wife rape was 
not serious.  During the debate about criminalizing marital rape in California, one state senator 
asked "But if you can't rape your wife, who can you rape?" (Yllö 1988)  Focusing exclusively on 
marital rape, Yllö and Finkelhor employed a qualitative methodology and conducted 50 
unstructured, in-depth interviews with women who had indicated in intake interviews at family 
planning agencies, feminist health centers, and battered women's shelters that a partner had used 
force or the threat of force to have sex with them.  They discovered three basic types of marital 
rape, battering rape, force-only rape, and obsessive rape.  Battering rape occurred in marriages 
characterized by a high level of violence and the rapes were an additional element of the beatings 
and humiliation.  Force-only rape occurred in marriages characterized as otherwise non-violent; 
the husband's desire for control was central and power rather than anger appeared to be the 
motivation.  Obsessive rape was most openly sadistic.  The study revealed that women’s fear of 
their rapist husbands outlasted their marriages; the fear was deeply engrained and often 
generalized to other men.  Some of the victims lived in fear for years during their marriages 
never knowing when a sexual assault might occur.  Even when the husband was no longer 
physically present, the insecurity persisted.   
Culbertson, Vik, & Kooiman, (2001) used the Safety Rating Scale and to examine the 
influence of sexual assault, the location of assault, the victim’s relationship to perpetrator, and 
the impact of assault on perceived safety.  Questionnaire packets that included the Safety Rating 
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Scale were distributed and completed by 314 female undergraduates, 55% of whom met assault 
criteria. Results indicated that sexually assaulted women felt less safe than those without an 
assault history, women assaulted in their homes reported lower perceived home safety than 
women assaulted in another location.  As the impact of the sexual assault increased, victims’ 
feelings of perceived safety decreased.  The prior relationship of the victim to the perpetrator was 
related to perceived safety.  Women sexually assaulted by a familiar perpetrator (e.g., previous 
sexual intimacy, cohabiting, or married) reported less perceived safety in the home than women 
assaulted by a stranger, an acquaintance, or a date. 
In Browne’s 1987 study, over half of the women in the comparison group (59%) reported 
to have been forced to have sexual intercourse on at least one occasion; 76% of the homicide 
group reported being raped by their mates.  The homicide group reported that sexual abuse was 
sometimes used as a mechanism to humiliate and control.  The women were least likely to reveal 
this kind of abuse to others making it “among the most risk-free forms of violence a man can 
engage in.” (pg. 101)  As Browne characterized it, a maximum amount of damage could be done 
both psychologically and physically with minimal risk of disclosure.  If the assault was revealed, 
there was also a decreased likelihood of penalty associated with the act.  In the homicide group, 
sexual assaults occurred relatively frequently and many times they were accompanied with other 
abusive acts or threats of violence. 
Because domestic violence generally takes place in the private sphere of the home, the 
evidence suggests that a victim of domestic sexual violence, who already has a reduced 
perception of safety in the home, might feel exceptionally vulnerable.  Considering the findings 
that rape in marriages was sometimes characterized by a high level of violence and were an 
additional element of beatings and humiliation, a victim of this type of domestic violence might 
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be especially cognizant and fearful of the likelihood of retaliation by the perpetrator.  
Additionally, where the partner’s desire for control is central the threat of retaliation must be 
considered together with a victim’s enhanced perception of vulnerability in the home suggesting 
the following hypothesis: 
H5:  When an incident of domestic violence involves a sexual assault, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police will increase. 
The Dugan and Apel (2005) study (described above) also found that some costs increased 
the chances that a victim will take action to seek help outside the home or seek changes in the 
status quo.  When examining the circumstances that might lead to the victim calling the police, 
the cost to most strongly lead to help seeking among women was having young children; victims 
who called the police were also more likely to leave the marriage.  Although their findings 
supported the assertion that the decision to seek help would be less likely if the costs were high, 
it appears that the cost of putting one’s children at risk of violence was higher than avoiding 
personal retaliation.   
Therefore, 
H6:  When an incident of domestic violence involves a juvenile victim, the odds of a 
victim not cooperating with police will decrease. 
and 
H7:  When an incident of domestic violence involves more than one victim, the odds of a 
victim not cooperating with police will decrease. 
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3.4.3 The influence of arrest policy 
There is a developing policy consensus favoring more aggressive arrest and prosecution 
of all offenders.  Aggressive arrest policy is partially based on the tenet that victims of domestic 
violence are not capable of and should not be asked to assess the future risk presented by an 
offender.  However, in light of the evidence, it appears that the victims of domestic violence 
have a very good sense of the likelihood of retaliation if, in fact, criminal justice intervention 
occurs.  As Dugan & Apel (2005) observed, victims of deliberate offenders, especially female 
victims of spousal violence, fear for their safety and may suspect that, given the opportunity, 
their offenders will retaliate; they appear to resist courses of action intended to help them.  The 
arrest policies provide some, if only brief, protection for the victim.  Additionally, as Dugan et.al 
(2003) concluded, victims inherently know what others have worked hard to discover – a little 
exposure reduction can be more harmful than none at all. 
The incident characteristics predicting victim non-cooperation may be influenced by the 
arrest policy guiding law enforcement arrest protocol.  A stricter arrest policy, one that limits 
both police discretion and victim agency, might increase the odds that a victim will refuse to 
cooperate in an attempt to prevent the arrest of the perpetrator and avoid the risk of retaliation.  
In other words, where law enforcement is operating under a stricter arrest policy, the odds among 
the predictors of victim non-cooperation will increase if the victim perceives that their reluctance 
to co-operate at the arrest level might result in the police not pursuing the case.    
H8:  When controlling for the type of arrest policy (discretionary, preferred, or 
mandatory), the odds of a victim not cooperating with police will increase among the predictors 
as restrictiveness of the dominant arrest policy increases. 
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4.0  ARREST POLICIES 
One of the most important innovations in domestic violence cases has been the change in the 
common law rule (Miller 1998).  Common law rule authorizes police to make warrantless arrests 
in misdemeanor cases only where they actually see the crime committed.  Most domestic 
violence cases are classified as a simple assault and battery, which is a misdemeanor.  Prior to 
the mid 1980s, police in most states could not make arrests for misdemeanors without a warrant, 
unless the act occurred in the officer's presence.  Arrests were rarely made in domestic violence 
cases.  This approach failed to protect the victim from abuse, and at the same time, protected the 
perpetrator from criminal responsibility.  Most domestic violence cases are classified as a simple 
assault and battery, which is a misdemeanor.  The societal message was that domestic violence 
was a private, not a criminal, matter.   
In a recent evaluation of the Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies Program, funded under 
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 and its reauthorization in 2000, the evaluators 
examined how the implementation of the Arrest Policies Program changed the criminal justice 
system.  It was concluded that "state legislation making domestic violence a crime and providing 
new remedies for victims of domestic violence is largely a hodge podge of differing provisions"  
(Miller N., 2005).  The report goes on to explain that diversity in legislation is a natural 
consequence of a federal system; different states do different things in different ways.  The 
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evaluation found that problems in responding to domestic violence that are common among the 
states are not universally addressed by the states.  
The arrest policies are intended to provide some, if only brief, protection for the victim.  
Part of the logic behind these policies is the assumption that the limited period of time that the 
batterer is away from the home may allow the victim opportunity to plan a course of action.  
Unlike violence between strangers, in most domestic assault cases, the victim lives with the 
perpetrator and cannot get away from the abuse. The aggressive arrest approach seeks to give the 
perpetrator a sense of the severity of the situation.  Much has been written on individual laws, 
but systematic attention to these laws as a whole has been limited (Miller 1998).   
Some argue that mandatory responses may place victims in danger.  The effectiveness of 
mandatory arrest is not clear.  The Spousal Assault Replication Program (SARP) conducted 
several replication studies of the original Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment with 
findings ranging from arrest having no effect to arrest producing an escalation effect (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 2003).  Additionally, the data suggest that recidivism is reduced in the short term, but 
may increase in the long term (Berk, 1993).  The replication experiments did not consider the 
effect of decisions by prosecutors and courts following arrest and therefore did not demonstrate 
the effectiveness of mandatory arrest as part of a coordinated system response to domestic 
violence; the experiments also did not address the effect of non-arrest (Zorza, 1994).  There is 
some agreement that actions by one part of the justice system are only effective when the system 
is operating as a whole (Zorza, 1994) - police making arrests, prosecutors prosecuting domestic 
violence cases, and courts enforcing orders and imposing sanctions for criminal convictions. 
Arrest communicates the message that domestic violence is a crime; a coordinated system 
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response sends a message from the community that domestic violence will not be tolerated, and 
that the criminal justice and law enforcement systems will be involved.   
Researchers remind us that, in reality, we know very little about what best protects 
victims (Fagan, 1996; Dugan et. al.2003; Dugan & Apel, 2005).  This uncertainty may be 
reflected in victim decision-making.  While police officers continue to express frustration and 
confusion when domestic violence victims refuse to cooperate with efforts to investigate the 
incident in order to prosecute the defendant, the victim may be using their knowledge and 
experience to manage the situation and create an outcome that will be acceptable to them 
considering their own unique set of circumstances.  The police have a protocol to follow, while 
the victim is operating under conditions of stress, fear, and sometimes panic. 
Every state now permits warrantless arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence cases 
subject to a police officer’s determination that domestic violence may have occurred, which is 
the common law standard used for felony cases (Miller, 1998).  States have adopted a wide 
variety of statutory models and, as a result, new laws have proliferated, including pro-arrest and 
mandatory, or no-drop, prosecution policies.  Some states have now enacted mandatory arrest 
statutes under which a police officer must make an arrest when there is evidence that some sort 
of violence occurred and the perpetrator and victim lived together as a couple, had a child 
together whether they lived together or not, or were members of the same family.  The 
mandatory arrest laws vary considerably from state to state (Miller, 1998).  Although most states 
have enacted legislation that strongly encourages arrests for acts of domestic violence and many 
mandate an arrest if certain conditions are met (Table 1). 
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Table 1     Domestic Violence Arrest Policies 
 Mandatory Preferred Discretionary 
State    
Alabama   X 
Alaska X   
Arizona X   
Arkansas  X  
California  X  
Colorado X   
Connecticut X   
Delaware   X 
District of Columbia X   
Florida  X  
Georgia   X 
Hawaii   X 
Idaho   X 
Illinois   X 
Indiana   X 
Iowa X   
Kansas X   
Kentucky   X 
Louisiana X   
Maine X   
Maryland   X 
Massachusetts  X  
Michigan  X  
Minnesota   X 
Mississippi X   
Missouri X  X 
Montana  X  
Nebraska   X 
Nevada X   
New Hampshire   X 
New  Jersey X   
New Mexico   X 
New York X   
North Carolina   X 
North Dakota  X  
Ohio X   
Oklahoma   X 
Oregon X   
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Pennsylvania   X 
Rhode Island X   
South Carolina X   
South Dakota X   
Tennessee  X  
Texas   X 
Utah X   
Vermont   X 
Virginia X   
Washington X   
West Virginia   X 
Wisconsin X   
Wyoming   X 
Source:  Adaption of National Institute of Justice (2002), National Evaluation of the Grants to 
Encourage Arrest Policies Program Final Report. US Department of Justice 
(http://www.ilj.org/Publications/ArrestPolicies.pdf) 
 
4.1.1 Mandatory Arrest Policies 
Many states have enacted mandatory arrest statutes under which a police officer must when 
there is evidence that some sort of violence occurred if the perpetrator lived together as a couple, 
had a child together whether they lived together or not, or were members of the same family 
(Miller 1997).  The mandatory arrest laws vary considerably from state to state (Table 2).   
Table 2     Mandatory Arrest Policies 
State Legislation Circumstances that apply 
   
Alaska Alaska Statute § 18.65.530(a) 
Probable cause to believe domestic 
violence offense committed within past 12 
hours 
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3601 (B) 
Domestic violence involving physical 
injury or use/threatened use of a deadly 
weapon 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.6 Probable cause to believe a crime of domestic violence was committed 
Connecticut 
 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-
38b (a) 
Speedy information that family violence 
was committed in jurisdiction 
District of D.C. Code Ann. § 16-1031 Probable cause to believe an intrafamily 
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Columbia offense that resulted in physical injury 
including pain or illness or was intended to 
cause reasonable fear of imminent serious 
physical injury or death 
Iowa Iowa Code Ann. §§ 236.12 (2) 
Probable cause to believe that domestic 
abuse assault was committed that resulted 
in bodily injury, or was committed with 
intent to inflict serious injury, or with use 
or display of dangerous weapon 
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2307 (b)(1) 
Probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed 
Louisiana 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-2140 
(1) (aggravated or second 
degree battery), (2) (danger to 
victim exists where assault or 
simple battery occurred) 
Reason to believe a family or household 
member has been abused and (1) probable 
cause exists to believe that 
aggravated/second degree battery was 
committed or (2) aggravated or simple 
assault or simple battery committed and 
reasonable belief in impending danger to 
abused 
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 19-A § 4012 (5) 
Probable cause to believe there has been a 
violation of title 17-A, section 208 
(aggravated assault statute) between 
members of the same family or household 
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 99-3-7 (3) 
Probable cause to believe that within 24 
hours the offender knowingly committed a 
misdemeanor act of domestic violence 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.137 Probable cause to believe that within 24 hours battery was committed 
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-21 
Probable cause to believe that domestic 
violence has occurred and either victim 
shows signs of injury or probable cause 
that weapon was involved 
New York N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (4)(c) 
Probable cause to believe that a felony has 
been committed against a member of the 
same family or household or, unless victim 
requests otherwise, a misdemeanor family 
offense was committed 
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.032 (A)(1)(a) 
Reasonable cause to believe that offender 
committed a felonious assault 
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.055 (2)(a) 
Probable cause to believe that a felonious 
assault or an assault resulting in injury 
occurred or action has placed another to 
reasonably fear imminent serious bodily 
injury or death  
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-29-3 Probable cause to believe the following:  felonious assault: assault resulting in 
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injury: action was intended to cause fear of 
imminent serious bodily injury or death 
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 16-25-70 
If physical injury is present and probable 
cause to believe person is committing or 
has freshly committed a 
misdemeanor/felony assault or battery 
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 23A-3-2.1 
Probable cause to believe that within the 
previous 24 hours (amended in 2001 from 
4 hours) there has been an aggravated 
assault, an assault resulting in bodily 
injury, or an attempt by physical menace to 
place in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury 
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2 
Probable cause to believe that an act of 
domestic violence was committed and there 
will be continued violence or evidence that 
the perpetrator has recently caused serious 
bodily injury or used a dangerous weapon 
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-81.3 Probable cause to believe assault or battery on family or household member 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.31.100 (2) 
Probable cause to believe a person 16 years 
or older within the previous 4 hours 
assaulted a family or household member 
and believes (1) felonious assault occurred, 
or (2) assault resulting in bodily injury 
occurred whether injury is visible or not, or 
(3) that any physical action has occurred 
which was intended to cause another 
person to reasonably to fear imminent 
serious bodily injury or death. 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 968.075(3) 
Reasonable cause to believe that offender 
committing or has committed domestic 
abuse and either evidence of physical 
injury or reasonable basis for believing 
continued abuse is likely 
 
Source:  Adaption of National Institute of Justice (2002), National Evaluation of the Grants to 
Encourage Arrest Policies Program Final Report. US Department of Justice 
(http://www.ilj.org/Publications/ArrestPolicies.pdf) 
The mandatory arrest policies are intended to provide some, if only brief, protection for 
the victim; a limited period of time that the batterer is away from the home may allow the victim 
time to plan a course of action.  The mandatory arrest approach seeks to give the perpetrator a 
sense of the severity of the situation (Zorza, 1994).   
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4.1.2 Preferred Arrest Policies 
Preferential arrest policy means that arrest is preferred solution, but an officer can exercise 
discretion and use other options.  There are many circumstantial variations among states with 
this type of domestic violence arrest policy. (Table 3)   
Table 3     Preferred Arrest Policies 
State Legislation Circumstances that apply 
   
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-113 
Preferred action when there is evidence that domestic 
abuse has occurred 
California Cal. Penal Code § 836 
The written policies shall encourage the arrest of 
domestic violence offenders if there is probable cause 
that an offense has been committed 
Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. §741.29 (4)(b) 
Arrest is the preferred response whenever a law 
enforcement officer determines upon probable cause 
that an act of domestic violence has been committed 
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 209A § 6 
Preferred response whenever the officer has 
witnessed or has probable cause to believe that a 
person has committed a felony, a misdemeanor 
involving abuse, or an assault and battery 
Michigan Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.874 (1), 28.1274(3) 
Arrest is preferred response when officer has probable 
cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred. 
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 46-6-311 (2)(a) 
Preferred response in partner or family member 
assault cases involving injury to the victim, use or 
threatened use of a weapon, or other imminent danger 
to the victim 
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 14-07.1-10 
If there is probable cause to believe that a person has 
committed a crime involving domestic violence, 
whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor, and 
whether or not the crime was committed in the 
presence of the officer, then the law enforcement 
officer shall presume that arresting the person is the 
appropriate response 
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619 
Preferred response when there is probable cause to 
believe that a crime committed involving domestic 
abuse within of outside of the presence of the officer 
 
Source:  Adaption of National Institute of Justice (2002), National Evaluation of the Grants to 
Encourage Arrest Policies Program Final Report. US Department of Justice 
(http://www.ilj.org/Publications/ArrestPolicies.pdf) 
 80
There are many variations in practice among states that have adopted a preferred arrest policy.  
In some states employing this type of arrest policy, an officer who investigates a domestic 
dispute is required to make a report of the incident, including visible injuries and actions or 
statements of the parties or witnesses; sometimes an officer must report a statement of the 
reasons for not making an arrest.   
4.1.3 Discretionary Arrest Policies 
There are 21 states whose laws provide only discretionary arrest authority which, on the surface, 
would seem to be the least strict policy.  These states employ warrantless arrest policies which 
are pro-arrest policies in that they allow police to make an arrest without a warrant based on a 
determination that probable cause exists to believe an act of domestic violence has occurred 
(police discretion).  Legislation in some of these states (Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West 
Virginia) require arrest without a warrant if the victim has an order of protection on file (Table 
4). 
Table 4     Discretionary Arrest Policies 
 Domestic Violence 
Legislation Violation of Protection Order Legislation 
State  Mandatory Discretionary 
Alabama Ala. Code § 15-10-3 (a)(8) 
  Ala. Code §§ 30-5A-
4, 15-10-3 (A)(7) 
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1904  
  Del. Code Ann. tit. 10 
§ 1046 
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 17-4-20.1 
  Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-
7-2, 19-13-1 (2), 17-4-
20 (a)  
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 709-906  
  Haw. Rev. Stat. § 
803-5  
Idaho Idaho Code § 19-603  
  Idaho Code § 39-6312 
(2)  
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Illinois 725 Ilsc 5/107-2;    725 Ilsc 5/112A-26 
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-1-1 
   
Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.005 (2)  
 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
403.760 
 
Maryland Md. Crim Proc.§ 2-204 
  Md. Fam. Law Code 
Ann. § 4-509 (b) 
Minnesota Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.341  
 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
518B.01 Subd. 14 (e) 
 
Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.1 
 Mo. Rev. Stat. §  
455.085.1 (2) 
 
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-404.02 (3);  
 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-
928, 28-311.09 (9) 
 
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 173-B:9, 
594:10 
 N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-
B:8 (I)  
 
New Mexico 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-
1-7 
 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-
13-6 
(c) 
 
North Carolina 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
15A-401 (b), 
(b)(2))(d) 
 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
4.1 (b) 
 
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 40.3 (B); 18  
  Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 
60.9 
Pennsylvania Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2711;  
 PA. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
6113 
 
Texas 
Tex. Crim. Proc. 
Code Ann. § 14.03 
(a)(4) 
 Tex Crim. Proc. Code 
Ann. § 14.03 (b) (if in 
presence of officer, 
otherwise 
discretionary) 
 
Vermont Vt. Rules Crim. Proc. Rule 3;  
  Vt. Rules Crim. Proc. 
Rule 3 
West Virginia W. Va. Code § 48-2A-14;  
 W. Va. Code § 48-2A-
10c (if injury); 
 
Wyoming 
Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-20-
102 (a), 35-21-107 
(b)(iv). 
  Wyo. Stat. § 7-20-102 
(b) 
Source:  Adaption of National Institute of Justice (2002), National Evaluation of the Grants to 
Encourage Arrest Policies Program Final Report. US Department of Justice 
(http://www.ilj.org/Publications/ArrestPolicies.pdf) 
It should be noted that in most cases, states do not always fit neatly into any one of these 
three general arrest categories.  A few examples are 
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• Missouri's legislation provides discretionary arrest authority in incidents involving 
domestic violence.  However, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.1 mandates arrest for a second 
domestic violence incident within 12 hours.  Specifically, a law enforcement officer is 
required to make an arrest if police are called to the same address within 12 hours and the 
officer has probable cause to believe same offender has committed abuse or assault 
against same or other family/household member.   
• California law provides for preferred arrest, but Cal. Penal Code §§ 836, 13701 requires 
local agencies to establish mandatory arrest policies.   
• Arizona and Louisiana law mandate arrest for domestic violence where injury is seen or 
fear of injury occurring exists.   
Ohio mandates arrest where the officer has probable cause and a preferred arrest policy 
where there is only a reasonable basis for arrest.   
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5.0  METHODS 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVES 
The relatively new FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) captures 
information on all incidents known to law enforcement and can be used to examine incident 
characteristics related to the likelihood that a victim will refuse to cooperate with law 
enforcement in an incident involving domestic violence.  NIBRS can provide insights into the 
problem of domestic violence by providing incident profiles for specific types of domestic 
assault and for various kinds of victims.  NIBRS data can provide descriptions of the 
characteristics of incidents of domestic violence that are related to the victim’s refusal to 
cooperate with law enforcement and how these relationships vary with victim, offender and 
incident characteristics. The NIBRS data also support analysis to determine what incident 
characteristics are differentially associated with the probability of victim non-cooperation. 
A preliminary examination of the NIBRS 2003 data revealed the importance of 
examining the victim subgroups rather than using a “one size fits all” approach (Figure 1).  In the 
2003 NIBRS data, the most serious assault charge was simple assault in 84.24% of all domestic 
assaults cleared by law enforcement.  Incidents of aggravated assault followed with 12.96%, 
while incidents of sexual assault were far less frequently reported (2.80%).  Overall, more than 
60% of the victims of these crimes were older than 25 years of age with more than one quarter 
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(26.50%) between the ages of 25 and 34.  A similar proportion (22.93%) of victims were 
between the ages of 18 and 24.  More than one third (38.25%) were 35 years of age and older.  
The remainder of the victims (12.32%) was under the age of 18. 
Figure 1     Age Profiles of Assault Victims 
The age profile of domestic assault victims differed from that of other assault victims. 
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The age profile of domestic assault victims varied with the nature of the crime.  While 
persons under the age of 18 were the large majority (79.03%) of the victims of sexual assault, 
persons over the age of 18 were the victims in 87.95% of the aggravated assaults and 89.85% of 
the incidents where simple assault was the most serious charge.  Children between the ages of 12 
and 17 were about 7.28% of all domestic aggravated assault victims and 7.17% of all domestic 
simple assault victims. 
Although incidents of domestic violence having sexual assault as the most serious charge 
involves the smallest proportion (2.80%) of the victims of domestic assault incidents, the age 
profile of the victims involved in these incidents was very different from those that involved 
simple and aggravated assault.  The majority of these victims was under the age of 18 at the time 
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of the crime (79.03%).  In fact, 64.20% of all victims of sexual assault in the domestic assault 
incidents reported to law enforcement were under age 15; more than one of every 10 (15.71%) of 
all domestic sexual assault victims reported to law enforcement agencies being under age 6. 
The victim age distribution differed with the nature of the assault (Figure 2).  The 
detailed age distribution of the victims of incidents involving sexual assault emphasizes the high 
proportion of young victims.  The single age with the greatest proportion of sexual assault 
victims reported to law enforcement was age 15.  There were more victims in each individual 
age group between 3 and 17 than in any individual adult age group, and more victims age 2 than 
in any age group. 
Figure 2     Age and Sex Profiles of Sexual Assault Victims 
The victim age distribution of incidents involving sexual assault differed considerably 
from that of incidents involving aggravated or simple assault. 
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The risk of being the victim of aggravated assault increased dramatically from age 10 to 
age 20, where it peaked and then dropped somewhat through age 40 and then declined steadily as 
victim age increased.  Although the pattern was similar for males and females, the risk of being a 
victim was consistently higher for females through the age of 50 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3     Age and Sex Profiles of Aggravated Assault Victims 
The age and sex profile of domestic aggravated assault victims differed from that of 
non-domestic aggravated assault victims. 
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The age profile of the victims involved in domestic simple assault incidents was very 
similar to those that involved aggravated assault.  The risk of being the victim of simple assault 
also increased dramatically, although not as sharply, from age 10 to age 20, where it peaked.  For 
females, it dropped from that peak fairly steadily as victim age increased, but not as quickly as it 
did for domestic aggravated assault.  For males, the risk of being a victim of domestic simple 
assault also increased through age 20, hovered at about the same level through age 40 and then 
steadily dropped.  The risk of being a victim of simple assault was consistently higher for 
females in incidents involving domestic violence. 
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Figure 4     Age and Sex Profiles of Simple Assault Victims 
Unlike their counterparts in non-domestic assault incidents, after age 12, females were 
much more likely than males to be victims of simple assault in incidents involving 
domestic violence. 
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This concurs with the findings in a recent publication by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) that highlights many findings using several data sets providing snapshots of family 
violence at different stages in the administration of justice (Catalano, 2006).  Some of the 
highlights of the BJS (2005) study that are comparable to the descriptive analysis of the NIBRS 
data include: 
 
 The majority of family violence victims (73%) were female. 
 The majority of the family violence incidents involved simple assault. 
 About 75% of the offenders were male. 
 Most family violence victims were white. 
 
The BJS report also indicates that approximately 60% of the family violence victimizations 
were reported to police and the female reporting rate was not significantly greater than the male 
rate.  The most common reason cited for not reporting was that the incident was a private matter.  
A little over 1/3 of the incidents (36%) that were reported to police resulted in arrest. 
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5.2 THE STUDY 
If a victim chooses not to cooperate at the scene of the incident, the police can clear the incident 
by exceptional means - without a charge.  While this could be termed rare, deciding not to do 
anything may reflect a host of factors that figure into police decision making.  Police decide who 
will and who will not be charged.  They act as the front line in screening cases in and out of the 
criminal justice system.  Whether and to what extent a victim’s reluctance to cooperate or press 
charges against an abuser are issues that need to be explored.  A victim’s reluctance to co-
operate at the arrest level may result in the police not pursuing the case at all. At this point we 
simply do not know how frequently this occurs.  The “system” will never have the opportunity to 
address the problem and the victims become “invisible”. 
In an effort to gain an understanding of these "invisible" victims, this study focused on: 
• Examining what extralegal factors predicted the likelihood of victim non-
cooperation in incidents involving domestic violence, and 
• Examining whether the type of arrest policy served to influence the extralegal 
factors that predict the likelihood of victim non-cooperation in incidents involving 
domestic violence when the nature of the domestic assault is considered. 
This study used NIBRS data to explore whether there is evidence contained in the 
incident level data reported by law enforcement that would reliably predict whether a victim will 
be unwilling to cooperate when law enforcement responds to an incident of domestic violence.  
We know from the evidence that police response is incident driven while victim decision-making 
is contextual in nature.  We also know that many domestic violence victims have experienced 
previous violence at the hands of the perpetrator and, when the violence escalates to some 
tipping point, it may result in the incident being reported to the police.  While it may seem 
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counterintuitive to hypothesize that incident characteristics indicating more serious assaults or 
more vulnerable victims may be predictors of victim non-cooperation with the police at the scene 
of the incident when we couple the victim's fear of retaliation and the fact that there may very 
well be a history of violence that has escalated to the point where the incident at hand has been 
reported to police, these incident characteristics may very well be indicators of the reality in 
which the victim is making decisions about what actions to take in the interest of present and 
future safety for themselves and members of their family. 
5.3 THE DATA 
Historically, traditional arrest statistics (the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports) have only reported 
aggregate counts and could not be used to assess the intersection of individual incident 
characteristics such as victim demographics (age, sex, race).  Thus, very little information 
existed about the victims in domestic violence incidents who refuse to cooperate with the police.  
However, the UCR’s relatively new National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) gives 
us detailed descriptions of domestic assaults reported by participating law enforcement agencies 
and how they were cleared.  The NIBRS data can provide a profile of the characteristics of 
domestic violence crimes that were reported to law enforcement including the demographics of 
the victims (characteristics of victim population subgroups) and the characteristics that these 
victims attribute to the offender(s) and the incidents.  These data also include law enforcement’s 
assessment of the relationship between the offender and the victim (parents, children, siblings, 
other family members and intimate partners), the nature of the offense, the location of the crime, 
the time that it occurred, the weapons involved, the degree of physical injury to the victim, and 
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the method of clearance (e.g., arrest, victim’s refusal to cooperate).  It is now possible to 
examine the incident characteristic to determine if any of these characteristics contribute to the 
increased likelihood that a victim will refuse to cooperate with law enforcement. 
 
The data for this study came from the 2003 National Incident Based Reporting System 
(NIBRS) master files compiled and distributed by the FBI.  The master files contain information 
on all incidents that occurred in the certified jurisdictions during that calendar year and all 
clearances resulting from these incidents that occurred as of December 31st of 2004. Incidents 
were selected in which the most serious offense was a domestic assault, that is, the 
victim/offender relationship indicated that the assault was a domestic assault.  Assault offenses 
are contained in the Group A category of offenses for which extensive data are collected in 
NIBRS (Appendix 1).  In 2003 the NIBRS data contained detailed crime information that law 
enforcement agencies in 24 states and the District of Columbia submitted to the FBI's system 
describing incidents reported to them.  Data for this study came from law enforcement agencies 
in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West 
Virginia (Appendix 2). 
NIBRS instructs law enforcement agencies to record a set of characteristics for each incident.  
These elements include: 
♦ the age, sex, and race of the victim(s), 
♦ the offense(s) involved, 
♦ the date of the incident, 
♦ the incident location, 
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♦ the age, sex, and race of the offender(s), 
♦ the victim-offender relationship(s), 
♦ the victim's level of injury, 
♦ what weapons were used, 
♦ the clearance code 
 
The original hierarchical file was transformed into a victim-level file - one record for each 
victim in each incident.  Each report summarized the victim's perceptions of the offender's 
identifying characteristics, the victim-offender relationship, the number of offenders in the 
incident, the presence of a weapon, where the incident occurred, the number of victims in the 
incident, individual victim characteristics, victim injury, and whether or not the victim refused to 
cooperate.  Each NIBRS record captured the victims’ perceptions of the demographic 
characteristics of the offender, the number of offenders in the incident, the presence of a weapon, 
the incident location, the number of victims in the incident, the demographics of the victim(s), 
the most serious injury sustained by any victim, the relationship between the offender and the 
victim, and how the incident was cleared.  For this analysis, when an incident had more than one 
offender, the analysis focused on the demographic characteristics of the first-listed offender. 
The incident characteristics were dichotomized as follows: 
♦ Did the victim refuse to cooperate? (Yes, No) 
♦ Number of victims (One, More than one) 
♦ Number of offenders (One, More than one) 
♦ Location of incident (Residence Residence/home, Nonresidence - Field/woods, 
Highway/road/alley'Lake/waterway; Inside -Air/bus/train terminal, Bank/savings and 
loan, Bar/nightclub, Church/synagogue/temple, Commercial/office building, 
Construction site, Convenience store, Department/discount store, Drug store/dr.s 
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office/hospital, Government/public building, Grocery/supermarket, Hotel/motel/etc., 
Jail/prison, Liquor store, Parking lot/garage, Rental storage facility, Restaurant, 
School/college, Service/gas station, Speciality store) 
 
♦ Most serious weapon (Personal or none - Personal weapons (hands, feet, teeth, 
etc.);Non-Personnel -Firearm (type not stated), Handgun, Rifle, Shotgun, Other 
firearm, Knife/cutting instrument, Blunt object (club, hammer, etc.), Motor vehicle, 
Poison (including gas) Explosives, Fire/incendiary device, Drugs/narcotics/sleeping 
pills, Asphyxiation, Other) 
♦ Victim age (Juvenile -persons under 18, Adult) 
♦ Victim sex (Female, Male) 
♦ Victim injured? (No, Yes) 
♦ Offender age (Adult, Juvenile) 
♦ Offender sex (Female, Male) 
♦ Did the incident involve a sexual assault? (No, Yes) 
 
Additionally, the victim’s domestic relationship to the offender was also characterized as 
family (spouse, common-law spouse, parent, sibling, child, grandparent, grandchild, in-law, 
stepparent, stepchild, stepsibling, other family member) or intimate (boyfriend, girlfriend, child 
of boyfriend, child of girlfriend, homosexual relationship, ex-spouse). 
It is important to note that participation in NIBRS by all local jurisdictions does not occur 
in all states (Appendix 2).  While there is no way to assess the national representativeness of the 
sample, the number of cleared domestic assault victimizations in the 2003 NIBRS sample is very 
large and does represent a census for  the reporting jurisdictions contained in the file.  Therefore, 
accepting the inherent qualifications associated with any analysis of NIBRS data, the number of 
reports and the detailed information available on each incident provides a unique opportunity to 
study the victims of domestic assault who refuse to cooperate with police the scene of the 
incident. 
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5.4 ANALYSIS 
This study used logistic regression to determine whether there is evidence contained in 
the incident data reported by law enforcement that would reliably predict that a victim would be 
unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement when they respond to an incident of domestic 
violence and whether that evidence differs when we consider what kind of arrest policy drives 
law enforcement policy.   
5.4.1 Dependent Variable 
For purposes of the analysis, the variables were dichotomized.  The dependent variable, 
victim non-cooperation, was expressed as a choice between two possibilities with value codes of 
either 0 or 1 assigned to each possibility.  In domestic assault cases that were cleared, the 
incidents in which law enforcement used the exceptional clearance code  "victim refused to 
cooperate" were assigned a value of 1.  Domestic assaults that were cleared either by arrest or by 
using other exceptional means were assigned a value of 0. 
It is important to acknowledge that there are problems with measuring domestic violence 
incidents across multiple law enforcement jurisdictions.  However, NIBRS data allows for 
considerable consistency because it routinely collects information on the relationship between 
the victim and the offender in reported crimes (Buzawa and Buzawa, 2003). 
This study used a definition of domestic relationships that included parents, children, 
siblings, other family members (such as cousins, grandparents), and intimate partners (current 
and former spouses and current boy/girlfriends, including homosexual relationships).  
Definitions of domestic violence that focus solely on intimate partners to the exclusion of 
parents, siblings, and other family members may overlook much of the violence perpetrated by 
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offenders against persons linked to them by close relationships.  Therefore, the victims treated in 
this study as having a domestic relationship with their offenders included both intimate partners 
and other persons connected biologically or by marriage, including: child (or step-child); parent 
(or step-parent); sibling (or step-sibling); and other family members (grandparent, grandchild, 
cousin, aunt, uncle, or in-law). 
Domestic assaults included sexual assaults (forcible rape, forcible sodomy, sexual assault 
with an object, and forcible fondling), aggravated assault, and simple assault (including 
intimidation).  The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program defines aggravated assault as an 
unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated 
bodily injury. The Program further specifies that this type of assault is usually accompanied by 
the use of a weapon or by other means likely to produce death or great bodily harm.  Attempted 
aggravated assault that involves the display of—or threat to use—a gun, knife, or other weapon 
is included in this crime category because serious personal injury would likely result if the 
assault were completed.  Murder attempts are classified as aggravated assault.  Simple assaults 
are limited to the use of physical force (no weapon) and result in little or no injury to the victim.  
Although abuse within families takes many forms, such as emotional abuse, economic abuse, and 
stalking, the focus of this study was on physical assault or the threat of assault. 
5.4.2 Independent Variables 
The situational characteristics of domestic violence incidents that were considered in 
these analyses included victim demographics, offender demographics, and incident 
characteristics.  Specifically, the variables included in the analysis were offender age, offender 
sex, victim age, victim sex, the location of the crime, whether or not a weapon was involved, 
whether or not the victim was injured, as well as the victim's relationship to the offender.  
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Although this set of characteristics is not exhaustive, it is a fairly comprehensive set of predictors 
and is supported by the data. 
Neither offender race nor victim race were included as attributes in this analysis.  An 
examination of the reporting agencies contained in the 2003 NIBRS data revealed that a very 
small proportion of the sample comes from cities with a population of 250,000 or more 
(10.33%), while more than one-third (35.5%) came from cities with under 50,000 population.  
Additionally, only 5 states had 100% of their law enforcement agencies reporting (Appendix 2). 
The absence of major metropolitan areas in these data may make race more of an indicator of 
which law enforcement agencies are included in the sample rather than an extralegal predictor of 
victim non-cooperation with police in incidents of domestic violence. 
The possible correlation between victim non-cooperation and incident characteristics 
were further explored within each arrest policy grouping by developing separate logistic 
regression equations for each of the reporting NIBRS states.  When examining the states on an 
individual basis, there were instances where expected frequencies less than 5 occurred in the 
contingency tables generated by crossing the dependent variable (victim non-cooperation) with 
each of the independent variables resulting in high parameter estimates and standard errors.  
When this occurred, there were two choices; either increase the number of cases or eliminate one 
or more of the predictors (Tabachnick, 2001; Allison, 2002).  For the state level analysis, it was 
impossible to increase the number of cases as the data file represents a census for each state's 
reporting jurisdictions.  The predictors with the low expected frequencies were, therefore, 
deleted from the logistic regression equation at the state level.  For the policy level analysis, the 
number of cases was always sufficient because each policy grouping was created by combining 
all of the states with a similar arrest policy into one of the three arrest policy groups – 
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discretionary, preferred, or mandatory – and then performing a logistic regression at the policy 
group level. 
 
5.4.3 Contextual Variables 
The core theoretical variable of interest at the organizational level was the type of arrest 
policy that existed for domestic violence cases.  As previously stated, every state now has 
domestic violence arrest policies, and although these laws vary from state to state, they can be 
generally classified as mandatory, preferred, or discretionary policies.  States in the NIBRS data 
were assigned to one of the three general categories of domestic violence arrest policy according 
to the domestic violence arrest policy that existed in their state. 
As was previously noted, not all states fit neatly into one category when considering the 
entire range of conditions that describe domestic violence incidents.  Therefore, each state was 
assigned to the cluster characterized by the most severe arrest action that could be taken on an 
initial response by law enforcement to an incident involving domestic violence. 
For example, Missouri's legislation provides discretionary arrest authority in incidents 
involving domestic violence but mandates arrest for a second domestic violence incident within 
12 hours.  Since the arrest policy for the initial response to an incident of domestic violence is 
discretionary, Missouri would be among the states in the "discretionary" cluster. 
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5.5 ANALYSIS STRATEGY 
Each NIBRS record summarizes the victims’ perceptions of the demographic characteristics of 
the offender(s), the number of victims in the incident, the number of offenders in the incident, 
the incident location, the presence of a weapon, the demographics of the victim(s), the most 
serious injury sustained by any victim, the closest relationship between the offender and victim 
and how the incident was cleared by police.  For the logistic regression analyses, when an 
incident had more than one offender, offender demographics were based on the characteristics of 
the first-listed offender.  The incident characteristics were dichotomized as follows: 
 
♦ Number of offenders (One; More than one) 
♦ Number of victims (One; More than one) 
♦ Location of incident (residence, non-residence) 
♦ Most serious weapon involved (Personal-hands, feet; Non-personal-firearms, knives, 
clubs, etc.) 
♦ Offender age (Under age 18; Adult) 
♦ Offender sex (Male; Female) 
♦ Were any victims injured? (No; Yes) 
♦ Victim age (Under age 18, Adult) 
♦ Victim sex (Male; Female) 
♦ Did the victim refuse to cooperate? (No; Yes) 
♦ Did the incident involve a sexual assault? (No, Yes) 
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The victims treated in this study as having a domestic relationship with their offenders 
include both intimate partners and other persons connected biologically or by marriage, 
including: child (or step-child); parent (or step-parent); sibling (or step-sibling); and other family 
members (grandparent, grandchild, cousin, aunt, uncle, or in-law).  Nearly all domestic violence 
arrest laws contain provisions that stipulate what the victim/offender relationship must be in 
order for the arrest policy to apply.  These provisions vary a great deal among the states within 
each of the three general arrest policy groupings.  Therefore analyses were conducted both 
generally as well as in the context of the victim's relationship to the offender (family versus 
intimate). 
States represented in the 2003 NIBRS data were assigned to one of the three general 
categories of domestic violence arrest policy – mandatory, preferred, or discretionary - according 
to the domestic violence arrest policy that exists in their state.  Law enforcement agencies 
represented in the ‘mandatory’ arrest policy cluster come from Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.  
The ‘preferred’ arrest policy cluster includes law enforcement agencies from Arkansas, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, North Dakota, and Tennessee.  The ‘discretionary’ arrest policy 
cluster consists of reporting law enforcement agencies from Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
Since there were no specific hypotheses about the order or importance of predictor 
variables, a direct logistic regression was performed allowing the evaluation of the contribution 
made by each predictor over and above that of other predictors (Tabachnick, 2001).  The logistic 
regression was used to determine which independent variables were predictors of a victim not 
cooperating with police in an incident involving domestic violence while controlling first for 
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type of arrest policy and additionally for the combination of arrest policy and type of domestic 
assault. 
The results of the analyses are presented, specifically discussing whether a victim's not 
cooperating with police in a domestic violence incident can be reliably predicted from the 
knowledge of the number of offenders involved in the incident, the number of victims involved 
in the incident, location of incident, most serious weapon involved,, the age of the offender, the 
sex of the offender,  victims injury, victim age, and victim sex. 
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6.0   ANALYSIS 
6.1 Data Screening 
Although the sample of law enforcement agencies represented by the NIBRS data might 
not necessarily be nationally representative, the 2003 NIBRS data did yield a large sample of 
assault victims.  The initial sample of 417,744 victims included 331,944 simple assault victims, 
68,114 aggravated assault victims, and 17,636 victims of sexual assault.  The District of 
Columbia (n=202) was removed completely from the analysis due to severe underreporting and 
missing characteristics.   
Of the remaining 417,542 victim records 14,436 (3.46%) were excluded from the 
analysis because at least one of the key characteristics was missing (Allison, 2002).  A 
comparison of records that were excluded with those that were included in the analysis found no 
substantial differences in incident attributes. The final base for the analysis, after incomplete 
records were excluded contained information for 403,106 assault victims - 233,063 domestic 
assault victims and 170,043 non-domestic assault victims.   
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6.2 OVERALL 
6.2.1 Descriptives 
The UCR Program considers a crime to be cleared when agencies make an arrest or there is 
evidence to support that the investigation will never lead to an arrest because of exceptional 
means (circumstances beyond the control of law enforcement).  The UCR program’s NIBRS data 
captures information on both the arrests associated with the incident as well as five 
circumstances of exceptional clearances, which include death of the offender, prosecution 
declined, extradition denied, victim refused to cooperate, and the offender was a juvenile and not 
taken into custody.  
Overall, as shown in Table 5, arrest was the most likely means of clearing an incident of 
assault (76.1%) among all types of victims followed by the victim refusing to cooperate (12.6%).  
The highest proportion of cleared incidents of assault in which the victim refused to cooperate 
with police was for those involving acquaintances (16.7%), followed by intimates (11.4%), and 
then strangers (10.5%).  The likelihood of an assault incident being cleared because the victim 
refused to cooperate with police was lowest among family victims (9.9%). 
Table 5     Assault Clearance Methods by Type of Victim 
 Victims (%) 
 
Clearance code  All Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
 
Total  (n=403,106) (n=146,830) 
(n = 
86,233) (n = 138,453)  (n = 31,590) 
      
Prosecution declined 10.3% 8.9% 9.0% 13.0%  8.3% 
Extradition declined 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1  0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate 12.6 9.9 11.4 16.7  10.5 
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Juvenile/no custody 0.9 0.6 0.2 1.8  0.7 
Arrest 76.1 80.6 79.2 68.4  80.4 
 
Among all incidents of sexual assault, 11.9% of incidents were cleared exceptionally 
because the victim refused to cooperate; the proportion was higher for intimates (15.6%), 
strangers (14.7%) and acquaintances (13.6%), than for victims who were family members 
(7.2%).  In each of the assault offense categories and in the total, arrest was the most frequent 
means of clearing an incident (Table 6).  However, there were substantial differences in the 
likelihood of arrest among the offenses; the likelihood of arrest for incidents involving sexual 
assault (64.3%) is lower than those involving simple (74.9%) or aggravated (85.2%) assaults.  It 
should be noted that this particular category of assault has higher proportions of being cleared 
due to prosecution being declined than the victim refusing to cooperate with police; this is not 
true among incidents of simple and aggravated assault. 
Table 6     Assault Clearance Methods by Victim Type and Type of Assault 
 Victims (%) 
 
Clearance code  All  Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
 
Sex assault  (n= 16,742) (n = 4,963) (n = 1,349) (n = 9,377)  (n = 1,053) 
Prosecution declined  22.1% 22.4% 25.9% 22.0% 16.2%
Extradition declined  0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  11.9 7.2 15.6 13.6 14.7 
Juvenile/no custody  1.5 1.5 0.7 1.7 0.6 
Arrest  64.3 68.6 57.6 62.6 68.5 
 
Aggravated assault  (n = 64,168) (n = 18,774) (n = 10,879) (n = 25,398)  (n = 9,117) 
Prosecution declined  5.8% 4.8% 4.8% 7.2% 5.3% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  8.4 6.6 7.1 10.8 7.0 
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Juvenile/no custody  0.5 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.4 
Arrest  85.2 88.1 87.8 81.1 87.3 
 
Simple assault  (n= 322,196) (n = 123,093) (n = 74,005) (n = 103,678)  (n = 21,420) 
Prosecution declined  10.6% 8.9% 9.4% 13.7% 9.2% 
Extradition declined  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  13.5 10.5 12.0 18.4 11.8 
Juvenile/no custody  1.0 0.6 0.2 2.1 0.9 
Arrest  74.9 79.9 78.4 65.8 78.1 
 
Among all incidents of aggravated assault, 8.4% of incidents were cleared exceptionally 
because the victim refused to cooperate; the proportion was highest for acquaintances (10.8%), 
followed by intimates (7.1%) and strangers (7.0%); victims who were family members had the 
lowest proportion (6.6%).   
Incidents of simple assault showed the highest likelihood (13.5%) of being cleared 
exceptionally because the victim refused to cooperate among the assault offense categories.  The 
proportion of simple assault victims refusing to cooperate with police was highest for 
acquaintances (18.4%), followed by intimates (12.0%) and strangers (11.8%); victims who were 
family members had the lowest proportion (10.5%).   
6.2.2 Logistic Regression 
Because incidents involving family victims differed from those involving intimates in 
several respects, a simple cross-tabular comparison of differential likelihoods of non-cooperation 
for family victims and victims defined as intimates may distort the actual influence of a victim's 
relationship to the offender on the likelihood of non-cooperation.  Therefore a logistic regression 
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was performed to study the effects of victim-offender relationship while controlling for other 
incident characteristics.   
The logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-cooperation 
for family and intimate victims (Table 7).  The odds of a victim refusing to cooperate with police 
were about 14% greater if the victim was an intimate partner than if the victim was a family 
member.   
Table 7     Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of All Domestic Assault Victims  
Dichotomized 
Independent Variable 
Value coded ‘0’ 
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds 
Ratio 
 Number of offenders  One (9.3) More than one (13.8) .581 1.787 *** 
 Number of victims  One (10.0) More than one (9.5) -.453 0.635 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence (9.8) Nonresidence (10.4) .083 1.086 *** 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (10.2) Non-Personal (8.2) -.208 0.812 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (7.8) Adult (10.2) .245 1.277 *** 
 Offender sex  Male (9.6) Female (10.8) .043 1.044 * 
 Victim injured?  No (13.2) Yes (6.5) -.840 0.432 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (10.4) Female (9.7) -.055 0.947 ** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (6.6) Adult (10.5) .346 1.413 *** 
 Sexual assault?  No (10.0) Yes (7.2) -.134 0.875 ** 
 Number of offenses?  One (10.0) More than one (6.8) -.321 0.726 *** 
 Victim/offender relationship  Family (9.9) Intimate (11.4) .133 1.142 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square   4775.399 **      
 12 df p<0.000        
 N = 233,063        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
 
Other incident characteristics also substantially affected the likelihood of non-cooperation.  If 
more than one offender was involved, the odds of victim non-cooperation were about 79% 
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greater than the odds of victim non-cooperation in a single-offender incident.  However, if more 
than one victim was involved, the odds of non-cooperation decreased about 57%.  If the incident 
took place in a location other than a residence, the odds of non-cooperation increased about 9%.  
The odds of victim non-cooperation increased if the offender was an adult (28%), if the victim 
was an adult (41%), if the offender was female (4%) and if the victim was male (6%).  If the 
victim was not injured, the odds of non-cooperation more than doubled (131%) and if the 
incident involved more than one offense, the odds decreased 38%.  The odds of victim non-
cooperation decreased 14% if the assault was a sexual assault and 23% if a weapon was involved 
in the incident. 
Because the logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-
cooperation for family and intimate victims, logistic regression equations were developed 
separately for family (Table 8) and intimate domestic assault victims (Table 9) to determine 
whether incident characteristics affecting likelihood of non-cooperation differed for these two 
groups.  Some of the incident characteristics that significantly affected the odds of victim non-
cooperation were the same for both groups.  If more than one offender was involved, the odds of 
victim non-cooperation more than 100% greater for family victims and more than 31% greater 
for intimate victims than the odds of victim non-cooperation in a single-offender incident.  If 
more than one victim was involved, the odds of non-cooperation decreased about 58% for family 
victims and 45% for intimates.  The odds of non-cooperation increased 7% for family victims 
when the offender was female and 23% for victims who were intimates and if the incident 
involved more than one offense, the odds of non-cooperation increased 61% for family victims 
and 25% for intimates.  If the incident involved a weapon, the odds of victim non-cooperation 
increased 25% for family victims and 20% for intimates. 
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Some of the incident characteristics that were significant for both groups affected the 
odds of victim non-cooperation differently.  Among incidents involving family members as 
victims, the odds of victim non-cooperation increased if the offender was an adult (36%) and if 
the victim was male (11%).  For incidents involving victims who were intimates, the odds 
decreased 22% if the offender was an adult and 26% if the victim was male. 
 Table 8     Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of All Family Domestic Assault 
Victims 
 
 Dichotomized 
Independent Variable 
 Value coded ‘0’ 
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds 
Ratio 
 
 Number of offenders  One (9.3) More than one (13.8) .722  2.059 *** 
 Number of victims  One (10.0) More than one (9.5) -.461  0.631 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence(9.8) Nonresidence (10.4) .025  1.025 ns 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (10.2) Non-Personal (8.2) -.224  0.799 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (7.8) Adult (10.2) .307  1.359 *** 
 Offender sex  Male (9.6) Female (10.8) .064  1.066 ** 
 Victim injured?  No (13.2) Yes (6.5) -.844  0.430 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (10.4) Female (9.7) -.105  0.901 *** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (6.6) Adult (10.5) .444  1.559 *** 
 Sexual assault?  No (10.0) Yes (7.2) -.246  0.782 *** 
 Number of offenses?  One (10.0) More than one (6.8) -.478  0.620 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square   3276.877**      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 146,830        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
 Victim sex and whether or not the assault was a sexual assault were significantly 
correlated with the probability of non-cooperation for family victims and not for intimates.  The 
odds of non-cooperation among family victims increased 56% if the victim was an adult, and 
decreased 28% if the assault was a sexual assault. 
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  Table 9     Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of All Intimate Domestic 
Assault Victims 
 
 Dichotomized 
Independent Variable 
 Value coded ‘0’ 
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds 
Ratio 
 
 Number of offenders  One (11.4) More than one (11.7) .274  1.315 *** 
 Number of victims  One (11.7) More than one (10.3) -.370  0.691 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence(11.1) Nonresidence (12.6) .125  1.133 *** 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (11.7) Non-Personal (9.5) -.179  0.836 **.* 
 Offender age  Juvenile (14.5) Adult (11.4) -.201  0.818 ** 
 Offender sex  Male (11.4) Female (11.5) .233  1.262 ** 
 Victim injured?  No (16.1) Yes (7.7) -.839  0.432 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (11.3) Female (11.5) .206  1.229 ** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (12.1) Adult (11.4) .067  1.069 ns 
 Sexual assault?  No (11.4) Yes (15.6) .114  1.121 ns 
 Number of offenses?  One (11.5) More than one (9.9) -.225  0.798 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square   1654.818 **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 86,233        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
         
 
The location of the incident was correlated with the probability of non-cooperation for 
domestic assault victims who were intimates but not for family victims; if the incident took place 
in a location other than a residence, the odds of non-cooperation increased about 13% for 
intimates.   
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6.3 DISCRETIONARY ARREST POLICIES 
6.3.1 Descriptives 
 Within the discretionary arrest policy group (Table 10), the highest proportion of 
cleared incidents of assault in which the victim refused to cooperate with police was for those 
involving acquaintances (19.5%), followed by intimates (17.2%), and then family (15.6%).  The 
likelihood of an assault incident being cleared because the victim refused to cooperate with 
police was lowest for strangers (13.4%).  Overall in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the 
states having discretionary arrest policies, arrest was the most likely means of clearing an 
incident of assault among all types of victims.   
 
Table 10     Assault Clearance Methods by Type of Victim - Discretionary Arrest Policies 
  Victims (%) 
 
Clearance code  All Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
Total 
 
(n = 
65,199) 
(n = 
24,159) 
(n = 
13,059) 
(n = 
 22,902)  
(n = 
 5,079) 
Prosecution declined  9.0% 8.9% 7.2% 10.6%  7.1% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  17.1 15.6 17.2 19.5  13.4 
Juvenile/no custody  0.8 0.5 0.1 1.7  0.5 
Arrest  73.0 75.0 75.5 68.2  79.0 
Individual states within the group of states with discretionary arrest policies differed in 
the proportions of incidents of assault not cleared by arrest in which the victim refused to 
cooperate with police among those involving family, intimates, acquaintances, and strangers 
(Table 11). 
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Table 11    Victims that Refused to Cooperate in Assault Incidents Not Cleared by Arrest - Discretionary Arrest Policies 
Refused to Cooperate 
  All     Family Acquaintance Stranger
 
No 
Arrest n %
No 
Arrest n % n %
No 
Arrest n %
No 
Arrest n %
Total  11,161 63.5% 6,029 3,765 62.4% 3,192 2,246 70.4% 7,283 4,469 61.4%  681 63.8%
Delaware  5,773 4,516 78.2 1,543 1,253 81.2 
Intimate
             
No 
Arrest
       17,572 1,068
1,207 1,035 85.7 2,599 1,911 73.5 424 317 74.8 
Idaho  2,705 1,043 38.6 944 366 38.8 432 165 38.2 1,183 458 38.7 146 54 37.0 
Kentucky                 374 187 50.0 85 44 51.8 71 43 60.6 191 88 46.1 27 12 *
Nebraska                 197 128 65.0 41 24 * 15 13 * 130 86 66.2 11 5 *
New 
Hampshire             373 140 37.5 71 32.4 35
 
* 221
 
34.8 46
 
* 
South 
Dakota*                24 10 * 5 0 * 2 2 * 14 * 3  *
Texas  6,550 4,236 64.7 1,598 60.2 1,245 824 66.2 2,290 1,563 68.3 361 
7 1
2,654 251 69.5 
Vermont*                 229 168 73.4 51 37 72.5 30 25 83.3 146 105 71.9 2 1 *
West  
Virginia  1,347 733 54.4 635 
420 
66.1
115 
74.2 509
174 
34.2 48
24 
*       155
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Among all incidents of sexual assault within the discretionary arrest policy group, 10.3% 
of incidents were cleared exceptionally because the victim refused to cooperate; the proportion 
was higher for intimates (15.4%), acquaintances (11.9%) and strangers (10.7%), than for victims 
who were family members (6.5%) (Table 12).  As with the overall picture, there were higher 
proportions among sexual assault victims of incidents being cleared due to prosecution being 
declined than the victim refusing to cooperate with police; this is not true among incidents of 
simple and aggravated assault.  For sexual assault incidents involving victims that were 
intimates, acquaintances, and strangers, the proportion of incidents resulting in a clearance of 
"prosecution declined" was about double that of "victim refused to cooperate".  However, among 
family victims of sexual assault, the proportion cleared by prosecution being declined was nearly 
triple that of the victim refusing to cooperate. 
Table 12    Assault Clearance Methods by Victim Type and Type of Assault - Discretionary 
Arrest Policies 
  Victims (%) 
Sex assault        
 
Clearance code  All  Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
Total  (n = 2,659) (n = 906) (n = 227) (n = 1,442)  (n = 84) 
Prosecution declined  23.6% 24.1% 27.3% 22.8% 21.4% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  10.3 6.5 15.4 11.9 10.7 
Juvenile/no custody  1.6 1.9 0.9 1.7 0.0 
Arrest  64.5 67.4 56.4 63.7 67.9 
 
Aggravated assault  (n = 8,509) (n = 2,608) (n = 1,272) (n = 3,328)  (n = 1,301) 
Prosecution declined  7.5% 6.3% 5.0% 9.9% 6.3% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  9.0 6.7 7.8 11.4 8.5 
Juvenile/no custody  0.3 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.1 
Arrest  83.1 86.6 87.2 78.1 85.1 
  (n = 54,031) (n = 20,645) (n = (n = 18,132)  (n = 3,694) 
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Simple assault 11,560) 
Prosecution declined  8.5% 8.5% 7.0% 9.7% 8.5% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  18.7 17.1 18.3 21.6 18.7 
Juvenile/no custody  0.9 0.4 0.0 1.9 0.9 
Arrest  71.9 73.9 74.6 66.7 77.0 
 
Among all incidents of aggravated assault in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the 
states having discretionary arrest policies, 9.0% of incidents were cleared exceptionally because 
the victim refused to cooperate; the proportion was highest for acquaintances (11.4%), followed 
by strangers (8.5%); intimates (7.8%) and victims who were family members  had the lowest 
proportion (6.7%).   
Incidents of simple assault showed the highest overall likelihood (18.7%) of being 
cleared exceptionally because the victim refused to cooperate among the assault offense 
categories in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having discretionary arrest 
policies.  The proportion of simple assault victims refusing to cooperate with police was highest 
for acquaintances (21.6%), followed by strangers (18.7%) and intimates (18.3%); victims who 
were family members had the lowest proportion (17.1%).   
Overall, in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having discretionary arrest 
policies in each of the assault offense categories and in the total, arrest is the most frequent 
means of clearing an incident.  However, there are substantial differences in the likelihood of 
arrest among the offense categories.  On average, the likelihood of arrest for incidents involving 
sexual assault (64.5%) is lower than those involving simple (71.9%) or aggravated (83.1%) 
assaults.   
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6.3.2 Logistic Regression 
In the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having discretionary arrest policies, 
incident characteristics involving family victims differed from those involving intimates in 
several respects.  Since a simple cross-tabular comparison of differential likelihoods of non-
cooperation for family victims and victims defined as intimates could distort the actual influence 
of a victim's relationship to the offender on the likelihood of non-cooperation, a logistic 
regression was performed to study the effects of victim-offender relationship while controlling 
for other incident characteristics for this group of reporting jurisdictions.   
The logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-cooperation 
for family and intimate victims for the discretionary policy group (Table 13).  The odds of a 
victim refusing to cooperate with police were about 7% greater if the victim was an intimate 
partner than if the victim was a family member.  Other incident characteristics also substantially 
affected the likelihood of non-cooperation.  If more than one offender was involved, the odds of 
victim non-cooperation were about 100% greater than the odds of victim non-cooperation in a 
single-offender incident.  However, if more than one victim was involved, the odds of non-
cooperation decreased about 58%.  If the incident took place in a location other than a residence, 
the odds of non-cooperation decreased about 10%.  The odds of victim non-cooperation 
increased if the offender was an adult (13%), if the victim was an adult (49%), and if the victim 
was male (15%).  If the victim was not injured, the odds of non-cooperation increased 158% and 
the odds increased 64% if the incident involved only one offense.  The odds of victim non-
cooperation decreased 119% if the assault was a sexual assault and increased 85% if a weapon 
was involved in the incident. 
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 Table 13    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of All Domestic 
Assault Victims - Discretionary Policies 
 
 Dichotomized 
Independent Variable 
 Value coded ‘0’
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds
Ratio
 
 Number of offenders  One (15.3) More than one 
(22.1) 
.696  2.005 *** 
 Number of victims  One (16.2) More than one 
(16.1) 
-.461 0.631 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence (16.3) Nonresidence 
(15.3) 
-.098 0.907 * 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (17.0) Non-Personal 
(9.9) 
-.615 0.541 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (14.6) Adult (16.3) .118 1.125 * 
 Offender sex  Male (15.5) Female (18.2) .071 1.074 ns 
 Victim injured?  No (22.2) Yes (10.7) -.947 0.388 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (17.6) Female (15.6) -.144 0.866 *** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (10.7) Adult (17.0) .400 1.492 *** 
 Sexual assault?  No (16.4) Yes (8.3) -.786 0.456 *** 
 Number of offenses?  One (16.3) More than one 
(12.1) 
-.494 0.610 *** 
 Victim/offender 
relationship 
 Family (15.6) Intimate (17.2) .064 1.066 * 
         
         
 Model Chi-square    1,609.270 **      
 12 df p<0.000        
 N = 37,218          
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
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Separate logistic regression equations were developed for each of the nine states in the 
discretionary policy group (Table 14).  In 2 states, Texas and West Virginia, a significant 
difference was found in the likelihood of non-cooperation for family and intimate victims; the 
odds increased if the victim was an intimate in Texas but for West Virginia the odds increased if 
the victim was a family member.  In 6 states, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire and Vermont, the victim-offender relationship was not significantly correlated with 
the likelihood of victim non-cooperation.  There were also differences among the states for each 
of the remaining predictors. 
 115
 Table 14    State Logistic Regressions - Discretionary Arrest Policies  
 
 
Number of 
offenders 
 
Number 
of victims
 
 
 
Location
 
 
 
Weapon
 
 
Offender 
age 
 
 
Offender 
sex 
 
 
 
Injury 
 
 
Victim 
sex 
 
 
Victim 
age 
 
 
Sexual 
assault
 
Number 
of 
offenses
Victim 
offender 
relation-
ship 
All  
More than 
one 
 
One 
 
Residence
 
No 
 
Adult 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
Male 
 
Adult 
 
No 
 
One 
 
Intimate
Delaware 
More than 
one 
 
One 
 
Residence
 
No 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
Male 
 
Adult 
 
No 
 
One 
 
ns 
Idaho 
More than 
one 
 
One 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
Male 
 
Adult 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
ns 
Kentucky 
More than 
one 
  
ns 
 
ns 
  
ns 
 
----- 
 
ns 
 
ns 
   
ns 
Nebraska ns   One ns   ns   No ns   ns
New 
Hampshire 
 
 
 
ns 
 
Residence
  
ns 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
Male 
 
Juve-
nile 
   
ns 
South 
Dakota 
            
Texas 
 
ns 
 
One 
Non-
residence
 
No 
 
Adult 
 
Female 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
Adult 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
Intimate
Vermont 
More than 
one 
 
One 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
ns 
   
ns 
West 
Virginia 
 
ns 
 
One 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
Adult 
 
ns 
 
One 
 
Family 
Shading indicates variables with expected values <5 in contingency tables generated with dependent variable  
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Because the logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-
cooperation for family and intimate victims, logistic regression equations were 
developed separately for family (Table 15) and intimate domestic assault victims (Table 
16) to determine whether incident characteristics affecting likelihood of non-cooperation 
differed for these two groups.  Some of the incident characteristics that significantly 
affected the odds of victim non-cooperation were the same for both groups. 
 Table 15    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of Family Domestic 
Assault Victims - Discretionary Arrest Policies 
 
 Dichotomized 
Independent 
Variable 
 Value coded 
‘0’ 
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds 
Ratio 
 
 Number of 
offenders 
 One (14.4) More than one (23.3) .871 2.390 *** 
 Number of victims  One (15.6) More than one (15.5) -.523 .593 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence(15.8) Nonresidence (14.2) -.133 .875 * 
 Most serious 
weapon 
 Personal (16.5) Non-Personal (9.0) -.709 .492 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (14.1) Adult (15.8) .149 1.161 ** 
 Offender sex  Male (14.9) Female (17.6) .079 1.082 ns 
 Victim injured?  No (21.0) Yes (10.5) -.925 .396 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (17.0) Female (14.9) -.169 .844 *** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (10.0) Adult (16.8) .426 1.531 *** 
 Sexual assault?  No (15.9) Yes (6.5) -1.007 .365 *** 
 Number of 
offenses? 
 One (15.8) More than one (9.3) -.755 .470 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square    1152.935 **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 24,159        
     * p ≤  .05        
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  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
         
If more than one offender was involved, the odds of victim non-cooperation were more than 
139% greater for family victims and more than 37% greater for intimate victims than the odds of 
victim non-cooperation in a single-offender incident.  If more than one victim was involved, the 
odds of non-cooperation decreased about 69% for family victims and 32% for intimates.  If the 
incident involved more than one offense, the odds of non-cooperation increased 113% for family 
victims and 42% for intimates.  If the incident involved a weapon, the odds of victim non-
cooperation increased 103% for family victims and about 56% for intimates.  If the victim was 
injured, the odds of non-cooperation decreased 153% for family victims and 170% for intimates.  
If the victim was an adult, the odds of non cooperation increased 53% for family assault victims 
and 39% for intimates.  For both groups of victims, offender sex was not correlated with non-
cooperation probability. 
 Table 16    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of Intimate Domestic 
Assault Victims - Discretionary Arrest Policies 
 
 Dichotomized 
Independent 
Variable 
 Value coded 
‘0’ 
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds 
Ratio 
 
 Number of offenders  One (16.8) More than one (20.0) .316 1.372 *** 
 Number of victims  One (17.1) More than one (17.6) -.280 .756 ** 
 Location of incident  Residence(17.4) Nonresidence (16.5) -.067 .935 ns 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (17.8) Non-Personal (11.8) -.442 .643 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (21.1) Adult (17.1) -.280 .756 ns 
 Offender sex  Male (16.6) Female (19.4) .118 1.125 ns 
 Victim injured?  No (24.4) Yes (10.9) -.995 .370 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (19.2) Female (16.6) -.066 .936 ns 
 Victim age  Juvenile (14.1) Adult (17.4) .327 1.387 ** 
 118
 Sexual assault?  No (17.2) Yes (15.4) -.223 .800 ns 
 Number of offenses?  One (17.4) More than one (14.2) -.350 .705 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square    505.998 **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 13,059        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
 ns not significant        
 
Some of the incident characteristics were correlated with the probability of non-
cooperation for family victims and not for intimates.  The odds of non-cooperation among family 
victims increased 14% if the incident occurred in a residence, 16% if the offender was an adult, 
18% if the victim was male and decreased 174% if the assault was a sexual assault. 
6.4 PREFERRED ARREST POLICIES 
6.4.1 Descriptives 
Overall in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having preferred arrest 
policies (Table 17), arrest was the most likely means of clearing an incident of assault among all 
types of victims.  Within the preferred arrest policy group, the highest proportion of cleared 
incidents of assault in which the victim refused to cooperate with police was for those involving 
acquaintances (14.9%), followed by strangers (8.7%), and then intimates (8.4%).  The likelihood 
of an assault incident being cleared because the victim refused to cooperate with police was 
lowest for family (6.8%). 
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 Table 17    Assault Clearance Methods by Type of Victim - Preferred Arrest Policies 
  Victims (%) 
Clearance code  All Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
Total  
(n = 
125,736) 
(n = 
 45,703) 
(n = 
 30,954) 
(n = 
 39,303) 
(n = 
 9,776) 
Prosecution declined  11.2% 10.1% 10.5% 13.4%  8.8% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  9.9 6.8 8.4 14.9 8.7 
Juvenile/no custody  0.7 0.5 0.2 1.4 0.5 
Arrest  78.3 82.6 80.9 70.3 81.9 
Individual states within the group of states with preferred arrest policies differed in their 
proportions of incidents of assault not cleared by arrest in which the victim refused to cooperate 
with police among those involving family, intimates, acquaintances, and strangers (Table 18). 
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Table 18    Victims that Refused to Cooperate in Assault Incidents Not Cleared by Arrest - Preferred Arrest Policies 
Refused to Cooperate 
 All    Family Intimate Acquaintance Stranger
 
 
No 
Arrest          n %
No 
Arrest n %
No 
Arrest n %
No 
Arrest n % 
No 
Arrest n %
Total     27,340 12,400 45.4% 7,695 3,102 38.9% 5,916 2,601 44.0% 11,687 5,843 50.0% 1,772 854 48.2%
Arkansas                911 771 84.6 178 134 75.3 177 148 83.6 551 488 88.6 5 1 *
Massachusetts  219              91 41.6 31 17 * 15 5 * 141 59 41.8 32 10 *
Michigan  8,740 2,939 33.6 2,687 683 25.4 1,228 335 27.3 4,242 1,683 39.7 583 238 40.8 
North Dakota  306             131 42.8 69 22 31.9 55 32 58.2 155 66 42.6 27 11 *
Tennessee  17,164 8,468          49.3 5,000 2,246 44.9 4,441 2,081 46.9 6,598 3,547 53.8 1,125 594 52.8
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Incidents of sexual assault showed the highest overall likelihood (18.7%) of being cleared 
exceptionally because the victim refused to cooperate among the assault offense categories in the 
group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having preferred arrest policies (Table 19).  
Among all incidents of sexual assault within the preferred arrest policy group, 11.1% of incidents 
were cleared exceptionally because the victim refused to cooperate; the proportion was higher 
for strangers (16.2%), intimates (13.2%), and acquaintances (12.7%), than for victims who were 
family members (6.5%).  Once again we see higher proportions among sexual assault victims of 
incidents being cleared due to prosecution being declined than the victim refusing to cooperate 
with police that do not occur among incidents of simple and aggravated assault.  For sexual 
assault incidents reported by jurisdictions in states having preferred arrest policies, involving 
victims that were intimates and acquaintances, the proportion of incidents resulting in a clearance 
of "prosecution declined" was about double that of "victim refused to cooperate".  Among family 
victims of sexual assault, the proportion cleared by prosecution being declined was nearly triple 
that of the victim refusing to cooperate.  However, the proportion of strangers cleared by 
prosecution being declined was only slightly higher than that of the incident being cleared 
because the victim refused to cooperate. 
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Table 19    Assault Clearance Methods by Victim Type and Type of Assault - Preferred 
Arrest Policies 
Clearance code Victims (%) 
Total All Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
 
Sex assault (n = 5,712) (n = 1,760) (n = 477) (n = 3,054) (n = 421) 
Prosecution declined 22.6% 24.0% 27.0% 21.7% 17.8% 
Extradition declined 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate 11.1 6.5 13.2 12.7 16.2 
Juvenile/no custody 1.5 1.4 0.6 1.8 0.2 
Arrest 64.8 68.1 58.9 63.8 65.8 
 
Aggravated assault (n = 25,283) (n = 7,266) (n = 4,727) (n = 9,589)  (n = 3,701)
Prosecution declined 6.0% 5.1% 6.2% 6.8% 5.4% 
Extradition declined 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate 6.3 4.0 4.3 9.1 6.1 
Juvenile/no custody 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.5 
Arrest 86.9 90.3 88.8 83.1 87.9 
 
Simple assault (n = 94,741) (n = 36,677)
(n 
=25,750) (n = 26,660)  (n = 5,654)
Prosecution declined 11.9% 10.5% 11.0% 14.9% 10.3% 
Extradition declined 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate 10.7 7.3 9.1 17.2 9.9 
Juvenile/no custody 0.6 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.5 
Arrest 76.7 81.7 79.8 66.4 79.1 
       
Among all incidents of aggravated assault in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the 
states having preferred arrest policies, 6.3% of incidents were cleared exceptionally because the 
victim refused to cooperate; the proportion was highest for acquaintances (9.1%), followed by 
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strangers (6.1%).  Intimates and victims who were family members had lower proportions (4.3% 
and 4.0% respectively).  
Among all incidents of simple assault in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the 
states having preferred arrest policies, 10.7% of incidents were cleared exceptionally because the 
victim refused to cooperate with police.  The proportion of simple assault victims refusing to 
cooperate with police was highest for acquaintances (17.2%), followed by strangers (9.9%) and 
intimates (9.1%); victims who were family members had the lowest proportion (7.3%).   
Overall, in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having preferred arrest 
policies in each of the assault offense categories and in the total, arrest is the most frequent 
means of clearing an incident.  However, again, there are substantial differences in the likelihood 
of arrest among the offense categories.  On average, the likelihood of arrest for incidents 
involving sexual assault (64.8%) is lower than those involving simple (76.7%) or aggravated 
(86.9%) assaults.   
6.4.2 Logistic Regression 
In the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having preferred domestic violence 
arrest policies, incident characteristics involving family victims differed from those involving 
intimates in several respects.  A simple cross-tabular comparison of differential likelihoods of 
non-cooperation for family victims and victims defined as intimates could distort the actual 
influence of a victim's relationship to the offender on the likelihood of non-cooperation, a 
logistic regression was performed to study the effects of victim-offender relationship while 
controlling for other incident characteristics for this group of reporting jurisdictions.   
The logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-cooperation 
for family and intimate victims for the discretionary policy group (Table 20).  The odds of a 
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victim refusing to cooperate with police were about 16% greater if the victim was an intimate 
partner than if the victim was a family member.  Other incident characteristics also substantially 
affected the likelihood of non-cooperation.  If more than one offender was involved, the odds of 
victim non-cooperation were about 109% greater than the odds of victim non-cooperation in a 
single-offender incident.  However, if more than one victim was involved, the odds of non-
cooperation decreased about 31%.  If the incident took place in a location other than a residence, 
the odds of non-cooperation increased about 13%.  The odds of victim non-cooperation increased 
if the offender was an adult (76%) and if the victim was an adult (46%).  If the victim was not 
injured, the odds of non-cooperation increased 92%.  The odds of victim non-cooperation 
increased nearly 25% if the assault was a sexual assault and decreased 63% if a weapon was 
involved in the incident. 
Table 20    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of All Domestic 
Assault Victims - Preferred Arrest Policies 
 
Dichotomized 
Independent Variable 
 Value coded ‘0’
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds 
Ratio 
 
Number of offenders  One (7.0) More than one 
(11.6) 
.736  2.088 **
* 
Number of victims  One (7.4) More than one 
(7.8) 
-.270 0.764 **
* 
Location of incident  Residence (7.3) Nonresidence 
(8.6) 
.122 1.129 **
* 
Most serious weapon  Personal (7.9) Non-Personal 
(4.8) 
-.491 0.612 **
* 
Offender age  Juvenile (4.3) Adult (7.8) .566 1.762 **
* 
Offender sex  Male (7.3) Female (7.8) .053 1.054 ns 
Victim injured?  No (9.6) Yes (5.5) -.649 0.522 **
* 
Victim sex  Male (7.5) Female (7.4) -.025 0.975 ns 
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Victim age  Juvenile (5.2) Adult (7.7) .377 1.459 **
* 
Sexual assault?  No (7.4) Yes (7.9) .219 1.245 * 
Number of offenses?  One (7.4) More than one 
(8.3) 
.062 1.063 ns 
Victim/offender 
relationship 
 Family (6.8) Intimate (8.4) .149 1.161 **
* 
        
        
Model Chi-square   1,131.475 **      
12 df p<0.000        
N =  76,657        
    * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
ns not significant        
Separate logistic regression equations were developed for each of the five states in the 
preferred policy group.  In 2 states, Arkansas and Tennessee, a significant difference was found 
in the likelihood of non-cooperation for family and intimate victims; the odds of victim non-
cooperation increased if the victim was an intimate (Table 21).  In 2 states, North Dakota and 
Michigan, the victim-offender relationship was not significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
victim non-cooperation.  There were also differences among the states for each of the remaining 
predictors. 
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Table 21    State Logistic Regressions - Preferred Arrest Policies 
 
Number 
of 
offenders 
Number 
of 
victims 
 
 
Location
 
 
Weapon
 
Offender
 
 age 
Offender 
sex 
 
 
Injury 
 
Victim 
sex 
 
Victim 
age 
 
Sexual 
assault
Number 
of 
offenses
Victim 
offender 
relation-
ship 
All 
More 
than one One 
Non- 
residence No    Adult ns No ns Adult Yes ns Intimate 
             
Arkansas ns One ns No     Adult Female No ns ns No ns Intimate 
Massachusetts             
Michigan 
More 
than one One 
Non- 
residence No ns        ns No Male Adult Yes ns ns
North  
Dakota ns One 
Non- 
residence   Male  No ns Adult   ns 
Tennessee 
More 
than one One ns No    Adult ns No ns Adult ns ns Intimate 
Shading indicates variables with expected values <5 in contingency tables generated with dependent variable 
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In general, offender sex, victim sex, and the number of offenses involved in the incident 
were not significantly correlated with the probability of non-cooperation.  However, since the 
logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-cooperation for family 
and intimate victims, logistic regression equations were developed separately for family (Table 
22) and intimate domestic assault victims (Table 23) to determine whether incident 
characteristics affecting likelihood of non-cooperation differed for these two groups.   
Some of the incident characteristics that significantly affected the odds of victim non-
cooperation were the same for both groups.  If more than one offender was involved, the odds of 
victim non-cooperation were more than 171% greater for family victims and about 30% greater 
for intimate victims than the odds of victim non-cooperation in a single-offender incident.  If the 
incident involved a weapon, the odds of victim non-cooperation decreased 55% for family 
victims and about 74% for intimates.  If the victim was injured, the odds of non-cooperation 
decreased about 90% for family victims and 94% for intimates. 
 Table 22    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of Family Domestic 
Assault Victims - Preferred Arrest Policies 
 
 
Dichotomized 
Independent 
Variable  
Value coded 
‘0’ 
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B  
Odds
Ratio  
 Number of offenders  One (6.1) More than one (13.2) .997 2.710 ***
 Number of victims  One (6.6) More than one (7.5) -.288 .750 ***
 Location of incident  Residence(6.6) Nonresidence (8.0) .150 1.162 ** 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (7.2) Non-Personal (4.7) -.439 .645 ***
 Offender age  Juvenile (3.9) Adult (7.3) .659 1.934 ***
 Offender sex  Male (6.5) Female (7.7) .112 1.118 * 
 Victim injured?  No (8.6) Yes (5.0) -.643 .525 ***
 Victim sex  Male (7.3) Female (6.6) -.104 .901 * 
 Victim age  Juvenile (4.5) Adult (7.3) .503 1.653 ***
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 Sexual assault?  No (6.8) Yes (6.5) .188 1.207 ns 
 Number of offenses?  One (6.8) More than one (7.6) .128 1.136 ns 
         
 Model Chi-square    833.449 **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 45,703        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
Several incident characteristics that significantly affected the odds of victim non-
cooperation for family victims were not correlated with the probability of non-cooperation 
among intimates.  Among incidents involving family victims in the preferred arrest policy group 
of reporting jurisdictions, if the incident involved more than one victim, the odds of victim non-
cooperation decreased 33%, the incident took place inside a residence the decrease was 16% 
(Table 23).  The odds of family victim non-cooperation increased if the offender was an adult 
(93%), female (12%) and if the victim was an adult (65%).  If the family victim was male, the 
odds of non-cooperation increased 11%. 
 Table 23    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of Intimate Domestic 
Assault Victims - Preferred Arrest Policies 
 
 
Dichotomized 
Independent 
Variable  
Value coded ‘0’
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B  
Odds 
Ratio  
 Number of offenders  One (8.3) More than one (9.3) .258 1.295 ** 
 Number of victims  One (8.4) More than one (8.4) -.143 .867 ns 
 Location of incident  Residence(8.3) Nonresidence (9.0) .079 1.083 ns 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (9.0) Non-Personal (5.1) -.552 .576 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (9.1) Adult (8.4) .002 1.002 ns 
 Offender sex  Male (8.5) Female (8.1) .205 1.227 ns 
 Victim injured?  No (11.4) Yes (6.1) -.662 .516 *** 
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 Victim sex  Male (7.8) Female (8.5) .248 1.282 ns 
 Victim age  Juvenile (8.9) Adult (8.4) .105 1.111 ns 
 Sexual assault?  No (8.3) Yes (13.2) .328 1.388 * 
 Number of offenses?  One (8.4) More than one (8.7) .006 1.006  
        
 Model Chi-square    361.283 **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 30,954        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
         
Among family victims, if the domestic the nature of the assault being a sexual assault was 
not correlated with the probability of non-cooperation.  However, for intimates in this policy 
grouping, if the assault was a sexual assault, the odds of non-cooperation increased 39%.  For 
both groups of victims, the number of offenses involved in the incident was not correlated with 
non-cooperation probability. 
6.5 MANDATORY ARREST POLICIES 
6.5.1 Descriptives 
Within the mandatory arrest policy group, the highest proportion of cleared incidents of 
assault in which the victim refused to cooperate with police (Table 24) was for those involving 
acquaintances (16.7%), followed by intimates (11.9%), and then strangers (10.6%).  The 
likelihood of an assault incident being cleared because the victim refused to cooperate with 
police was lowest for family (9.9%). 
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Table 24    Assault Clearance Methods by Type of Victim - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
 
 Victims (%) 
Clearance code  All Family Intimate Acquaintance Stranger 
Total 
 
(n = 
212,171) 
(n = 
76,968) 
(n = 
42,220) 
(n = 
76,248)  
(n = 
16,735) 
Prosecution declined  10.2% 8.1% 8.5% 13.6%  8.4% 
Extradition declined  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  12.8 9.9 11.9 16.7 10.6 
Juvenile/no custody  1.1 0.7 0.4 2.1 0.9 
Arrest  75.8 81.2 79.2 67.5 80.0 
Overall in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having mandatory arrest 
policies, arrest was the most likely means of clearing an incident of assault among all types of 
victims.  Overall, in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having mandatory arrest 
policies in each of the assault offense categories and in the total, arrest is the most frequent 
means of clearing an incident.  However, keeping in mind that arrest is mandatory for cases of 
domestic assault, it is interesting to note that the proportions of incidents resulting in arrest do 
not differ substantially between the victims defined to be family or intimate, and those who are 
not considered to be victims of "domestic" assault and therefore not protected by the mandatory 
arrest policy.  Among all incidents of assault within the mandatory arrest policy group, the 
proportion of incidents cleared by arrest 80.0% for strangers and 67.5% for acquaintances.  
Where the victim-offender relationship was family the overall proportion of incidents cleared by 
arrest was 81.2% and 79.2% for intimates.  
Individual states within the group of states with mandatory arrest policies differed 
somewhat in their proportions of incidents of assault not cleared by arrest in which the victim 
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refused to cooperate with police among those involving family, intimates, acquaintances, and 
strangers (Table 24). 
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Table 25     Victims that Refused to Cooperate in Assault Incidents Not Cleared by Arrest - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
Refused to Cooperate (n) 
 All    Family Acquaintance Stranger
 
 
No 
Arrest           n
No 
Arrest n %
No 
Arrest
Intimate 
% n %
No 
Arrest n %
No 
Arrest n %
Total    51,445 27,200 52.9% 14,505 7,652 52.8% 8,787 5,009 57.0% 24,805 12,760 51.4% 3,348 1,779 53.1%
Colorado  1,330 61.6% 383 249 65.0% 86 33 38.4% 725 440 60.7% 136 97 71.3%
Connecticut  209            159 76.1 36 23 * 44 39 * 117 89 76.1 12 8 *
Iowa              1,805 454 25.2 324 95 29.3 220 86 39.1 1,126 239 21.2 135 34 25.2
Kansas             3,104 1,396 45.0 714 237 33.2 671 114 17.0 1,474 893 60.6 245 152 62.0
Louisiana              207 193 93.2 80 75 93.8 44 43 * 79 72 91.1 4 3 *
Ohio              7,051 4,842 68.7 1,086 730 67.2 1,213 1,004 82.8 4,288 2,783 64.9 464 325 70.0
Oregon*              38 14 * 5 1 * 11 3 * 17 8 * 5 2 *
South 
Carolina             21,686 14,645 67.5 7,337 5,008 68.3 3,537 2,689 76.0 9,622 6,149 63.9 1,190 799 67.1
Utah              1,348 626 46.4 353 53 15.0 172 68 39.5 721 436 60.5 102 69 67.6
Virginia             14,667 4,052 27.6 4,187 1,181 28.2 2,789 930 33.3 6,636 1,651 24.9 1,055 290 27.5
 
819 
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Among assault categories within the mandatory arrest policy group (Table 26), 13.0% of 
incidents involving sexual assault were cleared exceptionally because the victim refused to 
cooperate; the proportion was highest for intimates (17.4%), and lowest for victims who were 
family members (7.9%); the proportions for victims defined to be acquaintances or strangers 
were similar (14.6% and 14.2% respectively).  Once again we see higher proportions occurring 
among sexual assault victims of incidents being cleared due to prosecution being declined than 
the victim refusing to cooperate with police that do not occur among incidents of simple and 
aggravated assault.  Among family victims of sexual assault, the proportion cleared by 
prosecution being declined was considerably higher that of the victim refusing to cooperate.  
However, the proportion of strangers cleared by prosecution being declined was equal to that of 
the incident being cleared because the victim refused to cooperate. For sexual assault incidents 
reported by jurisdictions in states having mandatory arrest policies, involving victims that were 
intimates and acquaintances, the proportion of incidents resulting in a clearance of "prosecution 
declined" was about 7 percentage points higher than that of incidents cleared by "victim refused 
to cooperate".   
Among all incidents of aggravated assault in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the 
states having mandatory arrest policies, 10.0% of incidents were cleared exceptionally because 
the victim refused to cooperate; the proportion was highest for acquaintances (12.0%), followed 
by intimates (9.6%) and family (8.7%); victims who were strangers had the lowest proportion 
(7.2%).   
Incidents of simple assault showed the highest overall likelihood (13.3%) of being 
cleared exceptionally because the victim refused to cooperate among the assault offense 
categories in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having mandatory arrest 
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policies.  The proportion of simple assault victims refusing to cooperate with police was highest 
for acquaintances (17.9%), followed by intimates (12.1%) and strangers (11.6%); victims who 
were family members had the lowest proportion (10.2%).   
Table 26    Assault Clearance Methods by Type of Assault - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
 
Clearance code  Victims (%) 
Sex Assault  All Family Intimate Acquaintance  Stranger 
Total  (n = 8,371) (n = 2,297) (n = 645) (n = 4,881)  (n =548) 
Prosecution 
declined  21.2% 20.5% 24.5% 21.9%  14.2% 
Extradition declined  0.4 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  13.0 7.9 17.4 14.6 14.2 
Juvenile/no custody  1.4 1.3 0.8 1.6 0.9 
Arrest  63.9 69.5 57.1 61.5 70.6 
 
Aggravated 
assault  (n = 30,376) (n = 8,900) (n = 4,880) (n = 12,481)  (n =4,115) 
Prosecution 
declined  5.3% 4.2% 3.3% 6.8% 5.0% 
Extradition declined  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  10.0 8.7 9.6 12.0 7.2 
Juvenile/no custody  0.5 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 
Arrest  84.3 86.8 87.0 80.4 87.4 
 
Simple assault  
(n= 
173,424) 
(n = 
65,771) 
(n = 
36,695) 
(n = 
58,886)  
(n = 
12,072) 
Prosecution 
declined  10.5% 8.2% 8.9% 14.3% 9.3% 
Extradition declined  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Victim refused to 
cooperate  13.3 10.2 12.1 17.9 11.6 
Juvenile/no custody  1.2 0.7 0.4 2.4 1.1 
Arrest  74.8 80.8 78.5 65.2 77.9 
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 Overall, in the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having mandatory arrest 
policies in each of the assault offense categories and in the total, arrest was the most frequent 
means of clearing an incident.  There were substantial differences in the likelihood of arrest 
among the offense categories.  On average, the likelihood of arrest for incidents involving sexual 
assault (63.9%) was lower than those involving simple (74.8%) or aggravated (84.3%) assaults.   
6.5.2 Logistic Regression 
In the group of jurisdictions reporting from the states having mandatory domestic 
violence arrest policies, incident characteristics involving family victims differed from those 
involving intimates in several respects.  A simple cross-tabular comparison of differential 
likelihoods of non-cooperation for family victims and victims defined as intimates might 
misrepresent the actual influence of a victim's relationship to the offender on the likelihood of 
non-cooperation.  A logistic regression was performed to study the effects of victim-offender 
relationship while controlling for other incident characteristics for this group of reporting 
jurisdictions.   
The logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-cooperation 
for family and intimate victims for the mandatory policy group (Table 27).  The odds of a victim 
refusing to cooperate with police were about 22% greater if the victim was an intimate partner 
than if the victim was a family member.  Other incident characteristics also substantially affected 
the likelihood of non-cooperation.  If more than one offender was involved, the odds of victim 
non-cooperation were about 51% greater than the odds of victim non-cooperation in a single-
offender incident.  However, if more than one victim was involved, the odds of non-cooperation 
decreased about 68%.  If the incident took place in a location other than a residence, the odds of 
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non-cooperation increased about 14%.  The odds of victim non-cooperation increased if the 
offender was an adult (22%) and if the victim was an adult (39%).  If the victim was not injured, 
the odds of non-cooperation increased 147%.  The odds of victim non-cooperation increased 
nearly 15% if a weapon was involved in the incident.  Offender sex, victim sex, and whether or 
not the assault was a sexual assault were not correlated with the probability of non-cooperation.   
 Table 27    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of All Domestic 
Assault Victims - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
 
 Dichotomized 
Independent Variable 
 Value coded ‘0’
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B 
 Odds
Ratio
 
 Number of offenders  One (7.0) More than one 
(11.6) 0.414 
 
1.513 *** 
 Number of victims  One (7.4) More than one 
(7.8) -0.518 0.595 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence (7.3) Nonresidence 
(8.6) 0.135 1.144 *** 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (7.9) Non-Personal 
(4.8) 0.139 1.149 *** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (4.3) Adult (7.8) 0.198 1.218 *** 
 Offender sex  Male (7.3) Female (7.8) 0.017 1.017 ns 
 Victim injured?  No (9.6) Yes (5.5) -0.904 0.405 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (7.5) Female (7.4) -0.033 0.968 ns 
 Victim age  Juvenile (5.2) Adult (7.7) 0.328 1.388 *** 
 Sexual assault?  No (7.4) Yes (7.9) -0.055 0.946 ns 
 Number of offenses?  One (7.4) More than one 
(8.3) -0.466 0.628 *** 
 Victim/offender 
relationship 
 Family (6.8) Intimate (8.4) 
0.196 1.216 *** 
         
         
 Model Chi-square   2669.694 **      
 12 df p<0.000        
 N =  119,188        
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     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
Separate logistic regression equations were developed for each of the ten states in the 
mandatory policy group (Table 28).  In 6 states, Colorado, Connecticut, Ohio, South Carolina, 
Utah and Virginia, a significant difference was found in the likelihood of non-cooperation for 
family and intimate victims; the odds of non-cooperation increased if the victim was an intimate 
in all but Colorado where the odds increased if the victim was a family member.  In 3 states, 
Iowa, Kansas, and Louisiana, the victim-offender relationship was not significantly correlated 
with the likelihood of victim non-cooperation.  There were also differences among the states for 
each of the remaining predictors. 
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 Table 28    State Logistic Regressions - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
Number
of 
offenders 
 Number 
of 
victims 
 
 
Location 
 
 
Weapon
 
Offender 
age 
 
Offender 
sex 
 
 
Injury 
 
Victim 
sex 
 
Victim 
age 
 
Sexual 
assault
Number 
of 
offenses
Victim 
offender 
relationship
 More 
than 1 
One Non-
residence 
Yes Adult    ns No ns Adult ns One Intimate 
  
Colorado ns           ns ns ns Juvenile ns ns ns ns Yes One Family
Connecticut 0   ns ns  ns ns    No ns ns   Intimate 
Iowa 
ns        ns ns ns Juvenile ns No ns ns  More 
than 
ns 
Kansas 
More 
than 1 
One         ns No Juvenile ns No ns Juvenile ns One ns
Louisiana 
More 
than 1 
ns      Residence No ns ns No Male ns  ns  ns
Ohio 
More 
than 1 
 
One 
Non-
residence 
 
No 
 
Adult 
 
ns 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
Adult 
 
Yes 
 
ns 
 
Intimate 
Oregon             
South 
Carolina 
 
ns 
 
One 
 
Residence
 
No 
 
Adult 
 
Female 
 
No 
 
Male 
 
Adult 
 
No 
 
ns 
 
Intimate 
Utah ns         One ns ns Juvenile ns No ns Adult Yes ns Intimate
Virginia 
More 
than 1 
One          ns Yes Adult ns No ns Adult ns One Intimate
Shading indicates variables with expected values <5 in contingency tables generated with dependent variable 
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 Since the logistic regression found a significant difference in the likelihood of non-
cooperation for the victim offender relationship, logistic regression equations were developed 
separately for family (Table 29) and intimate domestic assault victims (Table 30) to determine 
whether incident characteristics affecting likelihood of non-cooperation differed for these two 
groups.   
Some of the incident characteristics that significantly affected the odds of victim non-
cooperation were the same for both family victims and those who were intimates.  If more than 
one offender was involved, the odds of victim non-cooperation were more than 64% greater for 
family victims and about 27% greater for intimate victims than the odds of victim non-
cooperation in a single-offender incident.  If the incident involved a weapon, the odds of victim 
non-cooperation increased 11% for family victims and about 21% for intimates.  If the victim 
was injured, the odds of non-cooperation decreased about 155% for family victims and 137% for 
intimates.  If the incident involved more than one victim, the odds of nocooperation decreased 
62% for family victims and 73% for intimates and if the incident involved more than one offense 
the odds of non cooperation decreased for both family (91%) and intimate (40%) victims. 
Some of the incident characteristics that were significant for both victim types affected 
the odds of victim non-cooperation differently.  The odds of family victim non-cooperation 
increased if the offender was an adult (30%) but decreased 28% for intimates.  For family 
victims the odds of non-cooperation increased if the victim was male (9%) but for intimates the 
odds increased 42% if the victim was female. 
Incident location was not correlated with the probability of non-cooperation among 
family victims but for intimates the odds of non-cooperation increased 24% if the incident took 
place outside of the residence.  If the victim was an adult, the odds of non-cooperation increased 
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 58% for family victims, but victim age was not correlated with the probability of non-
cooperation among victims who were intimates.  The assault being a sexual assault was not 
correlated with probability of non-cooperation for either group of victims. 
 Table 29    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of Family Domestic 
Assault Victims - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
 
 
Dichotomized 
Independent 
Variable  
Value coded ‘0’
(% Refused) 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B  
Odds 
Ratio  
 Number of offenders  One (6.1) More than one (13.2) 0.496 1.642 *** 
 Number of victims  One (6.6) More than one (7.5) -0.482 0.617 *** 
 Location of incident  Residence(6.6) Nonresidence (8.0) 0.04 1.041 ns 
 Most serious weapon  Personal (7.2) Non-Personal (4.7) 0.105 1.111 ** 
 Offender age  Juvenile (3.9) Adult (7.3) 0.265 1.304 *** 
 Offender sex  Male (6.5) Female (7.7) 0.031 1.032 ns 
 Victim injured?  No (8.6) Yes (5.0) -0.937 0.392 *** 
 Victim sex  Male (7.3) Female (6.6) -0.085 0.919 ** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (4.5) Adult (7.3) 0.454 1.575 *** 
 Sexual assault?  No (6.8) Yes (6.5) -0.146 0.864 ns 
 Number of offenses?  One (6.8) More than one (7.6) -0.648 0.523 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square   1764.350 **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 76,968        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
Incident location was not correlated with the probability of non-cooperation among 
family victims but for intimates the odds of non-cooperation increased 24% if the incident took 
place outside of the residence.  If the victim was an adult, the odds of non-cooperation increased 
58% for family victims, but victim age was not correlated with the probability of non-
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 cooperation among victims who were intimates.  The assault being a sexual assault was not 
correlated with probability of non-cooperation for either group of victims. 
  Table 30    Logistic Regression to Predict the Non-cooperation of Intimate Domestic 
Assault Victims - Mandatory Arrest Policies 
 
Dichotomized 
Independent 
Variable 
Value coded ‘1’ 
(%Refused) 
Estimated 
B   
Value coded ‘0’
(% Refused) 
Odds
Ratio  
 One (8.3) More than one (9.3) 0.237 *** 
Number of victims  One (8.4) More than one (8.4) 0.579
 Location of incident esidence(8.3) 0.214 ***  R Nonresidence (9.0) 1.239
Most serious weapon  Personal (9.0) Non-Personal (5.1) 0.194 1.214 *** 
Offender age Juvenile (9.1) -0.247 0.781 * 
 Offender sex  Male (8.5) Female (8.1) 0.332 1.394 ** 
 Victim injured?  No (11.4) Yes (6.1) *** -0.863 0.422
Victim sex  Male (7.8) Female (8.5) 0.35 1.419 ** 
 Victim age  Juvenile (8.9) Adult (8.4) -0.047 0.954 ns 
 Sexual assault?  No (8.3) Yes (13.2) 0.125 1.133 ns 
 Number of offenses?  One (8.4) More than one (8.7) -0.337 0.714 *** 
         
 Model Chi-square   963.825  **      
 11 df p<0.000        
 N = 42,220        
     * p ≤  .05 
  ** p ≤ .01 
*** p ≤ .001 
       
 ns = not significant        
 Number of offenders 1.267
 -0.546 *** 
 
  Adult (8.4) 
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 6.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This aim of this study was to determine whether there was evidence contained in the incident 
data reported by law enforcement that would reliably predict that a victim would be unwilling to 
cooperate with law enforcement when they respond to an incident of domestic violence and 
whether that evidence differed when considering the restrictiveness of arrest policy driving law 
enforcement’s response.   
The two general questions posed were 
• Do certain extralegal factors predict the likelihood of victim non-cooperation in incidents 
involving domestic violence? and, 
• Controlling for the type of arrest policy (mandatory, preferred, discretionary), what are 
the extralegal factors that predict the likelihood of victim non-cooperation in incidents 
involving domestic violence? 
The analyses of these NIBRS data suggest that there are certain extralegal factors that predict the 
likelihood of non-cooperation.  As shown in Table 30, all of the extralegal factors in the model 
were significantly correlated with the likelihood of non-cooperation.  In other words, the odds of 
victim non-cooperation were significantly increased if 
• more than one offender was involved in the incident, 
• the incident involved only one victim, 
• the incident occurred in a place other than a residence, 
• the incident did not involve a nonpersonal weapon such as a gun, knife, or club, 
• the offender was an adult, 
• the offender was female, 
• the victim was not injured, 
• the victim was male, 
• the victim was an adult, 
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 • the assault was not a sexual assault, 
• the incident involved a single offense, and 
• the victim was an intimate partner  
6.6.1 Extralegal factors 
The logistic regression analysis found that type of victim significantly affected the likelihood of 
victim non-cooperation in incidents involving domestic violence (Table 31).  Specifically, if the 
victim was an intimate, the odds of non-cooperation increased supporting the first hypothesis: 
• When an incident of domestic violence involves a victim who is an intimate partner (as 
opposed to a spouse), the odds of a victim not cooperating with police at the scene of the 
crime will increase. 
If the victim was an intimate partner, the odds of victim noncooperation increased 14.2% 
(compared with the odds if the victim was a family victim). 
Table 31    Results of Logistic Regression To Predict Non-cooperation by Type of Victim 
Offense 
Characteristics 
All Victims 
(n = 233,063) 
Family 
(n = 146,830) 
Intimate 
(n = 86,233) 
% Non-
cooperation 
Odds 
Ratio
% Non-
cooperation
Odds 
Ratio
% Non-
cooperation 
Odds 
Ratio
Number of 
offenders 
 
1.787***
 
2.059***
 
1.315***
One (0) 10.1   9.3 11.4  
More than one 
(1) 
13.0 
 
13.8 
 
11.7 
 
Number of 
victims 
 
0.635***
 
0.691***
One (0) 10.0 11.7 
9.8 
 
9.5 
 
10.3 
 
Location of 
incident 
 
1.086***
 
1.025 ns
 
1.133***
 
0.631***
 
10.6    
More than one 
(1) 
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 Residence (0) 10.3   9.8 11.1  
Nonresidence 
(1) 
11.5 
 
10.4 
 
12.6 
 
Most serious 
weapon 
 
0.812***
 
0.799***
 
0.836***
10.7  10.2  11.7  
Non-Personnel 
(1) 
8.6 
 
8.2 9.5 
  
Offender age  1.277***  1.359***  
8.3 
 
7.8 
 
14.5 
 
Adult (1)  11.4  
Offender sex  1.044*   
Male (0) 10.3  9.6  11.4  
Female (1) 10.8  11.5  
Victim 
injured? 
   
0.432***
No (0) 14.2  13.2  16.1  
Yes (1) 7.0  6.5  7.7  
  0.901***  1.229** 
Male (0) 10.7  10.4  11.3  
Female (1) 10.4  9.7  11.5 
 1.413***  1.559***  1.069 ns
Under age 18 
(0)   
12.1 
 
Adult (1) 10.9  10.5   11.4 
Sexual Assault?  0.875**  0.782***  1.121 ns
No (0) 10.0  11.4  
Yes (1) 9.0   7.2 15.6  
Number of 
offenses 
 
0.726***
 
0.620***
 
0.798***
One (0) 10.5  10.0  11.5  
More than one 
(1)   
Victim/offender  1.142***   
Personal (0) 
0.818** 
Under age 18 
(0) 
10.7  10.2 
1.066** 1.262** 
11.0  
0.432*** 0.430***
Victim sex 0.947** 
 
Victim age 
7.4 6.6 
10.5  
8.5 6.8 9.9 
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 relationship 
Family(0) 9.9      
Intimate (1) 11.4      
       
* p ≤ 0.05       
** p ≤ 0.01       
*** p ≤ 0.001       
ns = not significant      
While the logistic regression analysis found a significant difference in the likelihood of 
victim noncooperation when the predictor was the sex of the victim, the results were mixed.  The 
second hypothesis in this study stated: 
• When an incident of domestic violence involves a female victim, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police will increase. 
The analysis revealed that, in general, the odds of a victim not cooperating with police at the 
scene of an incident involving domestic violence increased 5.6% if the victim was a male.  
However, while the odds of non-cooperation increased 11.0% for family victims when the victim 
was male, for intimates the odds of non-cooperation increased 22.9% if the victim was female. 
The NIBRS data offered no evidence to support the hypothesis that  
• When an incident involves a weapon, the odds of a victim not cooperating with police at 
the scene of the crime will increase. 
In fact, the absence of a nonpersonal weapon, such as a firearm or a knife, significantly increased 
the odds of victim non-cooperation.  Overall, compared with incidents involving a nonpersonal 
weapon, the odds of a victim not cooperating increased 23.2% when there was no weapon 
involved other than personal (hands, feet, etc.) in the incident; when controlling for type of 
victim, odds of noncooperation increased 25.2% among family victims and 19.6% among 
victims defined as intimate partners.   
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 These data also offered no evidence to support the hypothesis that: 
• When an incident of domestic violence involves injury to the victim, the odds of a victim 
not cooperating with police at the scene of the crime will increase. 
In this sample, when an incident of domestic violence involved no injury to the victim, the odds 
of a victim not cooperating with police more than doubled.  This was the case for both family 
victims and intimates. 
• When an incident of domestic violence involves a sexual assault, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police will increase. 
There was evidence in support of the hypothesis that:  
There was no evidence to support that: 
Overall, the odds of victim non-cooperation decreased significantly (14.3%) if the nature of the 
domestic assault was a sexual assault.  However, this differed by type of victim.  Among victims 
defined as family, the odds significantly decreased (27.9%).  But if the victim was an intimate 
rather than a family victim, the assault being a sexual assault, although not significantly 
correlated with the probability of non-cooperation, increased the odds (12.1%). 
• When an incident of domestic violence involves a juvenile victim, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police will decrease. 
In fact, among all victims in this sample, the odds of a victim not cooperating were significantly 
lower (41.3%) if the victim was an under the age of 18.  When controlling for type of victim, the 
odds of noncooperation when the victim was a juvenile decreased much more among victims 
defined as family members (55.9%). When the victim was an intimate rather than a family 
victim, victim age was not significantly correlated with the probability of non-cooperation. 
There was also evidence in this sample to support the hypothesis that:  
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 • When an incident of domestic violence involves more than one victim, the odds of a victim 
not cooperating with police will decrease. 
Among all victims in this sample, the odds of a victim not cooperating were significantly lower 
when there were multiple victims involved in an incident of domestic violence(57.4%); this held 
true even when controlling for victim type (58.5% for family victims, 44.7% for intimates). 
 
6.6.2 Controlling for arrest policy 
H2: When an incident of domestic violence involves a female victim, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police will increase. 
When controlling for the type of arrest policy, the odds of victim non-cooperation varied among 
the three general groupings of arrest policy (discretionary, preferred, and mandatory).  The final 
hypothesis was: 
• When controlling for the type of arrest policy (mandatory, preferred, or discretionary), 
the odds of a victim not cooperating with police will increase with the restrictiveness of 
the dominant arrest policy. 
The first five hypotheses in this study were related to an increase in the odds of victim 
non cooperation.  They were as follows: 
 
H1: When an incident of domestic violence involves a victim who is an intimate partner (as 
opposed to a spouse), the odds of a victim not cooperating with police at the scene of the crime 
will increase. 
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 H3: When an incident involves a weapon, the odds of a victim not cooperating with police at 
the scene of the crime will increase. 
H5: When an incident of domestic violence involves a sexual assault, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police will increase. 
 
 
H4: When an incident of domestic violence involves injury to the victim, the odds of a victim 
not cooperating with police at the scene of the crime will increase. 
 
There was evidence when controlling for type of arrest policy, the odds of 
noncooperation increased with the restrictiveness of the policy when an incident of domestic 
violence involved a victim who is an intimate partner (as opposed to a spouse or family 
member).  The odds of a victim who was an intimate partner not cooperating with police at the 
scene of the crime increased 6.6% compared with a family victim when the dominant arrest was 
a discretionary arrest policy (the least restrictive), 16.1% when the arrest policy was a preferred 
arrest policy, and 21.6% when the dominant policy was the most restrictive, a mandatory arrest 
policy (Table 32). 
Table 32    Results of Logistic Regression To Predict Non-cooperation by Type of Arrest 
Policy 
 
All Victims 
Offense 
Characteristics 
 
Discretionary 
(n = 37,218) 
 
Preferred 
(n = 45,703) 
 
Mandatory 
(n =119,188) 
Percent 
Non-
Odds 
Ratio 
Percent 
Non-
Odds 
Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
 
Number of 
offenders  
 
2.005***  
 
2.088***
 
1.513***
 Percent 
Non-
 
  149
 One (0) 15.3%  7.0%  10.5%  
22.1  11.6  11.2  
Number of 
victims 
  
0.631***
  
0.764***
 
16.2    7.4 11.1 
More than one 
(1) 
 
1.144***
Nonresidence 
(1) 
  
1.149***
4.8  
 1.125* 1.762*** 1.218***
Under age 18 
(0) 
Adult (1) 
 1.074 ns ns  1.017 ns
Male (0) 15.5  7.3  10.6  
Female (1) 7.8  10.7  
Victim 
injured? 
 
0.388***  0.522***  0.405***
No (0) 9.6 
Yes (1) 
Victim sex  0.866***  0.975 ns  0.968 ns
Male (0) 17.6  7.5  10.5  
Female (1) 
1.492***  1.459***  1.388***
Under age 18 
(0) 
10.7  5.2  7.7  
More than one 
(1) 
 
0.595***
One (0) 
16.1  7.8  9.0  
Location of 
incident 
  
0.907* 
  
1.129***
 
Residence (0) 16.3  7.3  10.4  
15.3  8.6  12.1  
Most serious 
weapon 
  
0.541***
 
0.612***
 
Personal (0) 17.0  7.9  10.5  
Non-Personnel 
(1) 
9.9  11.5  
Offender age   
14.6  4.3  8.8  
16.3  7.8  10.8  
Offender sex  1.054 
18.2  
22.2   14.5  
10.7  5.5  6.8  
15.6  7.4  10.7  
Victim age  
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 Adult (1) 7.7  11.0  
0.456***  1.245*  0.946 ns
No (0) 7.4  10.6  
Yes (1) 8.3  7.9  10.0  
Number of 
offenses 1.063 ns
 
7.4 10.8  
More than one 
(1) 
12.1   7.6  8.3 
  
1.066* 
  
Family(0) 6.8 9.9  
17.2  11.9  8.4  
    
* p ≤ 0.05       
    
   
ns = not significant      
17.0  
Sexual Assault?  
16.4  
  
0.610***
   
0.628***
One (0) 16.3   
Victim/offender 
relationship 
 
1.161***
 
1.216***
15.6   
Intimate (1) 
   
** p ≤ 0.01   
*** p ≤ 0.001    
 
There was also evidence when controlling for type of arrest policy, the odds of 
noncooperation increased, albeit slightly, with the restrictiveness of the policy when an incident 
of domestic violence involved a female victim. 
The odds of a victim not cooperating with police in incidents of domestic violence that 
involved a weapon other than body parts increased as the restrictiveness of the arrest policy 
increased.  The odds were significantly greater for a personal weapon for the two least restrictive 
arrest protocols (84.8% for the discretionary group and 63.4% for the preferred policy group); as 
the odds decreased for a personal weapon being involved the odds increased for a non-personal 
weapon being involved. For the mandatory arrest policy group (the most restrictive), the odds of 
a victim not cooperating with police were significantly higher (14.9%) when an incident 
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 involved a non personal weapon compared with incidents in which only a personal weapon was 
involved. 
The results were mixed when an incident of domestic violence involved injury to the 
victim.  The odds of a victim not cooperating with police were significantly higher under all 
three arrest policies when there was no victim injury reported (157% for discretionary, 91.6% for 
preferred, and 147% for mandatory).  However, the odds of victim noncooperation when there 
was no injury were highest when the policy was a preferred arrest policy, which was neither the 
most nor the least restrictive policy.   
A similar pattern held true for incidents of domestic violence that involved sexual assault.  
When the dominant arrest policy was discretionary, the odds of a victim not cooperating with 
police were significantly higher (119.3%) when the incident did not involve a sexual assault 
compared with incidents that did.  Under the preferred arrest policy, the odds of victim 
noncooperation were significantly higher (24.5%) if the incident did involve a sexual assault; 
under the mandatory arrest policy, the odds were nearly even .  
6.6.2.1 Family victims 
Among incidents involving family victims, there was evidence when controlling for type 
of arrest policy, the odds of noncooperation were significantly correlated with the incident of 
domestic violence involveing a male victim.  For the discretionary policy group, the odds of 
victim noncooperation were 18.5% higher for incidents involving male victims, for the preferred 
policy grouping, the odds of noncooperation were 11% higher for incidents involving a male 
victim, and for the mandatory policy group, the odds of victim noncooperation were 9% higher 
for incidents involving a male victim.  While the odds did not increase with the restrictiveness of 
the arrest policy, the results were significant regardless of the arrest policy. 
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 Among family victims, there was also evidence, when controlling for type of arrest 
policy, the odds of noncooperation increased with the restrictiveness of the policy when an 
incident of domestic violence involved a nonpersonal weapon (knife, gun, club).  Among these 
victims, the odds of noncooperation increased with the restrictiveness of the arrest policy when 
an incident of domestic violence involved a nonpersonal weapon.  The odds of victim 
noncooperation were significantly greater for a personal weapon under the two less restrictive 
arrest protocols, with higher odds under the least restrictive discretionary policy (103%) than 
under the preferred policy (55.0%); therefore, the odds of victim noncooperation when a non 
personal weapon was involved in the incident were higher in the more restrictive policy of the 
two.  For the mandatory arrest policy group, the most restrictive, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police were significantly higher (11.1%) when an incident involved a weapon 
compared with incidents in which no weapon was involved. 
Table 33    Results of Logistic Regression To Predict Non-cooperation by Type of Arrest 
Policy - Family Victims 
Among family victims, the results are mixed when an incident of domestic violence 
involved injury to the victim.  The odds of a victim not cooperating with police were 
significantly higher for all three arrest policy groups when there was no victim injury reported. 
(152.5% for discretionary, 90.5% for preferred, and 155.1% for mandatory).  However, the odds 
of victim noncooperation when there was no injury was lowest for the preferred arrest policy 
group, which was neither the most nor the least restrictive arrest policy.   
Offense 
Characteristics 
Preferred 
(n = 45,703) 
Discretionary 
(n = 24,159) 
Mandatory 
(n = 76,968) 
 
% Non-
cooperation 
Odds 
Ratio 
% Non-
cooperation
% Non-
cooperation 
Odds 
Ratio 
Odds 
Ratio 
Number of       
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 offenders 2.390*** 2.710*** 1.642***
One (0) 
More than one 
(1) 
23.3  13.2  11.5  
Number of 
victims 
  
0.593***
  
0.750***
  
0.617***
One (0) 
More than one 
(1) 
15.5  7.5  8.9  
Location of 
incident 
  
0.875* 
  
1.041 ns
Residence (0) 
Most serious 
weapon 
  
0.492***
  
1.111** 
Personal (0) 
   
Offender age  1.161**  
14.1  3.9   8.2 
15.8  7.3  10.2 
   1.032 ns
14.9  6.5   9.8 
17.6  7.7  10.4  
   0.392***
21.0  8.6   13.4 
10.5   5.0 6.1  
   0.919** 
Male (0) 17.0  7.3   10.2 
14.9  6.6  9.8  
Victim age  1.531***  1.653***  1.575***
10.0  4.5  6.7  
16.8  7.3  10.5  
Sexual 
Assault?? 
 
0.365***  1.207 ns  0.864 ns
15.9  6.8   10.0 
6.5  6.5  7.9  
Number of 
offenses 
  
0.470***
  
1.136 ns
 
15.8    6.8 10.1 
14.4  6.1  9.7  
15.6  6.6  10.3  
 
1.162** 
 
15.8  6.6  9.9  
Nonresidence 
(1) 
14.2  8.0  10.5  
 
0.645***
 
16.5  7.2  9.8  
Non-Personnel 
(1) 
 
9.0 
 
4.7 
 
10.6 
1.934***  1.304***
Under age 18 
(0) 
Adult (1)  
Offender sex 1.082 ns 1.118* 
Male (0) 
Female (1) 
Victim 
injured? 0.396*** 0.525***
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
Victim sex 0.844*** 0.901* 
Female (1) 
Under age 18 
(0) 
Adult (1) 
No (0) 
Yes (1) 
 
0.523***
One (0) 
  154
 More than one 
(1) 
      
     
      
*** p ≤ 0.001       
    
9.3  7.6  5.9  
 
* p ≤ 0.05  
** p ≤ 0.01 
ns = not significant  
Results were also mixed among victims who are defined as family for incidents of 
domestic violence that involved sexual assault.  When the dominant arrest policy was 
discretionary, the odds of a victim not cooperating with police were significantly higher 
(174.0%) when the incident did not involve a sexual assault.  For the preferred arrest policy 
group, the odds of victim noncooperation were higher (20.7%) if the incident did involve a 
sexual assault, but were not significantly correlated with victim noncooperation.  Within the 
mandatory arrest policy group, the odds of victim noncooperation were also not significantly 
correlated with the odds of victim noncooperation; the odds of noncooperation were 15.7% 
higher for incidents that did not involve a sexual assault compared with those that did.  
6.6.2.2 Intimate victims 
Among victims who were intimates, there was evidence when controlling for type of 
arrest policy, the odds of noncooperation increased with the restrictiveness of the policy when an 
incident of domestic violence involved a female victim (Table 34).  Within the discretionary 
policy group, the odds of a victim not cooperating with police were nearly equal for male and 
female victims; the odds increased 6.8% if the victim was a male and victim sex was not 
significantly correlated with the odds of victim noncooperation.  Within the preferred arrest 
policy group, which is more restrictive than the discretionary policy, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police increased 28.2% if the victim was a female compared with if the victim 
was a male.  Although victim sex was not significantly correlated with victim cooperation under 
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 the preferred arrest policy, the odds of victim cooperation favored a female victim.  Within the 
mandatory arrest policy group, the most restrictive policy, victim sex was significantly correlated 
with victim noncooperation with female victims being 41.9% more likely not to cooperate with 
police than males. 
Among intimate victims, the results were mixed when comparing the odds of 
noncooperation with the restrictiveness of the arrest policy when an incident of domestic 
violence involved a nonpersonal weapon (gun, club, knife) with incidents that involved only 
personal weapons (hands, fist, feet).  The odds were significantly greater for a personal weapon 
under the two least restrictive arrest protocols (55.5% for the discretionary policy group and 
73.6% for the preferred policy group).  However, within the mandatory arrest policy grouping, 
the odds of a victim not cooperating with police were significantly higher (21.4%) when an 
incident involved a non personal weapon compared with incidents in which a personal weapon 
was involved. 
Among victims who were intimates, there was no evidence to support that, when 
controlling for type of arrest policy, the odds of noncooperation increased with the restrictiveness 
of the policy when an incident of domestic violence involved injury to the victim.  In fact, among 
intimate victims, when an incident of domestic violence involved injury to the victim, the odds 
of a victim not cooperating with police were significantly higher for all three arrest policy groups 
when there was no victim injury reported.  The odds of victim noncooperation when there was 
no injury were highest when the arrest policy was discretionary, followed by mandatory, and 
were lowest when the arrest policy was a preferred arrest policy.  
There was no evidence to support that, among victims who were intimates, when 
controlling for type of arrest policy, the odds of noncooperation increased with the restrictiveness 
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 of the policy when an incident of domestic violence involved a sexual assault.  Among intimate 
victims, the odds of a victim not cooperating with police were significantly higher (38.8%) under 
the preferred arrest policy when the incident involved a sexual assault.  The odds of victim 
noncooperation were not significantly correlated with an incident involving a sexual assault 
under either the discretionary or the mandatory arrest policy.  
Table 34    Results of Logistic Regression To Predict Non-cooperation by Type of Arrest 
Policy - Intimate Victims 
Offense 
Characteristics 
Discretionary 
(n = 13,059) 
Preferred 
(n = 30,954) 
% Non-
cooperation 
Odds 
Ratio 
% Non-
cooperation
Odds 
Ratio 
% Non-
cooperation 
Odds 
Ratio 
Number of 
offenders 
  
1.372***
  
1.295** 
  
1.267***
One (0) 16.8  8.3  12.1  
More than one 
(1) 
20.0  9.3  10.6  
Number of 
victims 
  
0.756** 
  
0.867 ns
  
0.579***
One (0) 17.1  8.4  12.4  
More than one 
(1) 
17.6  8.4  9.4  
Location of 
incident 
  
0.935 ns
  
1.083 ns
  
1.239***
Residence (0) 17.4  8.3  11.3  
Nonresidence 
(1) 
9.0  13.9  
Most serious 
weapon 
  
0.643***
   
1.214***
Personal (0) 17.8  9.0  11.7  
Non-Personnel 
(1) 
 
11.8 
  
5.1 
  
13.2 
 
Offender age  0.756 ns  1.002 ns  0.781* 
Under age 18 
(0) 
21.1  9.1  16.1  
Adult (1) 17.1  8.4 
1.227 ns
Mandatory 
(n = 42,220) 
 
16.5  
 
0.576***
 11.8  
Offender sex  1.125 ns   1.394** 
Male (0) 16.6  8.5  12.0  
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 Female (1) 19.4  8.1  11.5  
Victim 
injured? 
 
 0.516***  0.422***
No (0) 24.4  11.4  16.7  
Yes (1) 10.9  6.1  7.9  
Victim sex  0.936 ns  1.282 ns  1.419** 
Male (0) 19.2  7.8  11.1  
Female (1) 16.6  8.5  12.1  
Victim age  1.387**  1.111 ns  0.954 ns
Under age 18 
(0) 
14.1  8.9  13.7  
Adult (1) 17.4  8.4  11.8  
Sexual 
Assault?? 
 
0.800 ns  1.388*  1.133 ns
No (0) 17.2  8.3  11.8  
Yes (1) 15.4  13.2  17.4  
Number of 
offenses 
  
0.705***
  
1.006 ns
  
0.714***
One (0) 17.4  8.4  12.1  
More than one 
(1) 
14.2  8.7  9.2  
       
* p ≤ 0.05       
** p ≤ 0.01       
*** p ≤ 0.001       
ns = not significant      
0.370***
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 7.0  IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This dissertation research focused on how incident characteristics of domestic violence incidents 
cleared using exceptional means due to the unwillingness of the victim to cooperate with police 
predicted the likelihood of victim noncooperation in such incidents in general, as well as when 
controlling for each general type of domestic assault arrest policy (mandatory, preferred, 
discretionary).   
Drawing from the domestic violence literature both from the family and feminist 
perspectives and a retaliation theoretical framework (Sherman 1992), the analyses were 
structured on the premise that certain incident characteristics substantially affect the likelihood 
that a victim would refuse to cooperate with police in incidents involving domestic violence and 
that these would differ by victim's relationship to the offender (family vs. intimate) before as 
well as after controlling for the type of overarching domestic violence arrest policy.   
The clearest and most far-reaching finding of this study was that the victim's relationship 
to the offender played a central role in determining the likelihood of victim non-cooperation with 
police in incidents of domestic violence.  Regardless of the overarching arrest policy, the odds of 
a victim not cooperating with police increased significantly if the victim was an intimate partner 
as opposed to a family member.  Additionally this study demonstrated that the odds of an 
intimate victim not cooperating with police increased with the restrictiveness of the arrest policy.  
Regardless of arrest policy, among intimate victims the absence of injury, an indicator of simple 
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 assault, was significantly correlated with the likelihood that a victim would not cooperate with 
police.   
In general, regardless of arrest policy, factors associated with victim vulnerability, such 
as the victim being a juvenile or female were not significantly correlated with the likelihood of 
victim noncooperation.  In fact, in contrast to their intimate counterparts, among family victims, 
the victim being male significantly increased the odds of noncooperation, regardless of the arrest 
policy. 
Also unlike intimate victims, under all three types of arrest policies for family victims the 
odds of victim noncooperation were significantly increased when the victim was an adult rather 
than a juvenile.  Among intimate victims, offender age was only significantly correlated with the 
odds of victim noncooperation for the mandatory arrest policy where they were 28.0% higher if 
the offender was under the age of 18. 
When considering factors associated with the seriousness of the incident, the results were 
mixed.  For both types of victims, no injury to the victim was significantly correlated with an 
increased likelihood of victim noncooperation; this was the case for all types of arrest policy.  
For both types of victims, the presence of a weapon was only significantly correlated with 
increased odds of victim noncooperation for the mandatory arrest policy group.   
7.1 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As stated in Chapter 1, for various reasons the interests of victims of domestic violence 
may be in direct contrast to the interests of the criminal justice system.  For the victim, making 
sense of the situation involves understanding many different and interdependent factors that must 
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 be integrated with the specifics and timing of the circumstances surrounding the incident (Weick 
1995).  Furthermore, applying Argyris and Schon‘s (1996) theories of action, the victim’s 
espoused belief, that the police arresting the perpetrator is in the interest of protecting that 
victim, may not be reflected in the victim’s behavior, refusing to cooperate with police in the 
arrest of their perpetrator. The espoused dimension corresponds to the sensemaking process, 
while the theory in use dimension corresponds to the decision-making process. When 
considering that a large part of the complexity involved with the victim's decision making 
environment is the intimate relationship between the victim and the perpetrator, this concept is 
especially important.  While all victims of domestic violence face a dynamic situation that seems 
unpredictable, uncontrollable and that may present a threat to their safety, it appears that the 
decisionmaking process is different for intimate victims compared with family victims.  
Additionally, while all victims of domestic violence engage in making sense of the situation 
from his/her point of view, it seems that decisions about what actions to take in the interest of 
both present and future personal safety differ for intimate victims compared with family victims.   
This study found that there is a difference between family victims and intimate victims in 
their decisions as to whether or not to cooperate with police (sign a complaint against their 
perpetrator) in incidents of domestic violence - intimate victims were more likely than family 
victims not to cooperate with police in the arrest of their perpetrator.   
It appears that the public policy guiding the arrest protocol of law enforcement plays a 
part in the victim's decisionmaking in incidents of domestic violence.  This study found that 
intimate victims were not only more likely than their family victim counterparts not to cooperate 
with police in the arrest of their assailant, but also that the more restrictive the arrest policy, the 
higher the odds of intimate victims being unwilling to cooperate.  In other words, the less agency 
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 the victim possessed legally in the arrest decision, the higher the odds that they would be 
unwilling to cooperate with police suggesting that intimate victims were more inclined to find an 
alternative way to take control of their situation other than having the perpetrator arrested.   
This study also found that there appears to be a difference between male intimate victims 
and male family victims in how they make sense of their situations and the decisions that they 
make with regard to cooperating with police.  Among family victims, the odds of a victim not 
cooperating with police was significantly higher for male victims regardless of the arrest policy.  
This was not the case among intimate victims where the only significant correlation with victim 
sex was for the mandatory arrest policy group where the odds were 41.9% higher for female 
victims. 
7.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The policy implications are particularly interesting when we consider the findings that 
intimate victims were more likely than family victims not to cooperate with police in the arrest of 
their perpetrator within the context of the legal implications of language as discussed in section 
2.4.  Specifically, the concept of separate realms being imbedded in the law and doctrines 
concerning the state’s relationship to the family.  As previously discussed, the family as a social 
unit has been constructed both socially and historically.  When addressing domestic violence we 
must consider the historical public/private because it can be used to define the state’s 
interventions into the private realm (Marshall, 1997).  We must also consider the differences 
between domestic violence assaults as opposed to other types of assaults in light of the 
interdependence of the civil code definitions of the relationship between the victim and the 
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 offender and the criminal code defining arrest protocol.  In these types of incidents, a change in 
the civil code can affect how the criminal code is enforced in incidents of domestic violence.   
The findings may have serious implications when we consider the current trend in using 
family values as a platform to promote legislative changes with the following three pieces of 
information simultaneously; 
• the definition of simple assault, 
• the changes implemented in arrest practices, specifically the application of common law 
rule, and 
• the fact that criminal laws regarding domestic violence arrest generally rely on the 
definition of domestic relationship that is used in the states' civil law codes. 
 
A simple assault incident is defined as having no injury or weapon involved and is 
typically characterized as a misdemeanor.  In essence, the change in the common rule involves 
the exception made for cases involving domestic violence that allows a police officer to make an 
arrest for incidents involving a misdemeanor when it did not happen in the officer's presence (a 
warrantless arrest).  The definition of domestic violence involves both the offense and the 
offender (what and who); while a state's penal code typically specifies the offenses that are 
considered to be domestic violence, the states' civil law codes generally specify the definition of a 
domestic relationship. 
In this sample, victims who were intimates comprised more than one-third of the 
incidents contained that were classified as domestic assault incidents.  The largest proportion of 
incidents involving domestic assault against intimates involved simple assault.  Females made up 
the majority of the victims of all intimate domestic violence incidents and 80% of the intimate 
victims of domestic simple assault in this sample were female.  In this sample, among incidents 
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 involving "intimates", nearly three quarters involved a boyfriend assaulting a girlfriend. (Table 
35). 
Table 35    Domestic Assaults by Type of Incident and Victim Type 
Victims (%) 
Incident Type 
Family (n = 146,830) Intimate (n = 86,233) 
Offender Victim   Offender Victim   
Husband  Wife 38.78% Ex-husband  Ex-wife 4.73% 
Wife  Husband 10.27% Ex-wife Ex-husband 1.53% 
Parent  Child  12.99% Boyfriend Girlfriend 72.38% 
Child Parent 14.66% Girlfriend Boyfriend 17.79% 
Sibling Female victim 6.28% 
Boyfriend/girlfrien
d 
Partner's 
child  1.92% 
Sibling Male victim 5.22% Homosexual partners 1.6% 
Family 
member 
Grandparent/grand
child 1.24%    
Family 
member In-law 2.06%    
Family 
member 
Other family 
member 8.51%   
Detail may not add up to 100% due to rounding 
7.2.1 Defense of Marriage Act 
Since the passage of the federal law commonly known as the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), some states have approved anti-same-sex marriage constitutional amendments.  The 
language in these amendments may be (and has been) used to argue that applying domestic 
violence laws to couples that are not in a civil relationship (legally married) are unconstitutional.  
This could have significant implications for a substantial proportion of victims of domestic 
violence, specifically females.  The language used in many of these amendments provides wide 
discretion in interpreting their meanings.  For example, Michigan's language, "To secure and 
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union 
of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or 
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 similar union for any purpose."1 prohibits legal recognition of relationships that constitute a 
similar union, while the Utah language prohibits legal recognition of relationships that constitute 
domestic status or union.  In Kentucky the language reads, "Only a marriage between one man 
and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical 
or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized."  denying legal status to relationships that are identical or substantially similar to that 
of marriage.2  In North Dakota, "Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a 
woman. No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or 
given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect".3  In Arkansas the language prohibits 
legal status to relationships identical or substantially similar to marital status.  Specifically,  
Section 1. Marriage. 
Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman. 
 
Section 2. Marital status. 
Legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to 
marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the 
legislature may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a 
man and a woman. 
 
Section 3. Capacity, rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities. 
 
                                                
The legislature has the power to determine the capacity of persons to marry, 
subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, privileges, and 
immunities of marriage.  4 
Other states with marriage amendments include Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Texas, and Virginia.  There are also states in which similar amendments are being 
 
1Michigan Constitution Article 1, § 25, (approved Nov. 2, 2004, Eff. Dec. 18, 2004) 
2 Approved by the electorate on November 2, 2004:An Act proposing an amendment of the Constitution of 
Kentucky by creating a Section 233A relating to marriage 
3 Approved by the electorate on November 2, 2004 
4 Arkansas Const. Amendment 83 (approved by the electorate on November 2, 2004) 
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 considered.  This list of states is not intended to be exhaustive but rather to highlight a trend 
among states in amending their state constitutions in order to define marriage.   
7.2.1.1 The Ohio Example 
Some states have interpreted their constitutional amendments to refuse more than 
marriage to same-sex couples.  One example is the state of Ohio, whose constitutional 
amendment states  
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in 
or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of 
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage.5 
Furthermore, an Ohio statute states, 
The recognition or extension by the state of the specific statutory benefits 
of a legal marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or 
different sexes is against the strong public policy of this state. Any public act, 
record, or judicial proceeding of this state, as defined in section 9.82 of the 
Revised Code, that extends the specific statutory benefits of legal marriage to 
nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or different sexes is 
void ab initio. Nothing in division (C)(3) of this section shall be construed to do 
either of the following: 
(a) Prohibit the extension of specific benefits otherwise enjoyed by all 
persons, married or unmarried, to nonmarital relationships between 
persons of the same sex or different sexes, including the extension of 
                                                 
5 Ohio Const. Art. XV, sec. 11 (approved by the electorate on November 2, 2004) 
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 benefits conferred by any statute that is not expressly limited to married 
persons, which includes but is not limited to benefits available under 
Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code; 
(b) Affect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid 
under the laws of this state. 
(4) Any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other state, 
country, or other jurisdiction outside this state that extends the specific 
benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital relationships between persons of 
the same sex or different sexes shall be considered and treated in all 
respects as having no legal force or effect in this state and shall not be 
recognized by this state.6 
The Ohio amendment essentially prohibits legal recognition of relationships that intend to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage; while the statute defines 
persons who may marry; makes same sex marriages against public policy; and excludes 
recognition or extension of specific statutory benefits of legal marriage to nonmarital 
relationships.   
                                                
The language in the Ohio constitutional amendment, which was ratified in December 
2004, has already been used to make the case that domestic violence laws do not apply to 
opposite-sex unmarried couples by arguing that the amendment prohibits the state from creating 
or recognizing any "legal status" for unmarried individuals that imitates marriage.  However, 
there is disagreement even among courts within the state as to whether or not the domestic 
violence laws apply to these individuals.  Five state appellate courts that have considered 
challenges to the domestic violence law have found it constitutional despite the marriage 
amendment.  Two district appellate courts have ruled the domestic violence statute 
unconstitutional as a result of the amendment.7 
 
6 Ohio Revised Code section 3101.01 
7 http://suealtmeyer.typepad.com/cleveland_law_library_web/domestic_relations/index.html 
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 For Ohio in the 2003 NIBRS data, 26.3% of the victims in simple assault incidents 
involving domestic violence were intimates.  Of the simple assault incidents involving victims 
who were intimates, 70.1% (n = 2,761) resulted in arrest compared to 55,8% (n = 5,067) of the 
simple assault incidents involving victims defined as acquaintances.  Although Ohio was one of 
the states that was incomplete in reporting, these numbers represented a consensus for the 
reporting agencies contained in the file.  The difference in the proportions of the numbers of 
simple assault incidents involving these two types of victims is indicative of law enforcement’s 
implementation of mandatory arrest policies relevant to the exception made for cases involving 
domestic violence that allow a police officer to make an arrest for incidents involving a 
misdemeanor. 
7.2.2 Potential for Unintended Consequences 
If, in fact, a growing trend develops where language in state constitutional amendments is 
interpreted to deny legal recognition of a relationship as a domestic relationship could serve to 
exclude unmarried partners from the legal jurisdiction of domestic violence protections.  When 
we put this all together, the initial end result could be a substantial number of victims, those 
defined in this study as "intimate partners", losing domestic violence protections and possibly 
motivating an already reluctant group of victims to become even more reluctant to cooperate 
with police or even to report the incident at all. 
When changes in civil code language open the door to litigation concerning the legal 
status of unmarried couples with regard to the existing domestic violence statutes, it may have 
created a great deal of confusion for both victims and law enforcement.  If there is confusion as 
to whether or not the victim is eligible for the protections provided by the domestic violence 
statutes, the victims may reason that the costs of the arrest process outweigh the potential benefit 
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 of procuring consequences for their assailant's behavior, rendering these victims invisible to the 
“system”.  Thus, the changes in civil code language will affect the victim’s decision making 
process, change the arrest decisions of police, and perhaps serve to hide the occurrence of 
domestic violence while making it appear that the problem is lessening. 
On the whole, this study found that among domestic assault incidents cleared by using 
the exceptional means, "Victim refused to cooperate", victims who were acquaintances of their 
offender were the most likely not to cooperate, possibly a reflection of their not having the 
benefits of the legal domestic violence protections provided to "family" and "intimate" victims.  
Changes in the civil code defining who is eligible for these protections would essentially place 
many victims who are currently included in the legal definition of “domestic” partner into the 
acquaintance category.  The data used in this study data provide an empirical picture of the 
numbers and proportions of victims that could be affected by such a change in legal status that 
would exclude them from the jurisdiction of domestic violence laws and the protections these 
laws provide.   
Included in these protections are warrantless arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence 
cases subject to a police officer’s determination that domestic violence may have occurred.  This 
exception, by definition, involves incidents that involve simple assault.  While "intimates" were 
more likely than "family" victims to not cooperate with police, acquaintances appeared to be the 
most reluctant group of simple assault victims, having the highest proportion of victims refusing 
to cooperate with police (Table 6).  If intimate victims, the highest proportion of which are 
female, were not under the statutory jurisdiction of domestic violence laws, then they would no 
longer be considered victims of domestic assault, but merely an assault victim that knew their 
offender.  This would essentially place them in the acquaintance group.  No matter what kind of 
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 arrest policy existed in any particular state, a change in the definition of legal status in the civil 
code could exclude intimates from the domestic violence arrest policy provided by the 
exceptional protection of “common rule” for domestic incidents of domestic violence – that is, 
an arrest without a warrant when the incident involves a misdemeanor assault.   
Denial of domestic violence protections other than those provided by arrest policies also 
has the potential to contribute to a victim's reluctance to cooperate with police in an incident 
involving aggravated assault, specifically with regard to victims in incidents that involve injury 
or a weapon.  As discussed earlier, legislation in various states (Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West 
Virginia) require arrest without a warrant if the victim has an order of protection on file (Table 
3).  Changing the definition of the legal status of intimate victims could prevent these victims 
from obtaining an order of protection.  So, in addition to the loss of benefit from the aggressive 
arrest policies that can be applied in cases of domestic assault, "intimate" victims might also 
legislatively excluded from a wide range of domestic violence protections that may be mandated 
by the state's laws regarding domestic violence policy including obtaining a protection order and 
having an existing order of protection enforced.  Knowing that these protective options would 
not be available to them could have an impact on these victims' decisions as to whether or not to 
cooperate with police in an incident involving an assault and perhaps whether or not to report the 
incident.  
As in the case of aggravated assault, denial of domestic violence protections other than 
those provided by arrest policies also have the potential to contribute to a victim's reluctance to 
cooperate with police in an incident involving sexual assault.  Some of these protections may 
include access to protective orders, temporary custody of children, access to temporary housing, 
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 and warrantless arrest for a violation of a protective order.  In some states, when law 
enforcement responds to domestic violence, arrangements are made for transportation to a safe 
place, requests are made for an emergency protective order for the victim, and victim services 
referral information is provided.  When the legal status for relationships of unmarried persons is 
in question due to legislative language, the victims defined as "intimate" in this study could 
potentially lose the legal protection that they once had from the laws created to provide safety for 
them and their children.   
All of the above may produce another unintended side effect - one that involves family 
victims.  If a sizeable proportion of domestic violence victims suddenly become excluded from 
eligibility for the protections provided by domestic violence legislation, service providers may 
see a decrease in volume of clients referred for their services.  This could translate into a decline 
in need for their services, not because victims do not exist, but because they are being legally 
excluded from eligibility.  Fewer services needed might then translate into less funding or 
elimination altogether.  Unfortunately, this situation could be fiscally attractive to decision 
makers looking for areas to trim budgets.  Should the number of available support services 
decrease, it would mean that less protection is available for family victims as well.  While family 
victims would continue to realize the benefits of aggressive arrest policies (arrest without a 
warrant in misdemeanor incidents) and civil orders of protection, the loss of available support 
services could very well render family victims unwilling to participate in the arrest process, 
creating a ripple effect and unraveling some of the progress that has been made for victims of 
domestic assault.   
Additionally, the number of arrests is typically used to report crime statistics on various 
categories of criminal behavior that come to the attention of law enforcement; clearance by 
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 exceptional means is typically not reported in detail and therefore an increase in the number of 
unwilling victims would not be immediately apparent in statistical reports such as Crime in the 
United States series.  It may appear that the number of incidents of domestic violence are 
decreasing, when in reality there is an increase in the reluctance of intimate victims to cooperate 
with police or even to report the incident at all.   
If we accept the premise that domestic violence is already underreported (Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 2003) and we determine that proportion of the domestic violence victims known to 
police for the reporting agencies is visibly less after the change in language, it could be that 
changes in the constitution and the legal exclusion of these victims from the protection of 
domestic violence legislation in a state is affecting how many of these incidents actually come to 
the attention of law enforcement. 
7.3 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Since these data (NIBRS 2003) were collected before Ohio's constitution was amended in 2004, 
we have the occurrence of a situation that could be used as a natural experiment.  It will possible 
to examine future NIBRS data from the same set of reporting Ohio agencies contained in the 
2003 data to compare the proportions of victims involving domestic violence coming to the 
attention of law enforcement as well as the proportions of these victims that refuse to cooperate 
with police in these incidents.  While the NIBRS sample may not be representative for any 
meaningful between-state comparisons, relative patterns of proportional differences may be 
instructive as to how the new language did or did not affect the relative volume of reporting 
these incidents by victim type.  
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 The analyses used in this dissertation could be replicated to investigate changes in the 
odds of victim noncooperation in the 2003 NIBRS data versus NIBRS data collected in years 
subsequent to the enactment of the constitutional amendment using the clearance year as an 
additional incident characteristic.  This analysis could be done to investigate whether or not 
victim noncooperation became more likely and to examine how the predictors of noncooperation 
among victims may have changed following the passage of the marriage amendment and the 
ensuing litigation.   
These data could be used at the local level to examine the same changes as mentioned 
above when a support service for domestic violence victims is either added or removed from a 
locale.  The results of such analyses should be disseminated to all stakeholder organizations 
including, but not limited to, law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and service providers to 
enhance their understanding of how such changes affect victim decision-making in reporting 
incidents of domestic violence as well as cooperating with police when the incident comes to the 
attention of law enforcement. 
When we examine the descriptive statistics, it appears that victims of sexual assaults are 
very different from aggravated and simple assaults (Table 5).  The proportions of sexual assaults 
cleared by "prosecution declined" among all types of victims is much higher than those for 
victims of both simple and aggravated assaults, and the proportions cleared by arrest are lower 
suggesting that these types of incidents are handled differently by the criminal justice system.  
These data could be used to examine whether certain extralegal factors in incidents of sexual 
assault predict the likelihood of the prosecution being declined and whether the type of 
prosecution policy has any influence on those factors. 
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 Particularly interesting was the finding that males were significantly more likely not to 
cooperate with police among family victims but not among intimate victims.  There is some 
attention paid to male victims in general being reluctant to report a domestic assault; most of the 
work has focused on this reluctance in the context of a differentiated police response to male 
victims (Buzawa & Buzawa, 2003).  However, this study found a difference between male 
family victims and male intimate victims cooperating with police.  Additionally, this study 
focused on victims' responses to police in terms of whether or not they cooperate in the arrest of 
their assailant not in terms of police responses to victims and whether or not an arrest was made.  
Future research is certainly warranted to investigate this finding. 
These data have a great amount of potential to answer many previously unanswered 
questions and they are collected on a routine basis.  More research is warranted.  Hopefully this 
study has highlighted the utility of these data.  They are publicly available and should not be 
limited to producing aggregated arrest statistics. 
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 APPENDIX A 
About the National Incident Based Reporting System 
(NIBRS) 
The National Incident-Based Crime Reporting System (NIBRS) is a standardized 
Incident-Based Reporting (IBR) system. Law enforcement agencies that adopt NIBRS are able to 
enhance the system to accommodate their own local reporting requirements while meeting the 
reporting standards of NIBRS. The core elements of NIBRS are standardized across states and 
localities making large data sets available for analysis. 
Incident-based reporting of criminal offenses or incidents is a data collection strategy that 
is distinctly different from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) Program. The UCR program is a summary-based reporting program that local law 
enforcement agencies use to provide a monthly aggregated count of offenses and arrests for 
certain offense categories to their state UCR systems.  The state systems, in turn, report these 
totals to the FBI.    
In the newer IBR systems, law enforcement agencies maintain a database of the details of 
criminal incidents that are reported to them and report these details to their state UCR programs.  
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 Law enforcement agencies using IBR are able to fulfill the summary reporting requirements of 
the FBI's UCR program by aggregating selected incident level data. 
Users of NIBRS data must decide what the unit of analysis will be for a particular 
analysis to avoid obtaining flawed results by incorrectly specifying the unit of analysis.  NIBRS 
contains data on many aspects of crime incidents, such as offenses, victims, offenders, and 
arrestees, that can be examined as different units of analysis.  While this is a major benefit of the 
new reporting system, it is also a major complexity.  The unit of analysis may correspond to any 
of the individual segment levels (offenses, property, victims, offenders, or arrestees), or it may 
be the crime incident itself.  
NIBRS categorizes incident reports into Group “A” and Group “B” offenses.  Because of 
the different natures of Group A and B offenses, fewer details are required for Group B Incident 
Reports.  However, NIBRS collects extensive data on Group A offenses, which include the 
offenses being examined in this study (sexual assault, simple assault, and aggravated assault).  
Specific definitions of each offense category are included in the NIBRS codebook.  
The NIBRS data file for Group "A" Incident Reports is a hierarchical file, that is, it is 
structured in levels.  Manipulation of the file requires an understanding of the levels and how 
linkages can be followed.   It is important to select the appropriate unit of analysis for research 
questions. 
Each originating law enforcement agency submits multiple Group "A" Offense Incident 
Reports.  Each report consists of multiple data segments.  Data segments may consist of multiple 
records and each of these records comprises several data elements.  Most of the data elements 
have single values, but there are some that have multiple valid values.  Some of the data 
elements are required, but others are not. 
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 A segment in NIBRS is a set of related data elements that describe an aspect of a reported 
crime incident.  A complete Group "A" Offense Incident Report involves six data segments: 
administrative, offense, property, victim, offender, and arrestee.  Each Group "A" Offense 
Incident Report includes the administrative, offense, victim, and offender data segments at the 
time the report was submitted.  In NIBRS, incidents can be cleared by exceptional means which 
means that some element beyond law enforcement control prevents a physical arrest.  
Exceptional clearances can be made and are reported under one of the following five 
circumstances: 
1) Death of the Offender  
2) Prosecution Denied  
3) Extradition Denied  
4) Victim Refused to Cooperate  
5) Juvenile/No Custody. 
A single Group "A" Offense Incident Report consists of at least four and no more than six 
data segments, and may have multiple records in all of the segments except the administrative 
data segment. 
The offense data segment can contain up to 10 types of offenses, each of which will 
trigger a separate offense segment record.  The FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting hierarchy rule 
for selecting only the most serious offense in an incident for summary reporting is not used in 
NIBRS.  Therefore, in multiple crime incidents all offenses (up to a maximum of the 10 most 
serious) are reported.  Each type of offense is recorded once per incident regardless of the 
number of counts or perpetrators. 
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 The victim data segment in a Group "A" Offense Incident Report can contain up to 999 
records.  Each record contains detailed information pertinent to each victim.  Similarly, the 
offender segment can contain up to 99 unique offender records and the arrestee segment can 
have up to 99 unique arrestee records.   
In one Group "A" Offense Incident Report, the originating law enforcement agency 
number (ORI) and the incident number link each data segment and its records to the other data 
segments and records of that incident report.  Each record in each data segment contains the ORI 
number and the incident number so that the records can be linked at both the segment level and 
the incident report level. 
In the victim segment, there is a direct link between the victim and the offense(s) in each 
victim record.  Each victim is assigned a unique sequential number and each offense committed 
against that victim is identified by the offense code. There is also a direct link between the victim 
and the offender(s) in the victim segment.  In a victim record, the offender sequence numbers are 
listed for each offender who offended that victim.  For each victim/offender pairing, the 
relationship of the victim to the offender is captured in the victim segment. 
There are some assumed links between data segments. For example, all offenders are 
considered to be responsible for all offenses in the incident. All offenses in an incident are 
assumed to have been committed on the same date, at the same time, and in the same location. 
An arrest clears an incident.  Therefore, there is not a one-to-one relationship between arrests and 
offenses. 
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 APPENDIX B 
NIBRS STATUS REPORT (FROM THE FBI) 
(October 2004)  
Date NIBRS 
Testing Started
Based on 2003 
submissions  
Based on 2003 
submissions 
  
Number of 
NIBRS 
Agencies 
Percent of 
State 
Population 
Represented 
Percent of State 
Crime Reported
through NIBRS
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Idaho 
Iowa 
Kansas 
 
Kentucky1 
Louisiana 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
Virginia 
West Virginia
Wisconsin2 
Metro Transit Police 
Department (D. C.) 
12/94
5/91
12/96
6/91
12/90
5/91
3/95
6/97
5/95
8/90
2/94
5/91
9/96
1/89
12/92
11/89
7/95
11/93
7/92
5/90
10/92
10/92
7/94
8/92
7/01
 
145
204
68
68
141
248
389
21
13
243
772
84
186
109
273
466
123
565
76
86
72
431
487
1
 
54%
60%
46%
100%
100%
100%
88%
5%
5%
64%
86%
31%
69%
87%
52%
100%
56%
100%
12%
78%
92%
100%
100%
0%
 
21%
47%
29%
100%
100%
100%
67%
6%
3%
47%
72%
17%
54%
76%
29%
100%
33%
100%
7%
75%
90%
100%
100%
0%
 
20% OF US POPULATION COVERED BY NIBRS REPORTING 
16% OF CRIME REPORTED VIA NIBRS 
31% OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES REPORTING NIBRS 
 1 Kentucky  is not NIBRS-certified, but agency data are individually accepted by the FBI.
2 Wisconsin was certified in August 1997. Have not received production data from them to date. 
Note: Counts are based on UCR participating agencies and their corresponding populations. 
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